GOSTIN

06/10/98 10:07 AM

PIERCING THE VEIL OF SECRECY IN HIV/AIDS AND
OTHER SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES:
THEORIES OF PRIVACY AND DISCLOSURE IN PARTNER NOTIFICATION
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN*
JAMES G. HODGE, JR.**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................10
II. The Three Meanings of Partner Notification: From Contact Tracing to
the Duties to Disclose and Warn ......................................................................14
A. Contact Tracing ..........................................................................................16
1. An Historical Perspective ...................................................................16
a) Development of Contact Tracing with a Focus on Syphilis .....16
i)
Reglementation ..............................................................17
ii)
The Progressive Era.......................................................19
iii)
The Influence of Thomas Parran, Surgeon
General ............................................................................21
b) Development of Contact Tracing with a Focus on
HIV/AIDS ......................................................................................23
2. The Contemporary Practice of Contact Tracing ..............................25
Table A - Statutory Authorization for Contact Tracing ............................................28
B. Duty of Infected Persons to Disclose .......................................................34

* J.D., LL.D. (Hon.). The author is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University and a Professor of Law and Public Health at the Johns Hopkins University. He is the Co-Director, Georgetown/Johns Hopkins Program on Law and Public Health and is a member of the CDC Advisory
Committee on HIV and STD Prevention. The views in this paper do not necessarily conform with
those of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
** J.D., LL.M. The author is an Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
He is also a Fellow in the Greenwall Fellowship Program in Bioethics and Health Policy (supported
by the Greenwall Foundation and jointly administered by Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins University).
The authors are grateful to Kathleen Maguire, R.N., J.D. (Georgetown/Johns Hopkins Program on
Law and Public Health), Kathleen J. Lester, J.D./M.P.H. Candidate (Georgetown/Johns Hopkins
Program on Law and Public Health), Ruqaiijah Yearby, J.D./M.P.H. Candidate (Georgetown/Johns
Hopkins Program on Law and Public Health), Thaddeus Pope, J.D./Ph.D. Candidate (Georgetown
University), Jennifer Phelps, J.D. Candidate (Georgetown University Law Center), Robert Vermylen,
J.D. Candidate (Georgetown University Law Center), and Lisa G. Rothman, J.D. Candidate
(Georgetown University Law Center), with special appreciation for the research of Mark Lowry,
M.D., J.D. Candidate (Georgetown University Law Center), and Bill Tarantino, J.D. Candidate
(Georgetown University Law Center). Special thanks to Karen Summerhill, J.D., Research Librarian,
Jason Oyler, J.D. Candidate (Georgetown University Law Center), and Darren Hultman, J.D. Candidate (Georgetown University Law Center) of the Edward Bennett Williams Law Library Faculty
Services for their research assistance.

9

GOSTIN

06/10/98 10:07 AM

10 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

Volume 5:9 1998

C.

Duty of Health Care Workers to Warn....................................................41
1. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California .........................41
2. Privilege of Health Care Workers......................................................44
Table B - Statutory Duty or Privilege to Warn ...........................................................47
III. An “Interest-Analysis of Partner Notification”..............................................51
A. Governmental Interests in Contact Tracing............................................52
B. Interests of Infected Individuals...............................................................55
1. Privacy Rights Protections ..................................................................55
2. Anti-Discrimination Protections ........................................................59
IV. Ethical Analysis Behind Partner Notification.................................................61
A. Norms and Consequences.........................................................................61
1. Privacy...................................................................................................62
2. “Right to Know”...................................................................................65
3. Normative Analysis.............................................................................66
4. Consequentialist Analysis...................................................................67
B. Feminist Theories and Sexual Ethics .......................................................68
V. Efficacy of Partner Notification ........................................................................72
A. Public Health Efficacy: Empirical Analyses............................................72
B. Economic Perspectives: Cost-Effectiveness and Incentives for
Behavior Change ........................................................................................78
VI. Alternative Models for Partner Notification ..................................................81
A. Partner Notification as Part of Public Health Surveillance and
Prevention Strategies .................................................................................82
B. Utility of Alternative Approaches to Partner Notification ...................85
VII. Conclusion...........................................................................................................87
I. INTRODUCTION
At least since their appearance in Western Europe in the late fifteenth cen1
tury, sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs), or “venereal diseases” as they were
2
once called, have been characterized by a remarkable paradox. Despite their
endemic nature in Europe and North America, STDs were, and still are, a “secret
3
malady.” Persons have endeavored to keep their sexually-transmitted infections hidden from the social world—from their sexual partners, families, and
communities. At the same time, prevailing social mores have kept STDs from

1. Historians have postulated that sexually transmitted diseases, principally syphilis and gonorrhea, were transported from the New World to Europe in the late fifteenth century. See Susan P.
Connor, The Pox in Eighteenth-Century France, in THE SECRET MALADY: VENEREAL DISEASE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN AND FRANCE 15, 17 (Linda E. Merians ed., 1996); see also infra Part
II.A.1.a (discussing the development of contact tracing in response to syphilis).
2. The term “venereal” disease derives from Roman mythology and pertains to Venus, the
goddess of sexual love and physical beauty. The Middle English venerealle, and the Latin venereus
refer to sexual intercourse and the genitalia. See THEODOR ROSEBURY, MICROBES AND MORALS: THE
STRANGE STORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE 6 (1971).
3. Connor, supra note 1, at 1; see also Deborah L. Shelton, STDs: Sex Turns Dangerous, AM. MED.
NEWS, Feb. 3, 1997, at 12 (noting that the epidemic nature of STDs is reflected in the United States,
which has the world’s highest rates of STDs, with rates of infection at ten to fifteen times that of
other industrialized nations).
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the public consciousness and consequently have prevented STDs from receiving
public action and effective intervention.
Secrecy nurtures disease because it provides an environment conducive to
the spread of infection. Where the social construction of sexuality and disease
4
condones secrecy, sex partners are unaware of the risks, and public health
authorities cannot track the epidemic in order to positively intervene. Not surprisingly, one of the earliest recorded public health strategies for STD prevention
was to pierce the veil of secrecy surrounding these hidden diseases by notifying
5
sexual partners (“contacts”) of infected patients (“index” cases). Sexual “contact
tracing” was supported by the moral theory that sexual partners could take pre6
cautions and seek medical treatment if the risk of infection was disclosed. Once
the risks of infection were identified, the incidence of STD infection would decline suggestively as infected persons reduced behaviors that placed them at risk
7
for disease.
Sexual contact tracing probably was practiced years before it became a for8
9
mal means of STD control. Originating from the reglementation of European
prostitutes, the earliest reference to contact tracing in contagious disease law
10
dates to the mid-nineteenth century in Europe and to the 1930s in the United
11
States. Buttressed by federal financial support and a decade of state STD laws,
“contact epidemiology” became a central public health strategy in America to
12
combat the syphilis epidemic. The development of a cure for the disease, peni13
cillin, in the early 1940s led, however, to significant reductions in the incidence

4. Women currently comprise the fastest-growing group of people with HIV/AIDS. See infra
notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
5. The history of contact tracing is closely related to the regulation of prostitution in the early
sixteenth century through the process known as reglementation. See infra Part II.A.1.a).i).
6. See COMMITTEE ON PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES, INSTITUTE OF MED., THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC: CONFRONTING SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 151-52
(Thomas R. Eng & William T. Butler eds., 1997) [hereinafter THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC].
7. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., CONTROL OF SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 47-51 (1985).
8. See Frances M. Cowan et al., The Role and Effectiveness of Partner Notification in STD Control:
A Review, 72 GENITOURINARY MED. 247, 247 (1996).
9. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
10. The Contagious Disease Acts of 1864 and 1866 adopted compulsory registration as a
method of controlling STDs; the statutes also ordered confinement for prostitutes. See Michael W.
Adler, The Terrible Peril: A Historical Perspective on the Venereal Diseases, 281 BRIT. MED. J. 206, 206
(1980).
11. The National Venereal Disease Act of 1938 adopted STD control measures proposed by the
anti-venereal disease campaigner, the former Surgeon General Thomas Parran. Dr. Parran supported screening, case finding, treatment, and contact tracing for persons with syphilis as the only
effective method of breaking the chain of disease transmission. As Parran stated in support of his
aggressive national partner notification campaign against syphilis, the once rampant STD: “In no
other respect is the [medical] practice in this country more reprehensible than in the failure of physicians, and even of public health clinics, to make diligent inquiry as to sources of infection and to use
all available methods to bring these persons under treatment.” Thomas Parran, The Eradication of
Syphilis as a Practical Public Health Objective, 97 JAMA 73, 75 (1931); see also infra Part II.A.1.a).iii)
(discussing the influence of Thomas Parran).
12. See ALLAN M. BRANDT, NO MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 150 (1985); see also infra Part II.A.1.a).iii) (discussing the use of “contact
epidemiology” in syphilis treatment).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 70-78.
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of syphilis. The effectiveness of contact tracing as a public health practice therefore largely remained unknown despite moral support for the concept.
From its widespread use during the 1930s, the notification of sexual partners (with the assistance of public health authorities) remained an accepted part
14
of the law and practice of STD control throughout this century. This concept of
tracking sexual contacts would later be called “partner notification.” Recently,
the concept of partner notification has expanded to formally include a range of
services such as counseling and medical treatment, in addition to notification.
Consequently, a preferred terminology has evolved—”partner notification sup15
port services” (PNSS).
In instances where contact tracing did not traditionally apply, legal reform,
driven by moral justifications and based on theories of tort law, imposed duties
on certain persons, generally infected persons and health care workers (HCWs),
to notify others of the risk of contracting an STD. Often known collectively as
the “duty to warn,” these judicially-imposed, common law obligations subse16
quently have been codified by many state legislatures. The affirmative “duty to
warn” is comprised of two obligations based on distinct legal foundations: (1)
the duty of infected persons to disclose to partners the risk of exposure; and (2)
the duty of health care professionals to warn partners of harm resulting from exposure to infected patients.
The social construction of disease, particularly STDs, perceptively changed
17
during the HIV/AIDS epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s. Infected persons (and,
to a certain extent, public health authorities) questioned the theories of disclosure and protection that justified partner notification. During the AIDS epidemic, secrecy and individual privacy reemerged as the prevailing social construct of public health, much as it was in the early days of the syphilis epidemic.
As Susan Sontag writes, “More than cancer, but rather like syphilis, AIDS seems
to foster ominous fantasies about a disease that is a marker of both individual
18
and social vulnerabilities.” Within this context, partner notification has been
challenged as an acceptable public health practice or legally-imposed duty, at

14. See Jon K. Andrus et al., Partner Notification: Can it Control Epidemic Syphilis?, 112 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 539, 542 (1990).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
16. See infra Part II.C. and Table B.
17. Acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is the most severe manifestation of HIV.
The spread of HIV has been documented to occur through direct exposure to contaminated blood
and bodily fluids, other than saliva. Exposure to bodily fluids may occur through unprotected sexual activity, the introduction of contaminated blood into the bloodstream through the use of contaminated syringes and needles primarily by intravenous drug users (IDUs), and through perinatal
transmission from mother to child. See ASSOCIATION OF STATE & TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS ET
AL., GUIDE TO PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE: HIV PARTNER NOTIFICATION STRATEGIES 1 (1988)
[hereinafter ASTHO]. Remote transmission of HIV also has been documented to occur through
blood transfusions and kissing. See Lawrence K. Altman, Case of H.I.V. Transmission Is First to Be
Linked to Kiss, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1997, at A14. Despite remote instances of non-sexual infections,
HIV has been classified legally as a sexually-transmitted disease since 1988. See infra note 226.
18. SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 153 (1990).
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least as it relates to a disease like HIV/AIDS, which is deeply private, socially
19
stigmatizing, and medically incurable.
In truth, partner notification, whether applied to traditional STDs or to
HIV/AIDS, is a highly complex concept that cannot be understood without careful consideration of related issues of public health, ethics, economics, and law.
Partner notification has deep roots in the historical, legal, and philosophical
heritage of America. To public health practitioners, the traditional practice of
partner notification, with its widespread, persistent, and systematic use over
time, justifies its continued implementation. Why then, it is often asked, does
society refrain from fully utilizing one of the most well-established public health
20
interventions in the HIV/AIDS epidemic? Under this perspective, failure to
pursue aggressively partner notification demonstrates how civil liberties have
trumped privacy in HIV/AIDS policy. These arguments, however, assume that
partner notification is effective and that syphilis and HIV/AIDS are truly analogous diseases.
Despite the use of partner notification in all of its forms, it has not been
systematically examined from legal, ethical, empirical, and economic perspectives. Based on this analytical examination, it is apparent that although partner
notification is well-grounded in the legal and moral traditions of America, there
exists a scarcity of empirical and economic evidence demonstrating its costeffectiveness. Consequently, alternative models are needed for STD prevention
and control that are both effective and protective of individual liberties and privacy. In particular, a model of “social network analysis” that promises to inform
those at risk of HIV through focused counseling and education may be warranted.
Part I explores the various meanings of partner notification within their
historical and legal foundations. Because partner notification has been used to
describe quite different kinds of intervention, the concept has created policy confusion. Contact tracing, the patient’s duty to disclose, and the health care professional’s duty to warn are described as a prerequisite to a more detailed ethical,
economic, and public health analysis. Part II examines the legal interests involved with partner notification, particularly contact tracing. The governmental
interests for contact tracing are discussed by framing the constitutional and
statutory justifications for contact tracing from the state and federal perspectives.
Arguments concerning an infected individual’s constitutional, statutory, and
common law interests in privacy are discussed along with anti-discrimination
protections for persons infected with STDs—particularly those infected with
HIV. These interests, while important, do not negate the power of government
to implement partner notification. Part III broadens the systematic evaluation,
exploring partner notification from normative and consequentialist perspectives.
One of the powerful reasons to support partner notification may not necessarily
be public health effectiveness, but simply an ethical claim that persons should be

See generally LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & ZITA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
PANDEMIC (1997).
20. See, e.g., Chandler Burr, The AIDS Exception: Privacy vs. Public Health, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
June 1997, at 57, 57 (arguing that partner notification, or at least contact tracing, has been deemphasized in relation to the HIV/AIDS epidemic to “accommodate civil-rights concerns”).
19.
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informed about sexual risks despite infringements on the autonomy of infected
persons. Principles of feminism suggest that women should be informed of demonstrable risks to their health and empowered to protect themselves. Part IV
evaluates the accumulated empirical data about the efficacy of partner notification, looking at how successful this intervention has been, under what circumstances it is likely to be most effective, and whether its effectiveness in a particular setting supports its efficacy as a national practice. Partner notification
also is evaluated from an economic perspective. The costs of partner notification
in comparison with other public health interventions are analyzed, as well as the
likelihood that the practice creates incentives or disincentives for avoidance of
risk behavior, promotion of healthy behavior, and access to treatment. Finally,
Part V proposes alternative models for partner notification. In conclusion, a
“social network analysis” is supported as part of a comprehensive prevention
strategy for STDs and HIV/AIDS. This alternative approach can achieve public
health objectives with less intrusion on personal liberty and privacy.
II. THE THREE MEANINGS OF PARTNER NOTIFICATION:
FROM CONTACT TRACING TO THE DUTIES TO DISCLOSE AND WARN
Partner notification is a highly complex concept. While often simplified to
denote the notification of persons who are at risk of becoming infected with a
disease, partner notification has at least three distinct, if at times overlapping,
meanings: (1) contact tracing; (2) the duty of infected persons to disclose their infection to a sexual partner; and (3) the duty of health care providers to warn of
sexual and other risks to the partners of their infected patients.
Contact tracing, whose origins can be traced to the reglementation of prostitutes in sixteenth century Europe, is characteristically a governmental responsibility undertaken by public health authorities. The health department typically
interviews an infected patient, called the “index case,” who voluntarily discloses
the names and locations of past and present sexual partners. These contacts are
then located—traced—when possible to notify them of their potential exposure
to infection. The partner is not informed of the name of the index case by health
authorities in an attempt to preserve the confidentiality of the index case. Medical treatment and personal counseling often are offered to contacts at the time of
notification. For those persons who are infected, the process is regenerated to
determine additional contacts. The principal objective of contact tracing is to reduce disease transmission by locating and containing the spread of a given STD
21
within a certain population. It seeks to break the chain of transmission by
identifying sources through which others in a given population have become infected. In addition, it should stem the tide of new infections by medically intervening to treat the disease and by counseling those infected with STDs to reduce
the risk of transmission by disclosing their infection to partners and engaging in
“protected” sexual activity (e.g., using a condom).
The second meaning of partner notification, what we term “the duty to disclose,” is derived from the legal doctrine of the “right to know.” This “right to
know” developed from the social hygiene movement of the early 1900s and

21.

See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 7.
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likely was influenced by women’s organizations and early principles of feminism. It developed under tort law that held that a person has a duty of care toward his sexual partner. This duty may entail an obligation to disclose an STD
to a sexual partner or to reasonably protect the partner from avoidable health
risks. In some instances, a health department or physician may ask a patient to
disclose the STD to his partner, a concept often referred to as “patient referral”
since the patient makes the disclosure.
The third meaning of partner notification is derived from a related legal
doctrine known as a “duty to warn.” Through conversations with an infected
patient, a physician may conclude that certain persons are at risk of contracting
the disease. Under the “duty to warn,” physicians treating a patient for a sexually transmitted disease have a duty to inform fully foreseeable third parties of
their exposure to the infection, regardless of whether the patient consented to
22
such notification or the patients identity was protected. This practice is sometimes known as “provider referral,” as the health care professional (or public
health counselor in contact tracing programs) makes the disclosure.
Similar to theories of tort law later enacted in statutory law, the duty to disclose and the duty to warn have as their principal objective the protection of unaware individuals from exposure to disease by others who know of their infectious conditions and are in control of their actions. The judicial imposition of
these duties may have had the unintended result of decreasing the transmission
of infectious disease among certain populations. The imposition of these duties
thus shared a primary goal with contact tracing: the reduction of infectious disease transmission in society. In this Part, the broad concept of partner notification is developed further by examining the theories underlying these three
meanings of partner notification.

22. See infra Part II.C.; see generally Ronald Bayer & Kathleen E. Toomey, HIV Prevention and the
Two Faces of Partner Notification, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1158 (1992) (discussing the two approaches—
duty to warn and contact tracing—to notifying sexual and/or needle sharing partners of possible
risk).
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A. Contact Tracing
1. An Historical Perspective
a) Development of Contact Tracing with a Focus on Syphilis
The historical origins of contact tracing date back to the syphilis epidemic
23
beginning at the turn of the sixteenth century in Europe. The appearance of
syphilis in Europe has been attributed to the transport of the disease from the
New World by the crew of Christopher Columbus after his 1492 expedition, al24
though this attribution has never been confirmed. The disease was spread
quickly by the dispersion of the multinational mercenary army of the French
ruler, Charles VIII, after they suffered an outbreak of what the English called
25
26
“the Great Pox” during the siege of Naples in the Italian Campaign of 1495.
Syphilis surfaced in Germany, France, and Switzerland in 1495, in Holland and
27
Greece in 1496, in the British Isles in 1497, and in Russia in 1499.
28
By 1530, syphilis was recognized as a sexually transmitted disease that
29
could be controlled by regulating the sources of infection. Early regulations focused on methods developed to control other epidemic diseases such as leprosy
30
and the plague. Syphilitics were banished from the community; other communities quarantined those infected in special hospitals created to house and treat

23. See GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 72 (1993) (“Among the new or apparently
new diseases that characterize the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the one that loomed largest
was syphilis.”). Syphilis is a chronic infectious disease most commonly acquired by sexual contact
with another infected individual. See Edmund C. Tramont, Treponema Pallidum (Syphilis), in
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2117, 2117-18 (Gerald L. Mandell et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1995). Bacterial in nature, syphilis manifests through a variety of symptoms in several stages
when untreated. See id. Initial symptoms include a relatively painless chancre (or lesions) on the
sexual organs. See id. at 2121. Symptoms progress within weeks to include a severe skin rash of the
palms and soles, oral lesions, fever, lymphadenopathy, headaches, and arthritis. See id. at 2122-23.
Without treatment, the disease slowly progresses to the cardiovascular and central nervous system.
See id. at 2118, 2125. Paralysis and mental disorders often occur as a result of the inflammation of
the central nervous system. See id. at 2124-25. Death can result after years of build-up of scar tissue
and tumor-like masses in vital bodily organs. See id. at 2121-25. The transmission of syphilis from
mother to fetus, known as congenital syphilis, can result in miscarriage and stillbirths of infants, or
permanent brain damage in surviving children who go untreated. See Susan Okie, Syphilis Cases in
U.S. Near All-Time Low, WASH. POST, May 27, 1997, at H7.
24. See WILLIAM ALLEN PUSEY, THE HISTORY AND EPIDEMIOLOGY OF SYPHILIS 12-13 (1933); Theodor Rosebury, Columbus and the Indians, MONTHLY REV., July-Aug. 1992, at 61, 68 (noting that
“Columbus’ crew probably did not bring syphilis to Europe”).
25. See ROSEN, supra note 23, at 72.
26. See PUSEY, supra note 24, at 4-5.
27. See ROSEN, supra note 23, at 72.
28. The term syphilis was adopted for the disease from the poem of Italian physician, Girolamo
Frascatoro, published in 1530, about the legend of a young shepherd, Syphilus, who was cursed
with the disease for insulting the Roman god Apollo. See id. at 72-73; see also Negib Ayachi, The Cultural Origins of Disease, WASH. TIMES, May 18, 1997, at B7 (reviewing JON ARRIZABALAGA ET AL., THE
GREAT POX: THE FRENCH DISEASE IN RENAISSANCE EUROPE (1997)).
29. See ROSEN, supra note 23, at 73.
30. See id. at 73-74. A 1496 decree of the Parliament of Paris required all infected persons to
leave the city within 24 hours. See PUSEY, supra note 24, at 5-6. The Scottish Privy Council banished
all persons in Edinburgh afflicted with syphilis to the Island of Inchkeith. See id.
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31

them, or simply prohibited them from entering public places or from associat32
ing with certain persons.
i) Reglementation
People saw prostitution as a “reservoir” of venereal diseases such as syphilis. Since prostitution was practiced widely in most of Europe at the inception of
the syphilis epidemic, governments subsequently focused regulations on prosti33
tutes in an attempt to thwart a known avenue of disease transmission. Prosti34
tutes were expelled from Bologna, Ferrara, and other cities beginning in 1496.
A proclamation of the town council of Aberdeen, Scotland in April 1497 ordered
that in “protection from the disease which had come out of France and strange
parts, all light women desist from their vice and sin of venery and work for their
support . . . [or risk] . . . being branded with a hot iron on their cheek and ban35
ished.”
Attempts to control syphilis in Europe also involved the medical inspection
36
of prostitutes through regulations that came to be known as reglementation.
Although early medical treatment for syphilis was highly toxic and therefore
37
largely ineffective, reglementation was emphasized as a way to control the
spread of the disease through the medical inspection and certification of prostitutes. It was implemented in conjunction with efforts to abolish prostitution
38
completely. While efforts to curb prostitution essentially failed, reglementation

31. See ROSEN, supra note 23, at 74. Special hospitals or other treatment facilities were established in Wurzburg (1496), Freiburg (1497), and Hamburg (1505). See id. A Venetian ordinance in
1552 required all syphilitics to receive treatment at the Hospital of the Incurables. See id.
32. See id. In 1497, Bamberg prohibited those infected with syphilis from entering churches and
inns, or from having any contact with non-syphilitics; barbers in Rome were forbidden to serve
known syphilitics. See id.
33. See id. at 73.
34. See id.
35. PUSEY, supra note 24, at 6-7.
36. See VERLA L. BULLOUGH, THE HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION 166-72 (1964). In 1507, Faenza required that women desiring to be prostitutes first be examined to determine whether they were
syphilitic. See ROSEN, supra note 23, at 73.
37. See Rudolph H. Kampmeier, The Introduction of Penicillin for the Treatment of Syphilis, 8
SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 260-65 (1981). Accepted treatment involved multiple administrations of heavy metal preparations (particularly mercury). See id. at 260. The use of mercurial compounds was an extension of the treatment administered for infectious diseases having skin manifestations and had been used since the days of the Crusades when the disease known as “temporary
leprosy” was transported back to western Europe. See id.; see also Ayachi, supra note 28, at B7
(noting that a mercury-based ointment and a remedy made of the bark of the exotic guaiac tree from
South America proved ineffective).
38. Frederick III abolished houses of prostitution in 1690 by deporting the women to workhouses, only to have them re-open in 1700. Henry VIII of England attempted unsuccessfully to suppress prostitution. Maria Theresa of Austria created a morals police, known as the “Chastity Commission,” which proved corrupt and eventually was dismantled. See Ludwig Weiss, The Prostitution
Problem in Its Relation to Law and Medicine, 107 JAMA 2071, 2071-72 (1906).
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was practiced until the nineteenth century in Europe. Criticism of governmentsupported medical inspections of prostitutes, however, was prevalent. Many
40
viewed the government-funded inspections as the countenance of prostitution.
Others questioned the validity of medical findings derived from the inspection
41
process. Although the efficacy of condoms in blocking the transmission of
STDs like syphilis was accepted medically, few physicians accepted their use
due to opposition from religious and nationalist groups concerned about the
42
concurrent prevention of pregnancy.
In the United States, the St. Louis Experiment of 1870-1874 established a
43
government-sponsored program requiring the inspection of prostitutes. The St.
Louis City Council passed the “Social Evil Ordinance” on July 5, 1870, appointing six physicians to inspect all registered public women of the city. Prostitutes
afflicted with venereal disease were committed to a special “Social Evil Hospital” until they were certified as cured. Despite the claim of the City Health Officer, William Barrett, that the program had “lessened disease, suffering, and
44
death and reclaimed fallen women,” the Missouri state legislature nullified it in
45
1874. In Illinois, the Board of Health had the authority to hospitalize any

39. In Great Britain, the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864 and 1866 required the compulsory
registration, supervision, and examination of prostitutes and allowed for compulsory hospital detention of those deemed as diseased. See Adler, supra note 10, at 206. In 1858, William Sanger, a
prominent New York physician, strongly advocated that the United States adopt the Parisian system
of compulsory medical inspection of prostitutes. He argued that in Paris, “the number of cases of
disease and the virulence of its form have materially abated.” John C. Burnham, Medical Inspection of
Prostitutes in America in the Nineteenth Century: The St. Louis Experiment and its Sequel , 45 BULL. HIST.
MED. 203, 205 (1971) (citation omitted).
40. See EDWARD B. VEDDER, SYPHILIS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 233-35 (1918).
41. See id. at 224-25. Abraham Flexner wrote in regard to the Paris examination:
All day long a dismal succession of groups of abandoned women file into the rudely
equipped rooms, in which two physicians ply their repellent task perfunctorily. . . . Of the
two physicians . . . one used a rubber glove, the other a rubber finger—in both cases the
same for all; though wiped on a towel from time to time, neither was changed or
cleansed. . . . I observed one of the physicians examine twenty-five to thirty girls without
changing . . . and a number of those examined were adjudged “diseased.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Still others advocated abandoning reglementation while emphasizing the institution of marriage
as an effective adjunct in the control of syphilis. See Rudolph Kampmeier, Syphilis and Marriage by
Alfred Fournier, 8 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE 29, 30 (1981). Alfred Fournier, a renowned French
professor of syphilology, wrote a treatise concerning the professional obligations of a physician to
his patient and society in which he set forth numerous conditions in order to grant medical permission for one to marry. Fournier argued that when a physician assumes responsibility for giving
medical permission to marry, his permission extends to the family “for behind that patient there is a
young wife, there are children yet unborn, there is a family, there is society itself, to be shielded at
the same time by [a physician’s] prohibition.” Id. at 29-30.
42. But see Gerard Tilles et al., Marriage: A 19th Century French Method for the Prevention of Syphilis: Reflections on the Control of AIDS, 32 INT. J. DERMATOLOGY 767, 767 (1993) (citing P. DIDAY,
EXPOSITION CRITIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES NOUVELLES DOCTRINES SUR LAS SYPHILIS: PARIS JB BAILLIERE ET
FILS 501 (1858)). The French physician Diday proposed the mandatory free distribution of condoms
in houses of prostitution. See id.
43. See Burnham, supra note 39, at 206.
44. Id. at 209.
45. See id. at 206.
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woman suspected of being infected with syphilis and to place placards on her
46
home stating “suspected VD.”
Private industries also practiced reglementation. In 1899, the Minnesota
Iron Company undertook reglementation in conjunction with their mining op47
erations in the northern part of the state. A system of thorough and regular examinations was performed among prostitutes working in parlors located on
company property. Infected women were treated and forbidden to solicit patrons. Male clients suspected of being infected with an STD were advised to
consult a physician and were expelled from the house of prostitution until their
STD status was ascertained. When suspected males consulted physicians, the
men were questioned about the house where they had contracted their disease.
They were asked to provide the names of the women who may have infected
them. This crude form of contact tracing resulted in a complaint brought against
48
company parlors and the medical examination of suspected women.
ii) The Progressive Era
At the turn of the twentieth century, societal and medical changes influenced the development of contact tracing. This was the Progressive Era, an age
of social reform in which health care professionals and progressive social reformers described venereal disease as a destroyer of the family unit and a social
49
evil. Three medical breakthroughs were crucial: (1) syphilis and gonorrhea
were shown to be caused by infectious organisms transmitted through sexual
contact; (2) a reliable diagnostic test for the diseases was developed by Dr. Adolph von Wassermann in 1907; and (3) a medication, Salvarsan, was identified as
50
an effective, although still toxic, treatment for syphilis.
In the United States, dissidents challenged the traditional view of venereal
disease as a “medical secret” between the patient and his physician. With enhanced knowledge of the cause and transmission of STDs like syphilis and gonorrhea, “innocent” victims (generally married women) of venereal disease became vocal. Patient confidentiality, primarily among male patients, was
51
considered secondary to the perceived ethical obligation to warn unsuspecting

46. Marvin S. Amstey, The Political History of Syphilis and Its Application to the AIDS Epidemic, 4
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 16, 17 (1994).
47. See W.E. Harwood, A Practical Lesson In Reglementation, 47 JAMA 2076 (1906).
48. See id. All expenses incurred by the women were borne by the keepers of the house, unless
it was shown that the woman deliberately infected the man, in which case the costs of both the afflicted patron and her own bills would be paid by her. See id.
49. See BRANDT, supra note 12, at 9.
50. See Rudolph Kampmeier, The Continuous Treatment of Early Syphilis by Arsphenamine and
Heavy Metals, 8 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE 224, 226 (1981) (citing J.E. Moore & A. Keidel, The
Treatment of Early Syphilis, 39 BULL. JOHNS HOPKINS HOSP. 1 (1926)).
51. The ethical conundrum was evident in the views expressed by Dr. Marion Potter, a female
physician of the early twentieth century: “We have seen the wife murdered by syphilis contracted
from an unfaithful husband, and an innocent woman its victim for life . . . .” Marion Craig Potter,
Venereal Prophylaxis, 7 AM. J. NURSING 340, 349 (1907). Yet surprisingly Dr. Potter endorsed the need
for medical confidentiality, defining the attempt of a health care provider to warn an infected spouse
as “gossip.” Id. at 350.
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spouses or fiancées about an infected partner. Although the belief remained
that “[p]rostitution is responsible to the greatest extent for the dissemination of
53
venereal diseases,” the concept of contact tracing, which arose from reglementation, was generating more interest, largely due to the perceived injustices suf54
fered by sex partners who were unaware of their risk.
With the return of the United States troops after World War I and the rela55
tive failure of the military to stymie STDs among soldiers, however, federal
funding to combat venereal disease decreased significantly. Despite the lobbying efforts of numerous women’s groups, by 1921 Congress had discontinued
appropriations to the Interdepartmental Social Hygiene Board, which had been
created three years earlier for the purpose of protecting troops from venereal
56
disease. The fiscal ravages of the Great Depression further decreased funding
for combating venereal disease. As incidence rates of syphilis infections rose,
many social hygienists blamed the increased prevalence on the relaxed sexual
57
morality of the 1920s, not on a pattern of decreased public health funding.
Whether due to changes in sexual morality and behavior or a decrease in public
58
health funding, the syphilis epidemic in the United States had worsened.

52. See Elizabeth Temkin, Turn-of-the-Century Nursing Perspectives on Venereal Disease, 26 IMAGE:
J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 207, 207-11 (1994).
53. George P. Dale, Moral Prophylaxis, 12 AM. J. NURSING 22, 25 (1911).
54. In 1911, Dr. George Dale, a social hygienist, summarized the changing focus: “We must insist that the man who has gonorrhea shall not marry until he is cured and in extreme cases in which
the patient refuses to take this advice, if possible the innocent person should be given warning.”
George P. Dale, Moral Prophylaxis, 11 AM. J. NURSING 782, 782 (1911).
55. The efforts of the American Expeditionary Force during World War I to control venereal
disease among service members again centered on the regulation of prostitution, as well as the use
of prophylactic treatment after sexual intercourse. See GEORGE WALKER, VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 100-01 (1922). While the British found success with contact tracing among troops during the war, see G. THIBIERGE, SYPHILIS AND THE ARMY 196-97 (C.F. Marshall
ed., 1918), American soldiers were reluctant to reveal the names of their sexual partners, see
WALKER, supra, at 58-74. Contact tracing in the United States military was abandoned in favor of the
imposition of military penalties, including court-martial and loss of pay, on soldiers who contracted
venereal disease or failed to take the required post-coitus prophylaxis. See id.
56. See BRANDT, supra note 12, at 123 (citation omitted). The Interdepartmental Social Hygiene
Board developed comprehensive programs on the transmission and treatment of venereal diseases.
One of its programs, the Program of Protective Social Measures, had an anti-prostitution agenda
that called for the detention of infected prostitutes. When the Board lost its federal funding, this
Program was transferred to the Department of Justice. See id.
57. See Maurice A. Bigelow, Youth and Morals, 14 J. SOC. HYGIENE 1, 1-5 (1928) (arguing that
there is not convincing evidence to prove any decline in sexual morality among youth).
58. By the 1930s, one out of every ten Americans was infected with syphilis. See THOMAS
PARRAN, SHADOW ON THE LAND: SYPHILIS 60 (1937). The cost of treating syphilis was greater than
that of treating any other infectious disease, including tuberculosis, despite the fact that (1) the
transmission route and agent for the disease were known (the organism, Treponema palladium, had
previously been identified as the source of syphilis when transmitted through sexual encounters, see
J.E. Moore & A. Keidel, The Treatment of Early Syphilis, 39 BULL. JOHNS HOPKINS HOSP. 1 (1926)); (2)
there existed a diagnostic means, the Wasserman test, to identify the infected; and (3) a treatment
that restricted transmission was available (the treatment developed by Salvarsan was effective although it was expensive and time-consuming, requiring a year to complete). See id.
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iii) The Influence of Thomas Parran, Surgeon General
By 1936, the New Deal was in full swing. In the spring of that year, Presi59
dent Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Thomas Parran as Surgeon General.
With a background in preventive medicine and epidemiology, Parran had as a
primary public health goal the control and eradication of the syphilis epidemic.
He advocated the reporting of STD infections to state health authorities, notification of the partners of infected persons, compulsory treatment, and isolation of
60
sources of infection when necessary. Recognizing that a major barrier to the
identification and treatment of syphilitics had been the moralization of the disease, Parran explained the disease in terms of costs to the public. It was estimated that fifteen million dollars was spent annually on the ambulatory care of
venereal patients, and three times that amount was spent on individuals institu61
tionalized due to insanity, blindness, or paralysis from syphilis. After securing
62
Parran further educated the public about the
substantial federal funding,
63
64
syphilis threat, organized mass screening programs for testing, and began a
national contact tracing program. His five-point program for controlling syphilis
65
consisted of case finding, prompt therapy at no cost to the patient, contact

59. See Lynne Page Snyder, New York, the Nation, the World: The Career of Surgeon General Thomas
J. Parran, Jr., MD, (1892-1968), 110 PUB. HEALTH REP. 630, 631 (1995).
60. As the New York Health Commissioner, Parran had identified the legal measures necessary
to combat the epidemic in conjunction with medical services. He wrote in a 1931 article championing the eradication of syphilis that
[l]egal aspects should include (a) notification of cases, particularly the lapsed cases; (b) notification of sources of infection; (c) compulsory treatment after other efforts have failed,
and (d) quarantine of irresponsible persons. . . . Every state in the union has a law requiring the notification of all or of certain of the venereal diseases. . . . [However] notification of
sources of infection is at present almost an unexplored field and yet this is a method by which
other communicable diseases are controlled.
Thomas Parran, The Eradication of Syphilis as a Practical Public Health Objective, 97 JAMA 73, 75 (1931)
(emphasis added).
61. See BRANDT, supra note 12, at 133 (citing Thomas Parran & Lida J. Usilton, The Extent of the
Problem of Syphilis and Gonorrhea in the United States, 14 AM. J. SYPHILIS 152 (1930)).
62. See BRANDT, supra note 12, at 143-44. The Social Security Act of 1935 provided the Public
Health Service with $8 million for state health care, 10% of which was directed toward combating
syphilis. Additional funding required to conduct Parrans national program was provided via the
National Venereal Disease Control Act, passed in May 1938, which provided $15 million over a
three-year period for syphilis control. See id.
63. Parran used the press to communicate his message to the general public. His article, “The
Next Great Plague to Go,” illustrating the nature and extent of his projected program against syphilis, was published in the Reader’s Digest and Survey Graphic. See Thomas Parran, The Next Great
Plague to Go, 25 SURV. GRAPHIC 405, 405-11 (1936).
64. One of the most effective examples of a mass screening program in relation to contact tracing was known as the Chicago project. See BRANDT, supra note 12, at 151-52. The Chicago Tribune
publicized the public health effort to administer free blood tests. See id. With federal funding under
the Social Security Act of 1935 and the Works Progress Administration, one-third of the city’s
population was tested for syphilis, resulting in 56,000 cases being identified and treated. See id.
65. Case finding was conducted through mass screening programs—the so-called Wasserman
dragnet. See id. at 152 (citing Paul de Kruif, Chicago Against Syphilis, READER’S DIG., Mar. 1941, at 23,
23-33).
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tracing and notification, premarital testing and prenatal testing for congenital
67
syphilis, and public education.
Studies of the period sought to demonstrate that contact tracing was an im68
portant part of syphilis control programs when properly executed. Two doctors, Dudley C. Smith and William A. Brumfeld, described the essential qualities
of a contact tracing program: (1) public health interviewers should emphasize
the medical aspects of the disease rather than its moral implications; (2) confidentiality should be stressed throughout; (3) after the names of sex partners and
close associates are elicited from the patient, the patient should be encouraged to
notify the contacts; (4) public health departments should send a letter advising
each contact to seek medical examination; and (5) legal measures to compel
69
compliance should only be used as a last resort.
Parrans efforts in relation to the syphilis epidemic marked the first time in
the United States that formal case finding and contact tracing were applied to a
70
sexually transmitted disease on a national scale. Before the role of contact
tracing in reducing infection rates could be explored effectively, the use of peni71
cillin as a potential curative treatment for syphilis had been developed in 1943
72
and, by the end of World War II, it was available to treat the disease. The advent of penicillin had a remarkable effect on the treatment of syphilis. The inci-

66. In 1935 Connecticut was the first state to pass a law requiring a blood test and physical examination for all prospective brides and grooms seeking a marriage license. See BRANDT, supra note
12, at 147-48. Many other states followed suit, but only required the groom to be tested. See id.
Women’s magazines at the time strongly endorsed these laws. See id. at 148 (citing Edward A.
Macy, Marriages Insured Against Syphilis, 74 SURVEY 262, 262-63 (1938)).
67. Legislation regarding prenatal testing was instituted to combat congenital syphilis with
very positive results. See BRANDT, supra note 12, at 149-50. After enacting such legislation in California, the mortality rate for congenital syphilis fell from 6.50 cases per 1,000 to 0.15 cases per 1,000
from 1938 to 1945. See id.
68. See Dudley C. Smith & William A. Brumfeld, Jr., Tracing the Transmission of Syphilis, 101
JAMA 1955, 1955-57 (1933); see also Dudley C. Smith, Practical Epidemiology of Syphilis, 107 JAMA
784, 784-86 (1936).
69. See Smith & Brumfeld, supra note 68, at 1956. Parran strongly supported the requirements
for contact tracing advocated by Dr. Smith and Dr. Brumfeld: “The authors have presented a new
method in the control of syphilis, which to my mind is as important as the discovery of a new
drug . . . . I am convinced that syphilis is kept alive by a series of local epidemics which can be
traced and controlled.” Thomas Parran, Abstract of Discussion to Tracing the Transmission of Syphilis,
101 JAMA 1957, 1957 (1933).
70. See Allan M. Brandt, Editorial, Sexually Transmitted Disease: Shadow on the Land, Revisited, 112
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 481, 481 (1990); Parran, supra note 63, at 405-11.
71. See Kampmeier, supra note 37, at 260-61. As early as 1943, three scientists demonstrated the
use of penicillin as a cure in experimental rabbits and human patients. See id. Soon after, John Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore and the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia undertook studies to
confirm the scientists’ findings. See id. at 260. Due to the urgency presented by the ongoing world
war, human testing was conducted at an accelerated pace and by June 1944 the Penicillin Panel of
the National Research Council’s Subcommittee on Venereal Disease had reported that penicillin was
effective in a) eliminating surface treponemas from open lesions in 12-18 hours; b) healing lesions at
least as rapidly as arsenic; and c) creating seronegativity at about the same rate as with metal chemotherapy. See id. at 261.
72. See id. at 261-65; see generally Syphilis Study Section, U.S. Pub. Health Serv., The Status of
Penicillin in the Treatment of Syphilis, 136 JAMA 873 (1948) (discussing the uses of penicillin to treat
syphilis).
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dence of syphilis infections and death rates dropped significantly over time.
Syphilis, one of the greatest epidemics in history, finally had been brought under
control due in part to an aggressive public health campaign, including contact
75
tracing, and in part to the timely availability of penicillin treatment. Currently,
76
new cases of syphilis in the United States have fallen to a forty-year low. Although prevalence rates remain unacceptably high in the southeast and among
77
African-Americans, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is hopeful that transmission
78
of the disease can be eliminated in the United States in the near future.
b) Development of Contact Tracing with a Focus on HIV/AIDS
Of course, syphilis would not be the last STD epidemic of the century. In
June 1981, the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report documented an un79
usual pneumonia in five homosexual men from Los Angeles. Later identified
as the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the HIV/AIDS epidemic has pre80
sented new challenges for public health officials. It also has presented chal-

73. In 1947 the rate of syphilis was 270 new cases per 100,000 persons. See BRANDT, supra note
12, at 171. By 1957, the incidence rate had plummeted to 3.9 new cases per 100,000 persons. See id.
74. In 1940 the death rate from syphilis was 10.7 deaths per 100,000 persons; by 1950 it was 5
deaths per 100,000 persons; and by 1970 it was 0.2 deaths per 100,000 persons. See id. Deaths from
congenital syphilis plummeted from 5.3 deaths per 10,000 births in 1940 to 0.57 deaths per 10,000
births in 1950. See id.
75. See Brandt, supra note 70, at 481 (“Parran’s program met with considerable success, breaking the conspiracy of silence associated with [STDs] and attracting much needed attention and resources.”).
76. See Susan Okie, Syphilis Cases Hit 40-Year Low Across Nation: Area’s Infection Rate Remains
Among Highest, WASH. POST, May 25, 1997, at A1 (noting that the incident rate of reported syphilis
cases across the United States was 4.4 cases per 100,000 persons in 1996, only slightly higher than the
historic low of 3.9 cases per 100,000 persons that occurred in 1956 and 1957).
77. See id. While 73% of U.S. counties reported no new cases of syphilis during 1996, half of the
11,624 cases reported in 1996 occurred in just 37 counties in the nation. See id. In addition, the CDC
reports that the syphilis rate among African-Americans is approximately 60 times the rate of white
Americans. See id.
78. See id. (“‘We are now sitting . . . with a [sic] historic opportunity to move to eliminate
transmission of this disease within the United States’” (quoting Judith N. Wasserheit, director of the
Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases at the CDC)).
79. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Pneumocystic Pneumonia—Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORALITY WKLY. REP. 250, 250 (1981).
80. HIV presents new challenges because it is different from many traditional STDs. One important difference between HIV and most STDs is HIV’s long latency period between infection and
the onset of symptoms. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., Partner Notification for Preventing Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection—Colorado,
Idaho, South Carolina, Virginia, 260 JAMA 613, 615 (1988). For the purposes of partner notification,
individuals who agree to participate in contact tracing and notification programs may have to provide names and relevant information of past sexual and IDU contacts. See id. at 613. Even if a person can recall these contacts, finding the contacts can be difficult. See id. at 615. In addition,
HIV/AIDS tracing and notification is plagued by anonymous contacts. See id. Partner notification
programs for hepatitis B, which epidemiologically is similar to HIV infection, suffer because of the
large number of anonymous sex partners, as well as the inaccessibility of the IDU population. See id.
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lenges similar to those of earlier STDs like syphilis. One obvious similarity
between the modern AIDS epidemic and the syphilis epidemic of the twentieth
century is the societal response to the two diseases. Fear and stigmatization of
82
those infected initially prevailed during both epidemics. The societal response
to homosexuals, prostitutes, and injection drug users (IDUs) infected with HIV
strangely is similar to the treatment of sex syphilitics and prostitutes during the
syphilis epidemic. In contrast, the response to children, hemophiliacs, and heterosexually-infected persons with HIV is significantly more tolerant, like society’s response to “innocently” infected wives, mothers, and children with syphi83
lis a century earlier.
Regardless of the similarities between the syphilis and HIV epidemics,
medical evidence also has shown that they are intertwined. Common STDs like
syphilis, gonorrhea, chlamydia, and genital herpes are known to increase the risk
84
of HIV infection. The association between STD infection and HIV may be due
85
as much to risky behaviors, including drug use, of persons likely to become infected with multiple STDs, in addition to the immune suppressed state of those
86
infected with common STDs. It only can be guessed as to the course of HIV
policy had these findings been known earlier. Almost from the inception of the
87
HIV/AIDS epidemic, issues of patient confidentiality and funding in the con88
text of contact tracing reemerged. “HIV exceptionalism,” suggesting that public health activities for HIV were markedly less aggressive than for other STDs,
became hotly debated.

81. See Peter G. Pappas, Syphilis 100 Years Ago: Parallels with the AIDS Pandemic, 32 INT’L J.
DERMATOLOGY 708, 708 (1993) (“The similarities between the two illnesses are striking in many respects. Both diseases are transmitted sexually. . . . Congenital infection is common to both illnesses . . . . Neither organism is routinely cultureable and the diagnosis of both diseases is based on
clinical and serologic data.”). In the beginning of the twentieth century the only reasonable therapy
for syphilis was toxic mercurial compounds; likewise there is no curative therapy for HIV and the
antiretroviral compounds are limited by toxicity. See id.; see also Brandt, supra note 70, at 482
(“[C]ontrolling HIV infection presents problems that are common to other sexually transmitted diseases such as syphilis . . . .”).
82. See Pappas, supra note 81, at 708-09.
83. See id. at 709.
84. See THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 6, at 49.
85. See Lawrence O. Gostin & Zita Lazzarini, Prevention of HIV/AIDS Among Injection Drug Users: The Theory and Science of Public Health and Criminal Justice Approaches to Disease Prevention, 46
EMORY L.J. 587, 650-51 (1997); see also Susan N. Blank et al., New Approaches to Syphilis Control: Finding Opportunities for Syphilis Treatment and Congenital Syphilis Prevention in a Women’s Correctional
Setting, 24 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 218, 218 (1997) (“The nationwide epidemics of syphilis
and (subsequently) congenital syphilis of the mid-1980s were fueled primarily by the emergence of
crack cocaine use and the barter of sex in exchange for drugs or money.” (citations omitted)).
86. See THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 6, at 51-54.
87. See John Potterat et al., Partner Notification in the Control of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 874, 875 (1989) (estimating the costs of a nationwide HIV contact
tracing program, assuming 100,000 new cases annually, at $20 million in 1989).
88. See, e.g., Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to HIV Exceptionalism?, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1501 (1991); Burr, supra note 20, at 58. But see Gabriel Rotello,
Editorial, AIDS Is Still an Exceptional Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at A23.
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The public health response to AIDS focused on individual responsibility.
90
The use of contact tracing enraged gay rights organizations, civil rights
91
92
groups, and even some public health officials. Although some states tried to
93
establish mandatory partner notification programs, most programs and state
educational initiatives centered on individuals protecting themselves from infec94
tion. Public health officials struck a balance between maintaining patient confidentiality and ensuring that known parties were informed of possible exposure
95
to HIV. As a result, officials attempting to control the epidemic emphasized the
96
personal obligation of the infected to notify their past and future partners.
2. The Contemporary Practice of Contact Tracing
Contact tracing is primarily the responsibility of state health departments.
Differing needs of individual communities render contact tracing suitable to

89. See Burr, supra note 20, at 59 (noting that first efforts to combat AIDS relied on the volunteerism of the infected individual).
90. See Bayer & Toomey, supra note 22, at 1159. As members of a stigmatized group, gays were
highly suspicious of the true intentions of public health officials attempting to institute contact tracing and partner notification programs. See id. In 1985, San Francisco tried to institute a pilot program in which the health department would ask bisexual men to provide the names of their sexual
partners so that they could be notified of their exposure. See RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES: AIDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC HEALTH 124 (1990). The gay community strongly
opposed the plan it labeled “Orwellian.” See id.
91. The Northern California branch of the American Civil Liberties Union favored programs
focusing on self-protection measures as opposed to voluntary notification. See BAYER, supra note 90,
at 128.
92. See, e.g., Burr, supra note 20, at 58-59; Nat Hentoff, Editorial, The AIDS Establishment’s Conspiracy of Silence, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1994, at A23.
93. See BAYER, supra note 90, at 129. Minnesota attempted to require notification of all partners
of HIV-infected patients. See id. at 129-31. Opposition from the gay community, however, defeated
the measure and ushered in a program of patient-initiated notification. See id.
94. See ASTHO, supra note 17, at 9; Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 1993 Sexually
Transmitted Diseases Treatment Guidelines: Partner Notification and Management of Sex Partners (Sept.
24, 1993) <http://wonder.cdc.gov/rchtml/Convert/ STD/ STDG3408.PCW.html> [hereinafter 1993
Treatment Guidelines].
95. See Lawrence O. Gostin & William Curran, AIDS Screening, Confidentiality and the Duty to
Warn, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH. 361, 364 (1987). The 1988 Report of the Presidential Commission on
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus recommended that the discretion of the health care provider be
preserved with regard to partner notification and that the “decision to warn” be made on a case by
case basis. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 129 (1988).
96. Self-disclosure of HIV infection to new sexual partners was a major concern. One study
reported only 52% of seropositive women and 31% of homosexual men reported their HIV-positive
status to new sexual partners. See Gary Marks et al., Self-disclosure of HIV Infection to Sexual Partners,
81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1321, 1321 (1991).
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state and local control. While no federal system of partner notification exists,
the CDC, as part of the Department of Health and Human Services, provides
funding to state and local health departments to perform a variety of testing,
98
screening, and partner notification services related to the HIV epidemic. As a
condition of funding eligibility, state health departments are required to imple99
ment partner notification programs according to CDC guidelines. Under this
100
system, “standards, procedures, and practices vary widely from state to state.”
Recently, the CDC proposed new parameters for partner notification, or what it
101
These proposals would
calls “partner notification support services” (PNSS).
require federally-funded contact tracing programs to provide a comprehensive
set of supplemental services, including testing, medical treatment, and counsel102
ing, in addition to notification assistance.
While states, therefore, are not federally mandated to provide partner noti103
fication services, states that choose to accept federal funding for such programs
must adhere to CDC guidelines regarding partner notification. In this way, the
CDC guidelines establish national criteria controlling the operation of federallyfunded contact tracing programs operated by state and local governments. The
guidelines allow public health authorities to practice two primary models of
partner notification—patient referral and provider referral. An additional model
104
known as conditional referral is a hybrid combination of the two, which often
prevails in modern practice.
With patient referral, index patients, who are identified through testing at
public health clinics, physician referrals, or through contacts of other infected
persons, are asked to contact their sex partners and IDUs with whom they have
97. See ASTHO, supra note 17, at 9. Variable factors across communities concerning the implementation of partner notification programs include financial resources, seroprevalence rates, awareness levels of at-risk populations, differing transmission rates, and the recency of exposure to HIV
from an infected source. See id.; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL PROGRAMME ON AIDS AND
PROGRAMME OF STD, CONSENSUS STATEMENT FROM CONSULTATION ON PARTNER NOTIFICATION FOR
PREVENTING HIV TRANSMISSION 3 (1989) (“In considering the decision to undertake partner notification as part of a comprehensive AIDS prevention and control programme, the following key local
and national variables must be taken into account: (a) Epidemiology . . . ; (b) Resources . . . ; (c) Local
Environment . . . ; (d) Existing AIDS Prevention and Control Activities . . . .”).
98. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300dd-300ff-90 (1994), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300dd-300ff-90
(West Supp. 1997); see also David R. Holtgrave et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Counseling,
Testing, Referral, and Partner Notification Services: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1225, 1230 (1993) (concluding that the CDC’s annual expenditure of more than $100 million in
funding to states, territories, and cities for the provision of HIV testing, counseling, referral and
partner notification services results in a net economic benefit to society).
99. See Gary R. West & Kathleen A. Stark, Partner Notification for HIV Prevention: A Critical Reexamination, 9 AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTION 68, 69 (1997).
100. Id. at 70.
101. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV PNSS OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE
DRAFT OUTLINE 1-8 (1997).
102. See id.
103. The federal government may lack the jurisdictional ability to mandate states to perform
partner notification in light of the principles of “new federalism” elucidated by the Supreme Court
in a series of decisions since 1976. See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public
Health Law, 12 CLEV.-MARSHALL J. L. & HEALTH (forthcoming 1998) (on file with the Duke Journal of
Gender Law & Policy).
104. See Cowan et al., supra note 8, at 248.
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105

shared syringes and needles. A public health official assists the index patient
by providing counseling, education, contact cards, and telephone or mail re106
Patient referral programs provide no assurance that
minders to the patient.
contacts are actually notified, little control over the quality of the information
actually conveyed, and no confidentiality protection for the identity of the index
107
patient.
Provider referral programs switch the responsibility for notification to trained
public health personnel who locate contacts based on names, descriptions, and
108
addresses provided by index patients. Information regarding their exposure,
possible infection, and treatment is provided to partners in a counseled environment, preferably during a face-to-face meeting between the contact and a
109
public health professional. The confidentiality of the index patient is protected
110
by declining to reveal the patient’s name to contacts, although in many instances, contacts are aware of the source of their exposure through their own de111
Provider referral programs are more expensive to
duction or other means.
administer than patient referral programs because of a significant outlay of state
personnel and resources. The confidentiality of index patients, however, is protected better through such programs, as is the quality of the information conveyed to contacts. In addition, there exists a greater potential that contacts will
112
be informed.
Conditional referral occurs when public health personnel obtain the names
and other information about the index patient’s contacts, but allow the patient a
113
period of time to notify them directly. If the contacts are not informed within
the designated time period, a public health worker informs them of their expo114
sure without revealing the index patient’s identity. As a hybrid model, conditional referral programs share many of the same weaknesses and benefits of patient referral and provider referral programs mentioned above.
Many states statutorily have authorized public health authorities at the state
or local level to utilize contact tracing as part of its comprehensive public health
strategy for controlling STDs, including HIV/AIDS. While the law of these jurisdictions varies, Table A below summarily charts the statutory sources and
general application of these laws.

105. See 1993 Treatment Guidelines, supra note 94.
106. See Cowan et al., supra note 8, at 248.
107. See Franklyn N. Judson, Partner Notification for HIV Control, HOSP. PRAC., Dec. 15, 1990, at
63, 66 tbl.3.
108. See 1993 Treatment Guidelines, supra note 94.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See infra Part IV.A.1.
112. See Judson, supra note 107, at 66.
113. See Cowan et al., supra note 8, at 248.
114. See id.
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TABLE A - STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR CONTACT TRACING
State

a

Disclosures
for contact
b
tracing?

Statutory Source(s)

Classification
c
of Programs

Specific
Diseases
d
Covered

Alabama

Y

ALA. CODE § 2211A-38(a), (d) (1997)

PR

CD

Alaska

N

-

-

-

Arizona

Y

ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-664(B)(3),
(K) (West 1993)

PR
PR

CD
HIV

Arkansas

N

-

-

-

California

Y

CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE
§ 121015(d) (West
1996)

PR

HIV

Colorado

Y

COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 25-4-402(3) (1997)

PR

STD

Connecticut

Y

CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 19a-215(c),
-584(a) (1997)

PR
PR

CD
HIV

Delaware

N

-

-

-

District of
Columbia

Y

D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 6-117(a)-(b) (1995)

PR

CD

Florida

Y

FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 381.004(3)(e)(5),
.26(1), .26(3)
(West 1993 & Supp.
1998)

PaR
PR

HIV
STD

Georgia

Y

GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-9-47(h)(3)(B)
(1995)

PR

HIV

GOSTIN

06/10/98 10:07 AM

PIERCING THE VEIL OF SECRECY

State

Disclosures
for contact
b
tracing?

Statutory Source(s)

29

Classification
c
of Programs

Specific
Diseases
d
Covered

Hawaii

Y

HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN.
§ 325-101(a)(4)-(5)
(Michie 1996)

PR

HIV,
AIDS

Idaho

Y

IDAHO CODE
§ 39-610(2) (1993)

PR

HIV,
HBV

Illinois

Y

410 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 325/5(a), /5.5
(West 1997)

PR
CR

STD
HIV

Indiana

Y

IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-41-7-4(c)
(Michie 1993)

PR

HIV,
AIDS,
HBV

Iowa

Y

IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 141.6 (West 1997)

CR

HIV

Kansas

N

-

-

-

Kentucky

N

-

-

-

Louisiana

Y

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1300.14E(1)(a)
(West 1992)

PR

HIV

Maine

N

-

-

-

Maryland

Y

CR

HIV

Massachusetts

N

-

-

Michigan

Y

PR

HIV

MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I
§ 18-337(b) (1994 &
Supp. 1997)
MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.5114a
(West 1992)
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Classification
c
of Programs

Specific
Diseases
d
Covered

Minnesota

Y

MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.4172(4) (West
1989)

PaR

CD

Mississippi

Y

MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-23-1(9) (1993 &
Supp. 1997)

PR

AIDS, CD

Missouri

Y

MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 191.656.2(1)(d)
(1996)

PR

HIV

Montana

Y

MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-16-1009(3)
(1997)

CR

HIV

Nebraska

N

-

-

Nevada

Y

NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 441A.220.5 (1996
& Supp. 1997)

PR

CD

New
Hampshire

Y

N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 141-F:9
(1996)

PR

HIV

New Jersey

Y

N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:4-41 (West
1996)

PR

STD

New Mexico

Y

N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-1-9.3 (Michie
1997)

PaR

STD

New York

Y

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2782.2(c), .4
(McKinney 1993)

PR

HIV

North
Carolina

Y

N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-143(4), (8)
(1995)

PR

HIV,
AIDS, CD

-
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State

Disclosures
for contact
b
tracing?

Statutory Source(s)

Classification
c
of Programs

Specific
Diseases
d
Covered

North Dakota

Y

N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-07.5-05.1(f)
(1991 & Supp. 1997)

PR

HIV

Ohio

Y

OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3701.241(3),
.243(B)(1)(a) (BanksBaldwin 1994)

PR

HIV,
AIDS

Oklahoma

Y

OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1502.2(A)(4) (West
1997)

PR

CD

Oregon

Y

OR. REV. STAT. §
433.045(3) (1992)

n/a

HIV

Pennsylvania

Y

35 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7605(e)(1)(2) (West 1993)

PaR

HIV

Rhode Island

Y

R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-11-10 (1996)

PR

STD

South Carolina

Y

S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-29-90, -146
(Law Co-op. 1985 &
Supp. 1997)

PR

STD,
HIV,
AIDS

South Dakota

N

-

-

-

Tennessee

Y

TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 68-10-102, -115
(1996);

PR
PR

STD
HIV

Texas

Y

TEX. CODE ANN.
§ 81.051 (West 1992
& Supp. 1998)

PR

HIV
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Disclosures
for contact
b
tracing?

Statutory Source(s)

Classification
c
of Programs

Specific
Diseases
d
Covered

Utah

Y

UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-6-3.5(1)(b)
(1995 & Supp. 1997)

PR

HIV,
AIDS

Vermont

N

-

-

-

Virginia

Y

VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32.1-36.1(A)(11)
(Michie 1997)

PR

HIV

Washington

Y

WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 70.24.022,
.105(2)(g) (West
1992)

PR
PR

STD
HIV

West Virginia

Y

W. VA. CODE
§ 16-3C-3(d) (1998)

PR

HIV

Wisconsin

Y

WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 252.12(2)(1) (West
1991 & Supp. 1997)

PaR

HIV

Wyoming

Y

WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-4-133(c)
(Michie 1997)

PR

STD

State

Notes:
a. The Table summarizes those jurisdictions which have enacted statutory law explicitly providing for or allowing contact tracing by state or local governments. It does not chart sources of
administrative or common law which may allow for the use of contact tracing in jurisdictions which
have not otherwise enacted statutory law authorizing its implementation.
b. Yes [Y]; No [N].
c. Provider Referral [PR]; Patient Referral [PaR]; Conditional Referral [CR].
d. Contagious or Communicable Diseases in general [CD]; Sexually-transmitted Diseases in
general [STD]; Human Immunodeficiency Virus [HIV]; Acquired Immuno-deficiency Syndrome
[AIDS]; Hepatitis B [HBV].
_______________________________________________________________________________________
115

Consider an example of a contact tracing program as an illustration. A local health department begins a contact tracing program with the names of 100
115. This example is based on information and estimates provided by the CDC. See Centers for
Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Partner Notification and Confidentiality of the Index Patient: Its Role in Preventing HIV, 17 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 113, 11314 (1990).
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persons (index cases) known to be infected with a certain STD. Based on CDC
116
sex partner indices, each index case will on average report 1.8 total sex partners
for an aggregate total of 180 sex partners who are potentially identifiable. Of the
100 index cases, half are either married or engaged in a long-term, primarily
monogamous sexual relationship. The identity of the marital or other monogamous partner either is already known or is easily obtainable by the health department without the assistance of the index patient. An estimated 50 sexual
contacts of the index case are thus readily identifiable. This leaves 130 additional
sexual partners whose identities are unknown. The goal of the contact tracing
program is to identify, locate, and contact these 130 persons.
Accomplishing this objective requires the participation of as many index
cases as possible. Statistics based on a study of 25 HIV-positive women in New
117
Jersey reveal that 68% of index cases would voluntarily provide the names of
their sex partners to health authorities provided their own identity was not revealed to the contacts. Only 20% of these same index cases would participate,
however, if their identities were revealed. As these data indicate, maintaining
the confidentiality of index cases is vital to the ability of authorities to track con118
tacts. If the program in question is based solely on patient referral where confidentiality is not protected, authorities may expect the participation of only 20%
of the index cases, or 20 persons, which in turn would locate approximately 20%
of the remaining 130 unidentified, potential contacts, or twenty-six persons.
Thus, a patient referral program would potentially locate a total of 76 contacts
(50 spouses/long-term partners + 26 other sex partners voluntarily notified), or
119
42% of all 180 identifiable sex partners. Of those persons reached, each would
know the source through which they were exposed to infection.
A conditional referral program may fare slightly better than one based
solely on patient referral since the health department guarantees that it will not
disclose the identities of index cases. The premise of a conditional referral program is, however, that index cases will notify their sexual contacts directly. Only
when index cases have failed to do so would health authorities assist. Since the
confidentiality of index cases ultimately is not guaranteed, many index cases will
not participate voluntarily.
Only through the implementation of a provider referral program can health
authorities assure index cases that their identities will not be revealed. Of
course, this does not mean that some contacts will not guess correctly the identities of the index cases. Regardless, where 68% of the index cases voluntarily
participate with such programs as statistics suggest, approximately 88 of the remaining 130 unidentified potential contacts would be named. A provider referral program thus potentially could
locate a total of 138 contacts (50
spouses/long-term partners + 88 other partners voluntarily disclosed), or 77% of
120
Of these contacts, only persons who shared
all 180 identifiable sex partners.
sexual or drug relations solely with the index case in the past several years

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id. at 113.
See id.
See id. at 114.
See id.
See id. at 113-14.

GOSTIN

34 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

06/10/98 10:07 AM

Volume 5:9 1998

would know for certain the source through which they were infected or were in
danger of being infected. Since confidentiality is preserved, many contacts remain unaware of the source of exposure, although they would be counseled to
121
practice safe sex with every partner to prevent future exposures.
Contact tracing in its traditional sense thus arose from a history of government control of STDs. As one form of partner notification, contact tracing represents a traditional activity of the state to protect the public from epidemic diseases. The voluntary nature of participation is a principal feature of traditional
contact tracing. Maintaining the confidentiality of index patients, while not a
central feature of patient referral and conditional referral systems, is important
in encouraging patients to volunteer their partners’ names.
B. Duty of Infected Persons to Disclose
While the duties of infected persons to disclose and health care workers
(HCWs) to warn partners of exposure to STDs share characteristics with contact
tracing, particularly the quintessential feature of notifying sexual partners, significant differences between these duties and contact tracing exist. The differences between the meanings of partner notification confuse policy formulation
and mar societal conceptions of contact tracing programs. In this Part the history
of the common law duty of infected persons to disclose their infectious condition
to their partners is traced and a modern description of the duty to disclose is
provided. In the next Part, the duty of HCWs to warn the sexual or needlesharing partners of their infected patients is explained further.
The underlying tort concept of “duty” is important to understanding the
differences between the three meanings of partner notification. A duty is a legal
122
obligation to conform to a certain standard of conduct towards another person.
Of the many factors that determine the existence of a duty, the most important is
123
the foreseeability of risk of harm to another. If it is foreseeable that a persons
behavior will cause harm to another, that person has a duty to take reasonable

121. See id. at 114.
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965) (listing seven major factors that contribute to
imposing a duty on a person: (1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2) the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury; (3) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury suffered; (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct; (5) the policy of
preventing future harm; (6) the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and (7) the availability,
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved); see also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).
123. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342.
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124

steps or “due care” to avoid such behavior. In the context of the transmission
of infectious diseases, “due care” requires at a minimum disclosing one’s condi125
tion to others at risk of exposure, including sexual or needle-sharing partners.
The breach of the duty to disclose or warn constitutes tortious, and occasionally
criminal, conduct when it results in harm to another.
The duties to disclose and to warn represent a more serious, obligatory side
to partner notification. Whether imposed judicially or statutorily, they are
grounded in the obligation to do no harm to others. In combination, they require
that certain persons, including those infected with STDs and the HCWs treating
them, inform foreseeable, unknowing sexual partners of the risks of exposure to

124. See B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Md. 1988). Courts originally based the duty to disclose infection of an STD on the special and intimate nature of the sexual relationship; a duty first
was imposed only in marital relationships. See, e.g., Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920)
(finding that a woman had a legal cause of action where she became infected with a venereal disease
by her husband who had hidden his true medical condition from her); Maharam v. Maharam, 510
N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (finding that a 31-year marital relationship gave rise to affirmative duty of a husband to inform his wife of his STD infection). The duty then was extended to
non-married sexual partners. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (“The basic premise underlying these old cases—consent to sexual intercourse vitiated by one
partner’s fraudulent concealment of the risk of infection with venereal disease—is equally applicable
today, whether or not the partners involved are married to each other.”); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d
852, 854 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the legal duty owed by one sexually active person to another “is the same one that every individual in this state owes another: the duty to exercise ordinary
care not to injure others”); Duke v. Hausen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979) (finding a duty where parties
had only a 17-day relationship). Today, most courts find that it is the foreseeability of risk and not
the relationship that is most important. See, e.g., B.N., 538 A.2d at 1179 (“One who knows he or she
has a highly infectious disease can readily foresee the danger that the disease may be communicated
to others with whom the infected person comes into contact. As a consequence, the infected person
has a duty to take reasonable precautions—whether by warning others or by avoiding contact with
them—to avoid transmitting the disease.”).
125. Partner notification is not the only standard of care. The California Supreme Court in Tarasoff explained that the duty was to take whatever steps were reasonable under the circumstances.
See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340; see also William Sundbeck, Note, It Takes Two to Tango: Rethinking Negligence Liability for the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 397, 427-30 (1995) (noting that
other standards of care include the duty to abstain, the duty to be tested, and the duty to wear a
condom). Partner notification, however, is proposed as the standard of care least intrusive to privacy and the most practical. See id. at 429; see also Daniel M. Oyler, Note, Interspousal Tort Liability
for Infliction of a Sexually Transmitted Disease, 29 J. FAM. L. 519, 528 (1990-91) (“A simple warning by
the infected person of the disease is sufficient in most cases because it gives fair notice of the danger
and thus fulfills the duty to use reasonable care . . . .”); Eric L. Schulman, Note, Sleeping with the Enemy: Combatting [sic] the Sexual Spread of HIV-AIDS Through A Heightened Legal Duty, 29 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 957, 971-76 (1996); Note, Standards of Conduct, Multiple Defendants, and Full Recovery of Damages in Tort Liability for the Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 6263 (1989). Some courts do not specify a standard of care. See, e.g., Long, 333 S.E.2d at 855. On the
other hand, the duty may be defined by the legislature: many states make the transmission of an
STD a criminal offense. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120600 (West 1996); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 1993); see also State v. Lankford, 102 A. 63, 64 (Del. 1917) (finding a
husband criminally liable for transmitting syphilis); Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (using criminal
statute to set standard of care); Cooper v. Hoeglund, 22 N.W.2d 450, 453-54 (Minn. 1946) (holding
that violation of criminal STD transmission statute constitutes negligence per se).
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infection. The impetus of these duties is the protection of individuals, not necessarily the concern for public health as is the focus of contact tracing.
Since these duties traditionally have been imposed on individuals, they
generally must be carried out by the individuals upon whom they fall, as opposed to being carried out by government health officials who assist with contact
tracing among volunteering individuals. The duties do not present voluntary
127
choices left to the discretion of infected persons and HCWs since the failure to
notify persons at risk when required to do so may result in civil liability and
128
In addition, unlike at least one form of contact tracing
criminal sanctions.
(provider referral), the satisfaction of these duties generally breaches the confidentiality of infected persons directly, when imposed on the patient, or indirectly, when imposed on HCWs. Under either circumstance, the identity of the
infected person is important to fulfilling the duty: persons are entitled to know
129
the individual source of danger of which they are unaware.
The duty of infected persons to disclose to their partners the threat of STD
exposure originates in the general duty to warn of contagious diseases (which
130
131
itself is based on the duty not to harm others). Since the turn of the century,
civil and criminal courts have imposed duties to disclose on infected persons

126. See Schulman, supra note 125, at 973 (“The general rule is that one who knows, or should
know, that he or she is infected with an STD, has a duty . . . at least to warn a sexual partner of the
infection prior to sexual contact.”); see also Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d
1251, 1281 n.19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (“If a physician has a duty to warn third parties of
the HIV status of patients who may be, for example, sexual partners of the patient, it could legitimately be argued that the risk of transmission would similarly require the surgeon to warn his own
patients.”).
127. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing an HCW’s “privilege to warn”).
128. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5114a(3) (West 1992) (creating criminal sanctions for
failure of infected person to inform sexual contacts of infectious condition prior to engaging in sexual relations).
129. See, e.g., Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);
DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990). Even in the few states
where HCWs are not required statutorily to notify at-risk individuals of the identity of the source of
exposure, see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120980(a) (West 1996) (permitting, under California’s HIV/AIDS disclosure statute, health care workers to inform only at-risk persons that they possibly have been exposed to the virus, without identifying through what source), the identity of the
infected person can be revealed by the mere circumstances of notification as with contact tracing
programs.
130. See Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340-41 (Wyo. 1979); Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, 487
(Mass. 1873).
131. See Schulman, supra note 125, at 971 (“The law on transmission of communicable diseases
dates back over 100 years, and includes cases imposing civil liability for transmission of such diseases as smallpox, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, whooping cough, scarlet fever, and even recently,
valley fever.”); see also Louis A. Alexander, Note, Liability in Tort for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 119 (1984) (“[E]arlier precedent . . . articulated the principle that a person who negligently exposes another to infectious disease should be
liable for damages.”); Deane Kenworthy Corliss, Comment, AIDS—Liability for Negligent Sexual
Transmission, 18 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 691, 699 (1988) (“[A] significant body of case law has developed over the last century to guide litigants in pursuing a cause of action grounded in negligence.”);
Celia M. Fitzwater, Comment, Tort Liability for Sexual Transmission of Disease: A Legal Attempt to Cure
“Bad” Behavior, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 807, 810 (1989) (“Beginning in mid-nineteenth century England, courts began to punish persons who knowingly exposed others to an infectious disease.”).
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132

who are aware of the danger of infection.
Persons with contagious diseases
133
134
135
like whooping cough or tuberculosis, or their guardians, were required to
warn others with whom they came into contact. The same duty has been im136
137
posed on other responsible parties, including innkeepers, parents, land138
139
lords, and most notably, physicians, when it is foreseeable that preventable
140
harm will fall on identifiable third parties.

132. See Hendricks v. Butcher, 129 S.W. 431, 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (holding that a person afflicted with smallpox has a duty to “so conduct himself as not to communicate [the] disease” or a
“duty to keep away from other persons, or should other persons approach him, to notify them of the
fact so that they might protect themselves”); see also Crim v. International Harvestor Co., 646 F.2d
161, 164 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that an auto manufacturer who brought a Texas car dealer to the
Arizona desert to test drive had a duty to warn of valley fever); Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.,
500 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972) (allowing recovery for contraction of salmonella); Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W. 1013 (Ky. Ct. App. 1910) (imposing criminal liability for going on public highway
while knowingly infected with smallpox).
133. See, e.g., Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884) (holding defendant, the parent of several children, liable for negligent transmission of child’s whooping cough where defendant failed to
tell the owner of a boarding house that the children were diseased).
134. See, e.g., Earle v. Kuklo, 98 A.2d 107, 108-09 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1953) (involving a defendant who rented a second floor apartment to plaintiff without disclosing that she, her husband,
and her daughter who occupied the first floor of the apartment building were infected with tuberculosis).
135. See Smith, 20 F. at 709.
136. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Hoffman, 23 N.W. 632, 634 (Iowa 1885) (finding innkeeper negligent for
allowing guests to frequent hotel with knowledge of presence of smallpox).
137. See, e.g., Kliegel v. Aitken, 69 N.W. 67, 68 (Wis. 1896) (affirming an action for negligent
transmission of child’s typhoid fever by a house servant against the child’s parents); Smith, 20 F. at
709.
138. See, e.g., Earle, 98 A.2d at 107; Minor, 112 Mass. at 477 (imposing liability on landlord for
failure to warn guests that rented rooms were infected with smallpox).
139. See, e.g., Davis v. Rodman, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (Ark. 1921) (holding that a physician had a
duty to notify parents that typhoid was contagious and that other children had contracted the disease); Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a physician owes
a duty to warn immediate family members of the dangers of the contagious disease and to explain
precautionary steps, even if the physician negligently fails to diagnose the condition); Bush v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 268 (Ky. 1880); Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919) (sustaining action for negligent exposure to scarlet fever where physician failed to warn father of daughter’s infectiousness); Edwards v. Lamb, 45 A. 480, 480-81 (N.H. 1899) (holding physician liable when he
directed patient’s wife to dress her husband’s infectious wound, negligently advised her that there
was not danger, and allowed transfer of infection from wound); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (sustaining an action where a physician failed to notify
plaintiff that her husband had contracted tuberculosis); Annotation, Liability of Physician for Permitting Exposure to Infectious or Contagious Disease, 5 A.L.R. 926 (1920); see generally Tracy A. Bateman,
Annotation, Liability of Doctor or Other Health Practitioner to Third Party Contracting Contagious Disease
from Doctor’s Patient, 3 A.L.R.5th 370 (1992) (discussing the question of a doctor’s liability to a third
party who contracts a disease from the doctor’s patient).
140. At least one author has recently discussed the duty of attorneys to warn third parties of the
HIV status of their clients. See David R. Katner, The Ethical Dilemma Awaiting Counsel Who Represent
Adolescents with HIV/AIDS: Criminal Law and Tort Suits Pressure Counsel to Breach the Confidentiality of
the Client’s Medical Status, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2311, 2332 (1996) (noting that “[t]he dilemma confronting
the professional who represents . . . HIV-infected [clients] will be to balance the ethical obligation of
confidentiality owed to the client against the duty to warn identifiable third parties who may be exposed”).
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The judicial origins of the duty to disclose STDs can be traced to 1866.
Early claims, often brought by aggrieved wives against infected husbands, usu142
ally were barred on the basis of the interspousal immunity doctrine. The interspousal immunity doctrine arose from the legal fiction that recognized a husband and his wife as a single identity. As a result, it was considered morally and
143
With the
conceptually objectionable to permit tort suits between spouses.
adoption of Married Women’s Acts into state law, wives began to achieve sepa144
rate legal identity from their husbands as states abrogated the doctrine. Although criminal liability for transmission of an STD from a husband to his wife
145
was imposed in the United States as early as 1917, it was not until 1920 that a
wife was allowed to bring a civil cause of action against her husband for the
146
transmission of an STD.
From its origin in common law, the modern duty to disclose requires infected persons to notify persons exposed to infection, whether sexually or
147
Spouses and
through the sharing of drug injection equipment among IDUs.
148
149
other sexual partners can recover tort damages for breaches of this duty

141. See Regina v. Bennett, 176 Eng. Rep. 925 (W. Cir. 1866) (charging the defendant for indecent
assault after infecting his thirteen-year old niece with a venereal disease, the court reasoned that an
assault occurred where the defendant knew of his condition but did not tell the victim to provide
her the opportunity to consent to the risk of exposure).
142. See Hegarty v. Shine, 14 Cox Crim. Cases 145 (Ir. Ct. App. 1878) (denying an unmarried
woman recovery on other grounds for infection with syphilis while having illicit intercourse with
the defendant); see also Bandfield v. Bandfield, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (Mich. 1898) (“The result of plaintiff’s contention would . . . destroy the sacred relation of man and wife . . . .”); Schultz v. Christopher, 118 P. 629 (Wash. 1911) (holding that a divorcee cannot bring an action for a tort committed
against her by her husband during the marriage); Regina v. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. 23, 16 Cox Crim.
Cases 511, 522 (1888) (finding conclusive presumption of consent from marriage vows).
143. See Oyler, supra note 125, at 522.
144. See LEONARD KARP & CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND
SEXUAL ABUSE § 1.16 (1995) (cataloguing the status of the interspousal immunity doctrine in each
state); see also Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Modern Status of Interspousal Tort Immunity in Personal
Injury and Wrongful Death Actions, 92 A.L.R.3d 901 (1979 & Supp. 1997). The doctrine has now been
dismantled in most jurisdictions. See Oyler, supra note 129, at 519-20; Foster, supra, at 906.
145. See State v. Lankford, 102 A. 63, 64 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1917) (“A wife in confiding her person to
her husband does not consent to cruel treatment, or to infection with a loathsome disease.”).
146. In Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920), a wife alleged assault by her husband when
he infected her with gonorrhea; her husband asserted immunity from suit on grounds of interspousal immunity. See id. at 208. The court, however, rejected his defense, holding that North Carolina’s
Married Women Statute provided the wife “the right of recovery of damages for any personal injury
or other tort sustained by her, and there is no exemption of her husband from liability in an action
by her . . . .” Id. at 209.
147. Few states statutorily have required infected persons to notify their contacts. But see IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-41-7-1(d) (Michie 1993) (requiring “carriers” of HIV, AIDS, or Hepatitis B to warn
or cause to be warned persons at risk); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5114(a)(3) (West 1992)
(requiring persons infected with HIV to inform their sexual partners before engaging in sexual relations); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243(F) (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (requiring persons knowledgeable
of a positive result on an HIV test or having been diagnosed with AIDS or AIDS-related complications to disclose such information to sexual or needle-sharing partners).
148. An adulterous person may even owe a duty to the married spouse of his or her partner,
since it is foreseeable that the partner will have sex with that person. See Mussivand v. David, 544
N.E.2d 265, 273 (Ohio 1989).

GOSTIN

06/10/98 10:07 AM

PIERCING THE VEIL OF SECRECY

39

150

through actions brought on the varied bases of assault or battery, fraud or mis151
152
153
154
representation, infliction of emotional distress, seduction, and negligence.
A crucial issue is whether it is reasonably foreseeable that sexual contact or
155
In general, a “reasonable person”
needle sharing might harm one’s partner.
who knows or should know that they have an STD must communicate this
156
knowledge to any sexual partner prior to sexual relations. The knowledge of
157
In general, “[a]ll courts agree that if
infection can be actual or constructive.

149. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Tort Liability for Infliction of Venereal Disease, 40 A.L.R.4th
1089 (1985 & Supp. 1997).
150. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Lankford,
102 A. at 64; Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Carbajalo v. Fernandez, 58
So. 581 (La. 1912); Trammel v. Vaughan, 59 S.W. 79 (Mo. 1900); State v. Marcks, 41 S.W. 973 (Mo.
1897); G.L. v. M.L., 550 A.2d 525, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988) (holding that the marital privilege does not “include immunity to personal injury suits between spouses based upon the transmittal of a sexual disease”); Cook v. Cook, 32 N.J. Eq. 475 (N.J. Ch. 1880); Regina v. Sinclair, 13 Cox
Crim. Cases 28 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1867); Regina v. Bennett, 176 Eng. Rep. 925 (W. Cir. Ct. 1866).
151. See, e.g., Baranowski v. Torre, No. CV90-0236178, 1991 WL 240460, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 7, 1991) (stating that the defendant claimed his previous lover died of cancer when he really
died of AIDS); B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1179-84 (Md. 1988) (allowing a nurse to recover damages
from a physician with whom she had sex where physician did not disclose his herpes infection); Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107; De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245, 246-47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936, no writ)
(allowing cause of action based on allegations plaintiff consented to intercourse based on a promise
to marry and contracted crab lice ).
152. See, e.g., B.N., 538 A.2d at 1179-84; Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987)
(requiring contemporaneous physical injury).
153. See White v. Nellis, 31 N.Y. 405 (1865) (allowing a parent to bring an action when the
daughter was seduced, contracted a venereal disease, and was unable to work as a result of the disease).
154. See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989) (allowing cause of action for
transmission of genital herpes, holding that “one who knows, or should know, that he or she is infected with genital herpes is under a duty to either abstain from sexual contact with others or, at
least, to warn others of the infection prior to having contact with them”); Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr.
564 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (involving herpes); Kathleen K., 198 Cal. Rptr. at 273 (affirming negligence as
a cause of action for the transmission of genital herpes due to defendant’s misrepresentation); Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So. 2d 404, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (negligence based on violation of statute
criminalizing the transmission of an STD); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)
(unmarried woman recovered for transmission of herpes); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988) (ex-wife with herpes had sexual contact with plaintiff without informing him); S.A.V.
v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Mo. 1986) (rejecting spousal immunity defense against negligent
transmission of herpes); Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1987) (affirming the lower court’s
holding that a wife could recover damages as a result of her husband transmitting a venereal disease
to her); Duke v. Hausen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979) (negligent transmission of gonorrhea but dismissed for elapse of statute of limitations). Most plaintiffs sue under several tort theories and often
satisfy the elements of more than one theory.
155. See Note, supra note 125, at 55. Reasonable care has also been specified as including a duty
to disclose one’s HIV status to HCWs. See Richard DeNatale & Shawn D. Parrish, Health Care Workers’ Ability to Recover in Tort for Transmission or Fear of Transmission of HIV From a Patient, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 751 (1996); A. Samuel Oddi, Reverse Informed Consent: The Unreasonable Patient, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1993).
156. See Schulman, supra note 125, at 973.
157. See id.
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one has actual knowledge of infection with an STD, he or she at the very least
158
has a duty to warn his or her sexual partner.”
Yet, in some instances, imposing a duty to disclose may be difficult where
159
an infected person is unaware that he is infected since he is not symptomatic.
Since some sexually transmitted infections manifest immediate symptoms, it is
reasonable to impute knowledge of infection, even though a person actually may
160
not have been diagnosed as infected, and thus impose a duty to disclose. Constructive knowledge of one’s infection thus is sufficient to impose liability. To
hold otherwise and require actual knowledge may provide an incentive for some
persons to avoid diagnosis and treatment in order to avoid knowledge of their
own infection.
Some STDs like HIV have long latency periods in which persons may not
161
know that they are infected for months or years. HIV has caused courts and
162
As one
commentators to struggle to define when the duty to disclose arises.
court questioned, “at what level of knowledge of the HIV virus should a [person]
foresee potential harm to [his sexual partner] such that [he] acquires a duty to act
as a ‘reasonably prudent person’, as well as to disclose [his] knowledge of the
163
HIV virus to [his sexual partner].” To date, courts have been reticent to impose

158. Id. at 974; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 554 (1977) (“A husband or wife who
fraudulently conceals from the other a physical condition that makes cohabitation dangerous to the
health of the other spouse is subject to liability to the other spouse for the harm suffered as a result.”); Sundbeck, supra note 125, at 407 (“The duty to take reasonable measures to avoid infecting a
sexual partner with a venereal disease is well-established.”).
159. See Sundbeck, supra note 125, at 420 n.164 (“The long asymptomatic stage of AIDS poses a
unique risk because a defendant may not have any physical symptoms which would cause him to
recognize the danger he poses to others.”).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Negron, 28 M.J. 775 (A.C.M.R.), aff’d, 29 M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1989)
(holding defendant liable for not informing his partner even though he used a condom); Doe, 267
Cal. Rptr. at 566-67 (holding that only a slight degree of foreseeability is needed to impose a duty);
Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 235-36 (La. 1994) (imputing knowledge and imposing a duty to
warn on a husband who experienced a problem with drippage and sought medical advice, but still
engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife); M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (finding that the transmission of herpes was reasonably foreseeable when defendant had recurring sores on his penis and was advised by a physician to get a herpes test).
161. See CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES MANUAL 1 (Abram S. Benenson ed., 16th ed.
1995).
162. See Schulman, supra note 125, at 987-92 (arguing for a broader basis for imputation of
knowledge and duty to warn).
163. Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (W.D. Mich. 1993).

GOSTIN

06/10/98 10:07 AM

PIERCING THE VEIL OF SECRECY

41

164

a duty based solely on a persons sexual history. Rather, the person must have
had some reasonable basis for knowing their infected status, such as a positive
test result, symptomology, or knowledge that a previous sexual partner was infected.
C. Duty of Health Care Workers to Warn
1. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California
If an infected individual refuses or fails to inform his partners, HCWs with
knowledge of the patients sexually-transmitted infection and knowledge of the
patient’s refusal to notify others at risk may have a duty to warn the partners. At
common law there was no affirmative obligation to act for the protection of oth165
ers. Courts have crafted exceptions to this rule, however, based on public policy considerations, and have imposed a duty on HCWs to warn their patient’s
166
partners of the patient’s infectious condition. While the duty of HCWs to warn
shares its origins with the same contagious disease line of cases through which
courts developed the duty of infected persons to disclose, it was recognized most
167
famously in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.
In Tarasoff, the California Supreme Court held that mental health professionals have a duty to warn third parties of threats of violence by the profes168
sional’s patients: “When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of
his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of
violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the

164. See, e.g., id. at 1382 (holding that the defendant, Magic Johnson, had a duty to warn, but refusing to extend liability to him solely on the basis of his high volume of sexual activity); C.A.U. v.
R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the defendant did not have duty to
avoid transmission and warn his partner because it was not reasonably foreseeable for defendant to
have constructive knowledge of AIDS and that he could transmit it given scant amount of information available at the time parties were engaged in sexual relations); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (declining to impose a duty on defendant to disclose homosexual activity to
wife). For cases were a duty to disclose was found but damages not imposed, see J.B. v. Bohonovsky, 835 F. Supp. 796 (D.N.J. 1993); Petri v. Bank of New York Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1992). On the other hand, criminal liability has been imposed in some cases. See Alan Stephens, Annotation, Transmission or Risk of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as a Basis for Prosecution or Sentencing in Criminal or Military Discipline Cases, 13 A.L.R.5th 628 (1993).
165. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 357 (5th ed.
1984).
166. See generally John C. Williams, Annotation, Liability of One Treating Mentally Afflicted Patient
for Failure to Warn or Protect Third Persons Threatened by Patient, 83 A.L.R.3d 1201 (1995) (discussing
failure to warn in the context of mental illness).
167. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); see also Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980)
(limiting duty to victims who are foreseeable and readily identifiable).
168. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340. The case involved the murder of Tatiana Tarasoff, who was the
former girlfriend of Prosenjit Poddar, a mentally-deranged patient of psychotherapist, Dr. Lawrence
Moore. In therapy sessions Poddar indicated to Dr. Moore his intent to kill a girl he did not specifically name, although it was evident to the doctor that the intended victim was Tarasoff. Dr. Moore
did not warn Tarasoff or her parents, but instead asked the police to pick up Poddar. Although the
police detained Poddar initially, he later was released on his recognizance after being advised to
stay away from Tarasoff. Two months later, Poddar murdered Tarasoff. See id. at 339-40.
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intended victim against such danger.” The Tarasoff decision has been accepted
170
widely by courts in the United States. Its holding has been extended in several
171
jurisdictions to apply to certain medical professions or to HCWs in general. As
172
a result, a HCW who is aware of a foreseeable danger posed by his patient may
have a duty to instruct and advise persons likely to come into contact with the
patient; in most instances the person at risk is an existing sexual or needle173
sharing partner. Even where a HCW is unaware of the existence of such partners, a HCW’s failure to warn infected patients of the potential to infect others is
174
actionable negligence when brought by a third party infected by the patient.
Exercising the duty to warn necessarily requires a HCW to inform partners
of the name of the patient who poses a danger to them. As a result, such notification constitutes a breach of the confidential relationship shared between doctors and patients. Most states recognize a common law duty of confidentiality
175
applying to certain health care professions. Whether derived from the ethical
obligations of HCWs or the contractual nature of the doctor-patient relationship,
169. Id. at 340.
170. See Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 98 (1994) (“Tarasoff has caused controversy, yet it has been widely accepted (and rarely rejected) by courts and legislatures in the
United States . . . .” (citation omitted)).
171. See, e.g., Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding duty to unidentified third persons fulfilled merely by informing patient of risks of transmission of AIDS); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (extending Tarasoff to cover
all HCWs); Douglas W. Baruch, AIDS in the Courts: Tort Liability for the Sexual Transmission of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 165, 190 (1987). But see In re Sealed Case, 67
F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (refusing to extend duty to warn third parties to lab technician working as
quality control consultant in doctor’s office); Lemon v. Stewart, 682 A.2d 1177 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1996) (denying recovery to a family who unknowingly cared for AIDS-infected man because there
was no possibility of transmission); Ellis v. Peter, 627 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (refusing to
impose a duty to warn spouses in light of negligent diagnosis of tuberculosis).
172. Tarasoff only extends to instances where an actual danger to third parties is relayed through
the treatment of patients. See, e.g., Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 119-20 (Mass. 1985) (holding
that unless faced with serious danger to patients or to others, a physician owes his patient a duty not
to disclose, without patient’s consent, medical information about the patient to the patient’s employer); Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Wis. 1988) (“A [physician’s] duty is established
when it can be said that it was foreseeable that his [patient] may cause harm to someone.” (quoting
A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. 1974))); see also Davis v. Rodman, 227
S.W. 612 (Ark. 1921) (holding physician negligent for advising patient who was diagnosed with typhoid fever to be put among other children).
173. See Kenneth E. Labowitz, Beyond Tarasoff: AIDS and the Obligation to Breach Confidentiality, 9
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 495, 510 (1990). Commentators also have discussed whether the duty extends to past partners. See Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Between a Rock and a Hard Place: AIDS and the
Conflicting Physicians’ Duties of Preventing Disease Transmission, 76 GEO. L.J. 169, 187-89 (1987)
(discussing that, although it would be wise from a public policy standpoint to notify past partners of
their contact with HIV to prevent further transmission, it is extremely unlikely that a physician
would be held liable for failure to warn past sexual partners of the risks of HIV).
174. See Reisner, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 523 (“[W]e believe that a doctor who knows he is dealing
with the 20th Century version of Typhoid Mary ought to have a very strong incentive to tell his patient what she ought to do and not do and how she ought to comport herself in order to prevent the
spread of her disease.” (citation omitted)). But see Britton v. Soltes, 563 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (holding that the negligent failure of a doctor to diagnose tuberculosis in a patient does not
give rise to an action by a third party who became infected through contact with that patient).
175. See Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Physician’s Tort Liability for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Information About Patient, 48 A.L.R.4th 668 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
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patient confidentiality is justified by the need to develop a trusting relationship
176
with one’s physician in order to facilitate information exchange. Patient confidentiality is designed to improve the therapeutic process by encouraging disclosures that assist in accurate diagnosis and effective treatment and to strengthen
177
the bonds of the physician-patient relationship as a general social good.
If a patient discloses personal information to a health care professional that
is private, the professional may be liable for disclosing such information to third
178
parties without the patient’s consent. Often described in tort law as a claim for
179
breach of confidentiality, courts also have relied on various other theories of
180
181
recovery, including invasion of privacy, implied term of contract, and breach
182
Breach of confidentiality claims have been upheld
of fiduciary relationship.
when the physician makes an unauthorized disclosure of information obtained
183
184
in the course of a therapeutic relationship to employers or family members.
Significant ethical dilemmas arose from this conflict concerning the extent
to which a patient’s confidentiality should be sacrificed in the performance of the

176. See, e.g., Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 118-19.
177. See Bernard Dickens, Legal Limits of AIDS Confidentiality, 259 JAMA 3449, 3449 (1998); Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS—Testing, Screening
and Reporting, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 45-47 (1987) (“Trust in and compliance with public health programs depend upon the maintenance of confidentiality.”).
178. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Health Information in the Emerging Health
Care System, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 15-16 (1995).
179. See Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426
(1982).
180. The invasion of privacy theory effectuates the interest implicated in publicity cases where a
person’s reputation is at stake. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973)
(holding that the plaintiff had a claim for relief for invasion of privacy where a psychoanalyst published certain confidential communications in a book sold publicly). The tort has significant doctrinal limitations in providing an adequate remedy for breach of confidentiality because it typically
requires broad publication of the private matter, the public interest in knowing about public events
or public figures may defeat the claim, and truth may be a defense. In fact, there may be four distinct branches of tort involved in an invasion of privacy theory: “intrusion upon seclusion,”
“appropriation of name or likeness,” “publicity given to private life,” and “publicity placing person
in false light.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B)-(E) (1977).
181. Courts sometimes incorporate a duty of confidentiality into an implied service contract between the physician and patient. The expectation of confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship may be inferred from the ethical codes of medicine, the law of the state (e.g., licensing requirements), or public policy favoring a strong therapeutic relationship, such as the maintenance of
trust between doctor and patient. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,
801 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (implying as a condition of the contract that “the doctor warrants that any confidential information gained through the relationship will not be released without the patient’s permission”); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding that a physician who enters into an agreement with a patient to provide medical attention makes an implied covenant to
keep in confidence all disclosures made by the patient).
182. Some courts see the therapeutic relationship as imposing on the physician a fiduciary duty
to the patient; a disclosure of private information without appropriate justification is deemed a
breach of the fiduciary obligation. See Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 532 N.E.2d
327, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962).
183. See Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 830-31 (Ala. 1973); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113,
119 (Mass. 1985).
184. See MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (Simons, J., concurring); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 530-33 (Or. 1985) (en banc).

GOSTIN

44 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

06/10/98 10:07 AM

Volume 5:9 1998

duty to warn. Many legal, medical, and ethical scholars determined that certain
cases justified breaches of confidentiality for the sake of preventing harm to in185
nocent third parties. The conflict between a HCW’s duty to warn and duty to
keep confidential a patients medical information also has been addressed legis186
latively through a variety of statutes.
Some state legislatures have imposed duties on HCWs to warn the partners
187
of their patients about a risk of infection. These effectively override and justify
188
These statutes at the state level replace
breaches of patient confidentiality.
common law duties to warn and more precisely define the duty for HCWs depending on each states requirements. In the case of STD infections, “duty to
warn” statutes typically require sex and needle-sharing partners to be notified
only if there is a significant risk of transmission, the patient can or will not contact the partner, and the HCW has informed the patient of the intent to notify
189
specified partners.
2. Privilege of Health Care Workers
In circumstances where the law does not impose a duty to warn on HCWs,
190
courts have respected a worker’s privilege to warn.
They have recognized a
narrow public policy exception to the physicians traditional duty of patient confidentiality in the form of a privilege (as opposed to a duty) to warn others of his

185. See Bayer & Toomey, supra note 22, at 1161; Gostin & Curran, supra note 95, at 364 (“When
there are strong clinical grounds for believing that a specific contact has not been informed who is in
serious danger from exposure to HIV, then the prudent course for the physician is to notify the contact of the positive serologic status of the patient.”). Eventually the American Academy of Family
Physicians, the American Medical Association, and the American Psychiatric Associations issued
similar statements supporting the warning of unsuspecting partners as an ethical practice. See Bayer
& Toomey, supra note 22, at 1161; see generally Dickens, supra note 177, at 3449.
186. See Christine E. Stenger, Note, Taking Tarasoff Where No One Has Gone Before: Looking at
“Duty to Warn” Under the AIDS Crisis, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 471, 494-99 (1996).
187. See Bobbi Bernstein, Solving the Physician’s Dilemma: An HIV Partner-Notification Plan, 6
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 127, 135 n.55 (1995) (listing the HIV partner notification provisions enacted in
over 30 states); see also infra notes 199-210 and Table B.
188. See Stenger, supra note 186, at 496-99 (reviewing how different states legislatively balance
confidentiality with issues of public health).
189. See Bernstein, supra note 187, at 131.
190. See Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920). In Simonsen, a physician warned the
manager of a hotel that his patient staying at the hotel was infected with syphilis. After being
evicted, the patient sued his physician for making the disclosure to the hotel manager. See id. at 83132. The court denied the patient’s recovery from his doctor, explaining that when a patient’s condition is “of a dangerous and so highly contagious or infectious a nature that it will necessarily be
transmitted to others unless the danger of contagion is disclosed to them, then the physician
should . . . be privileged to make so much of a disclosure to such persons as is necessary to prevent
the spread of the disease.” Id. at 832; see also Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 206-08 (Alaska 1995)
(refusing to hold a physician liable for breach of confidentiality after informing a patient’s spouse of
her condition without her authorization); Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (denying recovery to a patient after physician disclosed HIV status to his employer).
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191

patient’s infectious condition. The privilege to warn was effectively overruled
by Tarasoff. Once Tarasoff duties were adopted in most states, what was once
192
recognized as a privilege to warn transferred into a duty to warn. Under Tarasoff, physicians no longer had the discretion to breach patient confidentiality in
order to protect third parties. Instead, they were obliged, at the peril of tort liability, to disclose information regarding their patients’ STDs to endangered
third parties.
Although a physician’s duty to warn already had been recognized in the
context of contagious diseases, early cases did not confront the conflicting duty
of patient confidentiality. Tarasoff was likely the first case to address the conflict
193
between the duty of patient confidentiality and the duty to warn. Its requirement that HCWs disclose their patients’ STD infections to endangered third parties breaches patient confidentiality since such disclosure is prohibited by the
194
duty of patient confidentiality.
195
Many states attempted to resolve this conflict by enacting new legislation.
These statutes differ from state to state in three key components: (1) the voluntariness of disclosure; (2) the scope of disclosure; and (3) the legal duties imposed. Some statutes give physicians absolute discretion to decide whether to
196
For example, laws passed in California and New
notify a patient’s contacts.
York provide that a physician may notify a contact if the physician reasonably
191. See, e.g., Curry v. Corn, 277 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). In Curry, a woman’s physician revealed to her husband that she had a venereal disease; the husband used this information in a
pending divorce action. See id. The woman sued her physician for violation of physician-patient
confidentiality. See id. The New York Supreme Court denied recovery, holding that the physician
was not liable for breach of his patient’s confidentiality because “during marriage [a husband or
wife] has the right to know the existence of any disease which may have bearing on the marital relation.” Id. at 471 (citing Pennison v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617, 618 (La. Ct.
App. 1963) (denying a wife’s claim for breach of confidentiality when her medical record was disclosed to her husband who then used the information and obtained a divorce)); see also Zelin, supra
note 175, at 668 (discussing public policy exceptions to physician-patient confidentiality).
192. See Sonia M. Suter, Note, Whose Genes Are These Anyway?: Familial Conflicts Over Access to
Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1874 (1993) (“The recognition that physicians may be immune from liability for disclosure is related to, but distinct from, the duty to warn.”).
193. See id. at 1874.
194. See J. David Butts, HIV/AIDS-Related Information and the Rule of Confidentiality: Can We Accept
Exceptions?, 40 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 1 (1994) (providing a more in-depth historical and analytical
discussion of the conflict); Bernard Friedland, HIV Confidentiality and the Right to Warn—The Health
Care Provider’s Dilemma, MASS. L. REV., Mar. 1995, at 3, 5 (“[H]ealth care providers . . . are trapped
between Scylla and Charybdis.”).
195. In addition to modifying preexisting confidentiality statutes, states enacted statutes that
specifically guarantee the confidentiality of STD or HIV status. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10
(West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (protecting physician-patient confidentiality); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 120705 (West 1996) (protecting STD information); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120820
(West 1996) (protecting HIV information). HIV confidentiality statutes typically have narrower exceptions for the warning of third parties. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (West
1996) (“[N]o physician and surgeon shall disclose any identifying information about the individual
believed to be infected.”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(4)(b) (McKinney 1993) (“The physician or
public health officer shall not disclose the identity of the protected individual or the identity of any
other contact.”).
196. See Bernstein, supra note 187, at 131 (“A vast majority of the current state statutes give
health care practitioners absolute discretion to decide whether or not to notify the patient’s contacts.”).
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believes a significant risk of transmission exists and that the patient will not
198
warn the contact. In addition, the physician must have notified the patient of
199
Such laws expressly provide
the physician’s intent to warn the third party.
200
that a physician has no obligation to inform, identify, or locate any partner. In
contrast, duty to warn statutes create an affirmative obligation to warn, either
201
directly or indirectly, when a physician knows of a third party’s risk.
In examining the scope of disclosure, most statutes, including those in California and New York, allow notification of spouses, sexual partners, or needle202
sharing partners. Some statutes limit warnings to an index patients spouse or
203
cohabitating sexual partner of over one year; still others allow only for the
204
warning of the index patient’s spouse. In regards to the nature of the imposed
205
legal duties, most statutes, including those in California and New York, contain
provisions limiting the obligation to disclose and providing total immunity for
disclosure. While some statutes indicate that the physician has no duty to dis206
close, they provide no immunity from potential Tarasoff liability, essentially

197. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (West 1996); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2782(4)(a)(2) (McKinney 1993) (“[T]he physician reasonably believes disclosure is medically appropriate and there is a significant risk of infection to the contact . . . .”).
198. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(b) (West 1996) (“No physician and surgeon shall
disclose . . . unless he or she has first discussed the test results with the patient . . . and has attempted
to obtain the patient’s voluntary consent for notification of his or her contacts.”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2782(4)(a)(3) (McKinney 1993) (“[T]he physician reasonably believes the protected individual
will not inform the contact . . . .”).
199. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(b) (West 1996) (“The physician and surgeon shall
notify the patient of his or her intent to notify the patient’s contacts prior to any notification.”); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(4)(a)(4) (McKinney 1993) (“[T]he physician has informed the protected
individual of his or her intent to make such disclosure . . . .”).
200. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(c) (West 1996) (“This section is permissive. . . .
No physician has a duty to notify any person of the fact that a patient is reasonably believed to be
infected . . . .”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(4)(c) (McKinney 1993) (“A physician or public health
officer shall have no obligation to identify or locate any contact.”).
201. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5114a(1) (West 1992) (mandating that physicians
“shall refer the individual to the appropriate local health department for assistance with partner notification”).
202. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (West 1996) (allowing notification of a “person
reasonably believed to be the spouse, or to a person reasonably believed to be a sexual partner or a
person with whom the patient has shared the use of hypodermic needles”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2780(10) (McKinney 1993) (permitting notification of “an identified spouse or sex partner of the
protected individual or a person identified as having shared hypodermic needles or syringes with
the protected individual”).
203. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.282(1)(a) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
204. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/9(a) (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-36.1(A)(11)
(Michie 1997).
205. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (West 1996) (“[N]o physician and surgeon . . .
shall be held criminally or civilly liable for disclosing . . . .”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2783(3)
(McKinney 1993) (“There shall be no criminal sanction or civil liability on the part of, and no cause
of action for damages shall arise against any physician . . . solely on account of . . . the failure to disclose . . . or . . . disclosure . . . to a contact . . . .”).
206. Compare VA. CODE. ANN. § 32.1-36.1(D) (Michie 1997) (“This section shall not be deemed to
create any duty . . . to release the results . . . .”), with 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7609(c) (West 1993)
(“A physician shall have no duty to identify, locate or notify any contact, and no cause of action
shall arise for nondisclosure or for disclosure . . . .”).
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failing to resolve the physician’s conflict between the duty to warn and the duty
of confidentiality.
Table B, below, summarizes those states that statutorily have imposed duties or created privileges for health care workers to warn their patient’s sexual or
needle-sharing contacts of their risk of exposure to STDs, including HIV/AIDS.
TABLE B - STATUTORY DUTY OR PRIVILEGE TO WARN
State

a

Statutory Duty
or Privilege to
b
Warn

Statutory Source(s)

Specific
Diseases
c
Covered

Y-P

ALA. CODE § 22-11A-38(d)
(1997)

CD

Alaska

N

-

-

Arizona

Y-P

Arkansas

N

-

-

California

Y-P

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 121015(a), (c) (West
1996)

HIV

Colorado

N

-

-

Alabama

Connecticut

Y-P

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-664(A)(2) (West 1993

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19a-584(b) (West 1997)

CD

HIV

Delaware

N

-

-

District of
Columbia

N

-

-

Florida

Y-P

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.2416
(West 1991) (renumbered
as § 455.674 (West Supp.
1998))

HIV

Georgia

Y-P

GA. CODE ANN. § 24-947(g) (1995)

HIV

Hawaii

Y-P

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 325-101(a)(4)-(5) (Michie
1996)

HIV, AIDS
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Statutory Source(s)

Specific
Diseases
c
Covered

Idaho

Y-P

IDAHO CODE § 39-610 (2)(3) (1993)

HIV, HBV

Illinois

Y-P

410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
305/9-9(a) (West 1997)

HIV

Indiana

Y-P

IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-73(b)(2) (Michie 1993)

HIV, AIDS,
HBV

Iowa

Y-P

IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 141.6(3)(d) (West 1997)

Kansas

Y-P

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 656004(b) (1992 & Supp.
1997)

Kentucky

Y-P

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311-282(1) (BanksBaldwin 1997)

HIV

Louisiana

Y-P

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1300.14E(1) (West
1992)

HIV

Maine

HIV

AIDS, HIV

N

-

-

Maryland

Y-P

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTHGEN. I § 18-337(b) (1994 &
Supp. 1997)

HIV

Massachusetts

Y-P

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 112, § 12 (West 1991)

STD

Michigan

Y-D

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.5131-5(b) (West 1992
& Supp. 1997)

HIV, AIDS

Minnesota

N

-

-

Mississippi

N

-

-
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Statutory Duty
or Privilege to
b
Warn

Statutory Source(s)

Specific
Diseases
c
Covered

Missouri

Y-P

MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 191.656.2(1)(d), (2) (West
1996 & Supp. 1998)

HIV

Montana

Y-P

MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-16-529(9), -1009(3)
(1997)

Nebraska

N

State

Nevada

Y-P

New
Hampshire

N

New Jersey

Y-P

New Mexico

N

New York

Y-P

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 441A.220.5 (Michie 1996
& Supp. 1997)
-

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-41
(West 1996)
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2782.4 (McKinney 1993)

Health Care
Information
HIV

CD

-

STD

HIV

North
Carolina

N

-

-

North Dakota

N

-

-

Y-P

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3701.243(B)(1)(a) (BanksBaldwin 1994)

HIV, AIDS

Oklahoma

N

-

-

Oregon

N

-

-

Ohio

Pennsylvania

Y-P

35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7609(a) (West 1993)

HIV
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Statutory Source(s)

Specific
Diseases
c
Covered

Rhode Island

Y-P

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-617.2(v) (1996)

HIV, AIDS

South Carolina

Y-P

S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-90,
-146 (Law. Co-op. 1985 &
Supp. 1997)

HIV, AIDS

N

-

-

Tennessee

Y-P

TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-10115 (1996)

HIV

Texas

Y-P

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN.§ 81.103(b)(7)
(West 1992)

Utah

N

-

-

Vermont

N

-

-

Virginia

Y-P

VA. CODE ANN. § 32.136.1(A)(11), (D) (Michie
1997)

HIV

Washington

Y-P

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.24.105(2)(g) (West
1992)

STD, HIV

West Virginia

Y-P

W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(d),
(e) (1998)

HIV

WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 252.15(5)(a)(14) (West
1991 & Supp. 1997)

HIV

South Dakota

Wisconsin

Y-P
(If individual
is deceased)

HIV, AIDS

GOSTIN

06/10/98 10:07 AM

PIERCING THE VEIL OF SECRECY

State

Wyoming

51

Statutory Duty
or Privilege to
b
Warn

Statutory Source(s)

Specific
Diseases
c
Covered

N

-

-

Notes:
a. This Table charts statutory sources of authority for health care workers to notify their patients’ contacts who are at risk, such as spouses and sexual or needle-sharing partners, of their risk
of exposure to STDs or contagious diseases (of which STDs are included). It does not tabulate those
jurisdictions where duties or privileges to warn solely are provided for by administrative or common law.
b. YES [Y]; NO [N]; DUTY [D] (health care worker is statutorily required to warn third parties);
PRIVILEGE [P] (health care worker is statutorily allowed to warn third parties, but is not otherwise
required to do so).
c. Contagious or Communicable Diseases in general [CD]; Sexually-Transmitted Diseases in
general [STD]; Human Immuno-deficiency Virus [HIV]; Acquired Immuno-deficiency Syndrome
[AIDS]; Hepatitis B [HBV].
_______________________________________________________________________________________

Most courts and legislatures thus agree that HCWs have a duty to warn
third parties who they are aware are in danger of exposure to STD infection from
contact with their patients, consistent with Tarasoff. The conflicting duty of
HCWs to preserve their patients’ confidentiality, however, has forced states to
legislate limited degrees of immunity from tortious and administrative actions
for breaches of patient confidentiality or failures to satisfy Tarasoff duties, creating wide-ranging variations of a HCW’s privilege to warn.
III. AN “INTEREST-ANALYSIS” OF PARTNER NOTIFICATION
Having described the three meanings of partner notification, this Part outlines a systematic analysis of its various justifications—both theoretical and empirical. This Part provides an “interest-analysis” of partner notification, particularly contact tracing, and evaluates the conflicting interests of government,
infected individuals, and their partners. In so much as governmental interests
are grounded firmly in constitutional tradition and statutory directive based on
the need to control diseases damaging to the public health, they are plenary and
at times compelling. They are not, however, absolute. Against these interests is
the right to privacy of infected individuals in maintaining the confidentiality of
their health status. While these individual interests are legally recognized, they
generally are not sufficient to invalidate government interests in contact tracing.
Finally, this Part discusses individual fears of discrimination arising from the
dissemination of their health status to others and the legal response to such fears
in the form of anti-discrimination legislation designed to protect certain infected
individuals from egregious societal harms. This interest analysis demonstrates
the balance of governmental power over individual rights that legally justifies
partner notification.
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A. Governmental Interests in Contact Tracing
Contact tracing is an activity funded, promoted, or undertaken directly by
207
federal or state government. Government at both levels, however, must have
constitutional and statutory authority to undertake legal contact tracing. As argued in this Part, government has ample, albeit limited, constitutional and
statutory authority to engage in contact tracing.
Contact tracing is a quintessential function of state and local governments.
208
States enjoy wide latitude in measures designed to protect the public health.
State police powers provide states, as sovereign governments, with broad
authority to act in the interest of the public in matters of general welfare, in209
Pursuant to their police power,
cluding in matters concerning public health.
states have constitutional authority to implement contact tracing programs. Under such authority, states have enacted legislation or delegated authority to administrative agencies or local governments to implement contact tracing programs as part of their public health statutes regarding STD or disease-specific
210
interventions.
While exercises of state police power are plenary, they are not absolute.
Police powers cannot be exercised in a manner that violates federal or state con211
stitutional rights. To the extent that state actions regarding partner notification
bear a reasonable, if not substantial, relationship to the legitimate state interest in
protecting the health of its citizens, courts will uphold partner notification
212
against due process challenges based on its unreasonableness or arbitrariness.
However, where contact tracing is designed improperly or is operated so as to
violate the constitutional rights of individuals, such as to coerce or require individual participation under the threat of criminal sanction, state authority likely is
invalidated.
Since public health is traditionally the exclusive domain of state government, there is no national requirement that contact tracing programs be implemented. This is not to say that federal involvement is minimal. Congress historically has set policy in the area of contact tracing primarily through the
exercise of its Spending Power, which allows the federal government to condi207. Contact tracing traditionally is funded and operated at the state and local levels. While the
federal government does not operate these programs, it does fund contact tracing at the state level.
See, e.g., Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the Resurgence of
Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REV. 111, 132 (1994).
208. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“[T]he police power of a State must be
held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations . . . as will protect the public health and the
public safety.”); see also Lawrence O. Gostin, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Corpus of AntiDiscrimination Law: A Force for Change in the Future of Public Health Regulation, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 89,
91-103 (1993) (explaining how the states hold wide discretion in regulating individual actors to protect the public health).
209. See Hodge, supra note 103 (forthcoming 1998).
210. See supra Table A.
211. See Hodge, supra note 103 (forthcoming 1998).
212. See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38; see also Huffman v. District of Columbia, 39 A.2d 558, 560
(D.C. Cir. 1944) (holding that an attempt to locate and treat partner of index case infected with gonorrhea, as authorized by congressional delegation to local health board, does not violate the constitutional rights of a partner where the measures taken constitute a legitimate exercise of police powers to prevent the spread of communicable diseases).
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tion the receipt of federal funds for contact tracing programs operated by state
213
and local government on adherence to federal standards. Legislation enacted
214
pursuant to the Spending Power has influenced state STD control since 1918.
Although Surgeon General Thomas Parran incorporated contact tracing into
mainstream public health practice in the 1930s, the term was not enumerated in
federal law for four more decades, when Congress passed the Communicable
215
Disease Control Amendments Acts of 1972. These laws authorized the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to grant funds
for case finding and follow up activities, including contact tracing, of infectious
216
individuals with STDs (particularly syphilis and gonorrhea). In 1976, Congress
amended the Acts to authorize the Secretary to make project grants for routine
217
testing, including laboratory tests and follow up efforts, of infected persons.
The Acts were further amended in 1984 to include other sexually transmitted
218
diseases besides syphilis and gonorrhea.
219
Despite being classified as an STD since 1988, Congress has treated HIV
differently from other STDs. In specific response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it
enacted the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE)
220
Act of 1990, amending the Public Health Service Act of 1944. The CARE Act
authorized the DHHS Secretary to provide grants to state public health depart-

213. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
214. Initial federal law concerning the control of STDs did not mention contact tracing. The
Army Appropriations Act of 1918, 42 U.S.C. § 25 (1918) (repealed 1944), created a Division of Venereal Diseases within the Bureau of the Public Health Service to investigate the cause, treatment, and
prevention of venereal diseases. Congress authorized the Division to control and prevent venereal
disease primarily through the isolation and quarantine of those infected. The National Venereal
Disease Act of 1938, 42 U.S.C. § 25(a)-(d) (1938) (repealed 1944), which amended the Army Appropriations Act of 1918, authorized Surgeon General Thomas Parran to prescribe broad rules and
regulations necessary to control and prevent the spread of venereal disease. In 1944, Congress augmented the Surgeon General’s power by authorizing Parran to develop the most effective measures
for the prevention, treatment, and control of venereal diseases and to grant funds to the states to
perform these measures. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 246 (1944); see also supra Part
II.A.1.a).iii).
215. See Communicable Disease Control Amendments Acts of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 247c (1994).
216. See S. REP. NO. 92-825, at 3431 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3430.
217. See Public Health Service Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-317, § 203d(1)(B), 90 Stat. 695, 703-05
(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 247c (1994)).
218. The amendments added genital herpes, chlamydia infections, and other causes of nongonoccal to the Acts. See S. REP. NO. 98-393, at 4818 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4804. The
antiquated term “venereal disease” was replaced with the modern term “sexually transmitted disease.” Preventative Health Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-555, § 3(d)(6)(A)-(B), 98 Stat. 2854,
2855 (1984).
219. See Deborah Dalrymple-Blackburn, Comment, AIDS, Prisoners, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 839, 852 (1995); Abigail English, The HIV-AIDS Epidemic and the Child
Welfare System: Protecting the Rights of Infants, Young Children, and Adolescents, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1509,
1534 n.131 (1992).
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 300ff (1994), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff (West Supp. 1997).
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ments to implement partner notification programs for HIV infected persons.
More recently, Congress passed the Ryan White CARE Act Amendments of
222
It conditioned the receipt of federal funds for partner notification pro1996.
grams by states upon the implementation, via legislative or administrative action, of good faith efforts to notify spouses of index cases infected with HIV and
223
offer testing to them. Other federal legislation concerning contact tracing has
224
been considered but not enacted.
Although the federal government lacks the power to require contact tracing
programs as an STD preventive measure, Congress’ use of its Spending Power to
condition the funding of such programs on compliance with federal guidelines
by states is influential. All states receive federal funding for their contact tracing
programs and therefore virtually all government contact tracing programs in the
225
United States are operated consistent with CDC partner notification guidelines.

221. See 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-46(b) (1994). Congress further authorized the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to monitor and study state HIV partner notification programs to determine: 1) how
many partners notified pursue counseling and testing for HIV; 2) how many of those who pursue
testing are seropositive; 3) the extent to which partner notification results in behavioral changes that
effectively prevent transmission and exposure of HIV to other persons; and 4) whether partner notification programs represent a cost-effective use of available HIV-related resources. See Pub. L. No.
101-381, § 402, 104 Stat. 576, 621-22 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-46 note (1994)).
222. See 42 U.S.C.A. 300ff-13, -101 (West Supp. 1997).
223. The Ryan White CARE Act states that
[t]he Secretary of Health and Human Services shall not make a grant under part B of title
XXVI of the Public Health Service Act . . . to any State unless such State takes administrative or legislative action to require that a good faith effort be made to notify a spouse of a
known HIV-infected patient that such spouse may have been exposed to the human immunodeficiency virus and should seek testing.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-27(a) (West Supp. 1997). “Spouse” is defined as any individual who is the marriage partner of an HIV-infected person or who has been the marriage partner of the infected person
at any time within ten years of diagnosis. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-27(b).
224. Controversial legislation introduced in 1997 by Representative Tom Coburn (R-Okla.),
known as the HIV Prevention Act of 1997, would require states to establish confidential partner notification programs for all partners. See H.R. 1062, 105th Cong. § 1930A(2)(a) (1997); see also Stephanie Stapleton, Treating HIV Like Any Epidemic, 40 AM. MED. NEWS 1, 31 (1997) (stating that bill makes
state funding contingent upon their compliance with partner notification programs, in addition to
HIV tracking and testing requirements). Separate legislation introduced in the House during the
same period by Representatives Nancy Pelosi (D-Cal.) and Connie Morella (R-Md.) would amend
the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247c (1994), to revamp substantially the federal role in
controlling the HIV/AIDS epidemic. See William A. Bailey HIV Prevention Act of 1977, H.R. 1219,
105th Cong. (1997). The bill conditions the receipt of federal funds by state and local governments
and agencies to control the HIV/AIDS epidemic, including funds for partner notification programs,
on numerous federal requirements such as epidemiologic and community resource assessment; local
health boards seeking federal funds for partner notification programs would have to coordinate efforts with state and local community planning groups and demonstrate that the use of funds will be
effective to be entitled to federal support. See H.R. 1219, 105th Cong. § 2532(f) (1997).
225. See, e.g., Partner Notification Programs Seek Less Controversy, More Sensitivity, AIDS ALERT,
Jan. 1994, at 11. Interestingly, recommendations from the CDC’s 1993 Sexually Transmitted Disease
Treatment Guidelines, see 1993 Treatment Guidelines, supra note 94, regarding partner notification are
reflective of the trichotomy of the concept discussed supra Part II. The CDC recommendations are as
follows:
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While the practice of contact tracing varies across jurisdictions, the authority of
states to use contact tracing as a means to control the spread of STDs is wellgrounded in their police powers allowing governmental exercises of authority in
the interests of public health.
B. Interests of Infected Individuals
While governmental interests in contact tracing are grounded firmly in constitutional and statutory exercises of power for the benefit of the public health,
persons infected with STDs have individualized, and often countervailing, interests at stake. Infected persons desire to maintain the privacy of their health
status from unnecessary disclosure and to live in a society free from discrimination. They seek to avoid the invasion of privacy and societal discrimination that
government-sponsored partner notification subrogates in the interest of public
health.
1. Privacy Rights Protections
Contact tracing is criticized for its encumbrance on the privacy interests of
those infected with STDs. Notifying the partners of infected individuals of their
exposure to an STD, whether attempted anonymously through provider referral
programs or explicitly through patient referral programs, necessarily infringes
privacy interests of infected individuals. While the degree of privacy infringement varies depending upon the method of partner notification employed, no
method completely is protective of an individual’s privacy interests. As a result,
partner notification is challenged by infected individuals on the grounds that it is
violative of constitutional, statutory, and common law privacy protections.
These challenges regularly fail in light of the overriding governmental interest in
preserving the public health, the voluntary nature of partner notification, and the
general inadequacy or non-applicability of privacy protections.
Constitutional claims to privacy made by persons with STDs are unlikely to
invalidate partner notification programs. The federal Constitution does not expressly provide individuals with a right to privacy, although the Supreme Court
has recognized a limited right to health information privacy as a liberty interest
226
Other courts have relied on
within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

[(1)] Persons who are HIV-positive should be encouraged to notify their partners and to
refer them for counseling and testing [to satisfy their duty to disclose]. [Medical providers] should assist in this process, if desired by the patient, either directly or through referral to health department partner notification programs [through the traditional method of
contact tracing].
[(2)] If patients are unwilling to notify their partners or if it cannot be assured that their
partners will seek counseling, physicians or health department personnel should use confidential procedures to assure that the partners are notified [in accordance with HCWs’
duty to warn].
1993 Treatment Guidelines, supra note 94.
226. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 495-98
(1995) (providing an in-depth discussion of the privacy rights of individuals in their health care information).
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state constitutional provisions in support of such rights. In either case, constitutional privacy rights are limited. Courts regularly allow infringements on informational privacy through the administration of a flexible test that balances the
228
invasion of privacy against the strength of the governmental interest. Provided

In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Court considered whether the constitutional right to privacy was infringed by a state reporting law that required physicians to relay the names and other
information of persons receiving prescriptions for certain addictive drugs to the state health department. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found no unlawful violation of individual privacy rights as a result of the reporting requirement where the state had adequate standards and procedures to protect the privacy of the information. See id. at 600. The Court explained that the
measures taken by the state health department, including limited access to information and the prevention of on-line interception of computer databases containing such information, were sufficient
to protect individual privacy. See id. at 600-02. Rather than prescribing exacting constitutional standards to protect individual privacy, the Court deferred to the ability of governments to protect information that is private in nature, including health information. See id. at 605-06; see also Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976) (appearing to recognize an independent
right to informational privacy, but upholding reporting and record-keeping requirements that were
reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and properly respected patient confidentiality).
Four months preceding its decision in Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589, the Court acknowledged a narrow
right to privacy in one’s personal communications in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S. 425 (1977), although it again deferred to the ability of government sources to protect such privacy interests. See id. at 458-62. Against a challenge by former President Richard Nixon, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute directing the General Services Administration to take
custody of Presidential materials and to have them screened by federal archivists. See id. at 484. The
Court based its opinion on the limited intrusion of the screening process, the appellant’s status as a
public figure, his lack of expectation of privacy in the overwhelming majority of materials, and the
virtual impossibility of segregating the small quantity of private materials without comprehensive
screening. See id. at 465. It emphasized that the statute’s sensitivity to the President’s legitimate privacy interests and the unblemished record of the archivists for discretion sufficiently guarded
against any infringement of personal privacy. See id. But see J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th
Cir. 1981) (holding that the right to privacy does not extend to a general right to nondisclosure of
personal information). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in DeSanti relied on Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976), in rejecting a constitutional right to informational privacy. See DeSanti, 653 F. 2d
at 1090. In Davis, the Supreme Court held that publication by the police department of a person’s
arrest for shoplifting did not raise a constitutional question, relying, in part, on the fact that there
was no constitutional bar to government publishing a record of an official act such as an arrest. See
Davis, 424 U.S. at 712-13.
227. See, e.g., Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 570 P.2d 469, 476 (Alaska 1977) (citing the
Alaska constitutional provision guaranteeing a right to privacy); People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738,
742 (Cal. 1983) (citing a provision of the California Constitution that recognizes a patient’s right to
privacy, but holding that the right is not absolute); see also ROBERT E. SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE
AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 17-18 (1981) (listing state constitutional amendments designed to protect a variety of privacy interests, including limits on access to personal information).
228. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458 (“[A]ny intrusion must be weighed against the public interest in
subjecting the Presidential materials . . . to archival screening.”); see also United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (enunciating six factors developed by the Third
Circuit to be balanced in determining the scope of the constitutional right to informational privacy:
(1) the type of record and the information it contains; (2) the potential for harm in any unauthorized
disclosure; (3) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; (4)
the adequacy of safeguards to prevent nonconsensual disclosure; (5) the degree of need for access;
and (6) whether there is a recognizable public interest or statutory mandate).
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229

the government articulates a valid societal purpose and employs reasonable
security measures, courts have not interfered with traditional governmental activities of health information collection and distribution. The constitutional right
230
to privacy, in the context of public health, has proven to be nominal, especially
in instances where, as with contact tracing, government policies protect individual privacy to the degree possible and individuals are not compelled to comply
with contact tracing programs. Where contact tracing programs represent a traditional method of public health control of infectious diseases and are operated
in a manner that safeguards the privacy interests of individuals who voluntarily
participate, constitutional privacy rights are thus largely are not implicated.
Statutory protections of personal privacy either are not pertinent or are
trumped by legislative directive authorizing partner notification. While the federal government has enacted several statutes and regulations to protect privacy
of health information, such protections do not pertain to partner notification ef231
forts conducted at the state and local level. States have enacted health information privacy protection in many forms, including laws similar to the federal
232
233
A few states
Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).
have passed comprehensive medical information statutes that prohibit medical
providers from disclosing identifiable health information without a patient’s
234
written consent, unless the disclosure is required or authorized by law, as is the
case with reporting requirements for STDs or pursuant to duties to disclose or
warn.

229. See, e.g., Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1560 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding the city’s financial disclosure law furthered a substantial state interest in deterring corruption and conflicts of
interest); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d at 578-79 (noting strong public interest in facilitating
research and investigations of National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health); Schachter v.
Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding information in medical records crucial to implementation of sound state policy of investigating licensed physicians for medical misconduct).
230. Individuals asserting a constitutional right to informational privacy are unlikely to obtain a
remedy except in cases where the state fails to assert any significant interest or is particularly careless in disclosing highly sensitive information. See Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376
(D.N.J. 1990) (holding that a police officer violated constitutional right to privacy by disclosing that a
person was infected with HIV); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (extending the
constitutional right to privacy to disclosure of a prisoner’s HIV status by prison medical service personnel) (holding that giving chaplains open access to patient medical records violated privacy rights
of patients), aff’d, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990); Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.
Iowa 1987), aff’d in part and modified in part, 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988).
231. Federal legislation such as the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(3), (6) (1994), which
requires federal agencies to utilize fair information practices with regard to the collection, use, or
dissemination of systematized records, and the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (“FOIA”), 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1994), which exempts from governmental disclosure several categories of records,
which include health information, apply primarily to federal agencies, not necessarily to state actors
whose only federal connection is partial funding. Other federal regulations requiring privacy protections in relation to the treatment of persons for drug or alcohol dependency in federally-funded
facilities, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994), and the administration of human subject research, 45 C.F.R. §§
46.101-.404 (1993), simply do not apply to state-run contact tracing programs.
232. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 91-99 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997-1998).
233. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-61-1, -10, -11, 13, -15, -17 (1991 & Supp. 1997).
234. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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States have also passed disease-specific privacy laws, including privacy
235
236
laws concerning HIV infection or AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases.
These state laws probably are not applicable to contact tracing for two reasons.
237
First, contact tracing expressly is authorized by state statute and courts are
likely to defer to the specific purpose of these statutes of notifying partners of
their risk of infection. Second, contact tracing relies on voluntary cooperation of
persons with infection. By voluntarily disclosing the names of partners, individuals appear to waive their statutory right to privacy in relation to these disclosures.
These same conclusions can be reached concerning common law protections. As previously discussed, the common law imposes a duty of confidentiality on certain health care professionals not to disclose the confidences of their
238
patients. As with statutory privacy protections, the primary exception to the
duty of confidentiality in this context is the Tarasoff duty of HCWs to warn unknowing partners of their exposure to infection to protect them from contracting
239
Whether in the form of a
a communicable or sexually transmitted infection.
240
241
duty or privilege to warn, the exercise of this form of partner notification undercuts the privacy interests an infected person may expect from the doctorpatient relationship. In this way, partner notification breaks down the privacy
expectations of doctors and patients for the limited purpose of notifying third
parties.
Despite significant privacy protections governing individual health information at the federal and state levels, governmental interests in partner notification override privacy protections in instances where partners are informed
through procedures that are statutorily mandated and respectful of the privacy
interests of infected persons.

235. See Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of AIDS: Legislative
Options, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 155 (1990) (examining state legislation dealing with HIV-related problems in medical privacy laws).
236. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 463-65
(1986) (arguing for reform of the states’ public health statutes to respond to modern notions of disease and privacy).
237. See supra Table B.
238. See supra Part II.C.1.
239. See Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 189 (D. Neb. 1980) (holding that the
psychotherapist of patient who shot two people is liable for foreseeable harm caused by failure to
exercise due care in assessing the patient’s risk of danger to others); Hoffmann v. Blackmon, 241 So.
2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (finding a doctor liable to family members infected by his patient for negligent failure to diagnose a contagious disease); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 183
N.Y.S.2d 351, 357-58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (holding that having diagnosed a contagious disease, tuberculosis, a doctor was under a duty to warn members of the patient’s family); see also Alan A.
Stone, The Tarasoff Decision: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976);
Toni P. Wise, Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of
Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165 (1978).
240. See supra Part II.C.1.
241. See supra Part II.C.2.
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2. Anti-Discrimination Protections
Discrimination against persons with STDs, particularly those infected with
242
HIV, is a serious concern of infected individuals and of society in general.
Since most STDs are not transmissible through casual contact, discrimination in
the form of access barriers to employment, public accommodations, and services
243
is especially egregious and morally unwarranted. Discrimination against persons with HIV and other STDs nevertheless takes many forms, including refusal
to provide medical treatment, adverse employment decisions, and refusals to
244
contract. Persons living with HIV/AIDS are stereotyped by society as homosexuals, drug users, or prostitutes, and often are relegated to a lesser social
status. As a result, individuals with HIV who participate in contact tracing programs often fear discrimination should their identities be revealed. They similarly may ignore their duty to disclose their HIV status to their partners for fear
that such information would be circulated generally throughout the community.
Adequate legal protection against discrimination is critical to successful public
health strategies because it encourages participation of persons living with
HIV/AIDS.
Legislatures at the state and federal levels proscribe discrimination against
245
246
persons with disabilities. The federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities by private actors and
state and local governments. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits such dis247
crimination by the federal government and others receiving federal funding.
Together these laws establish national anti-discrimination protection for persons

242.

One commentator has noted that

[p]eople infected with HIV have much to fear besides the disease. Because of the association of AIDS with promiscuity, primarily homosexual but also heterosexual, or the selfabandonment connected with intravenous (IV) drug use, any adult with AIDS is suspected of degeneracy. . . . The level of public ignorance about the disease, the deficiency of
scientific understanding surrounding aspects of its transmission, and the general hysteria
about AIDS mean that people diagnosed as HIV positive must face social, economic, and
medical hurdles no one with such dire medical prospects should have to confront. . . . A
diagnosis of HIV infection, or even suspicion of this, is sufficient in some cases to deprive
people of housing, employment, life and health insurance, social tolerance, routine and
even emergency medical treatment like mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, schooling, social
contacts, friendships, the right to travel in and out of countries—a social identity.
Ferdinand Schoeman, AIDS and Privacy, in AIDS & ETHICS 240, 241 (Frederic G. Reamer ed., 1991).
243. See Ronald Bayer & Larry Gostin, Legal and Ethical Issues in AIDS, in 2 CURRENT TOPICS IN
AIDS 263, 264-65 (M.S. Gottlieb et al. eds., 1989).
244. See Burr, supra note 20, at 58 (citing ELINOR BURKETT, THE GRAVEST SHOW ON EARTH (1995));
Larry Tye, AIDS Patients’ Partners Tracked, Informed: Colorado Says Its Program Fights Spread of Disease
While Protecting Privacy, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 1993, at 1.
245. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WHO ARE HIV POSITIVE: THE
AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV DISEASE AND AIDS 220-21
(1996) (citing AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION AIDS PROJECT, EPIDEMIC OF FEAR: A SURVEY OF AIDS
DISCRIMINATION IN THE 1980S AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1990S 83-134 (1990)).
246. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
247. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994).
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with HIV. Many state and local governments also have laws that prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities generally or against persons with
249
HIV/AIDS specifically.
A critically important question under disability discrimination law is
whether it covers persons in the early stages of STD or HIV infection. The definition of disability under the ADA focuses on the existence of a substantial im250
pairment of a life function, or the perception or record of such impairment.
Certainly once an STD, including HIV, infection creates serious impairments, it
becomes a disability within the meaning of the statute. In the past, courts regu251
larly found that pure asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability, but recent

248. The federal acts specifically prohibit discrimination against disabled persons, which may
include persons with HIV, in matters of employment, in places of public accommodation, and in the
provision of public services. See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 245, at 221. Persons discriminated
against are entitled to bring civil suits requesting injunctive relief and can request that the United
States Attorney General investigate alleged violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (1994); 28 C.F.R. §§
36.501-.502 (1994).
Virtually all health care providers are prohibited by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
from refusing to treat HIV-infected individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104
(1997) (listing places of public accommodation). The ADA also prohibits the unequal provision of
services (such as the failure of a doctor to treat an HIV-positive individual for certain conditions that
he would normally treat in sero-negative patients) unless necessary, see 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(1)(A)(iii); the separate or distinct provision of services (such as the use of special facilities
for the treatment of HIV-positive persons), see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i); and the use of eligibility
criteria that effectively screen out HIV-infected individuals (such as a medical provider that requires
prospective patients to demonstrate they are HIV-negative) unless necessary, see 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
Places of public accommodation, which include virtually every public business, see 42 U.S.C. §
12181(7), and government-operated facility, see §§ 12131-12165, are prohibited from discriminating
against persons with HIV. HIV-infected individuals who face unjustified discrimination at their
place of employment in nearly any aspect of the employment relationship can file complaints with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is required to investigate meritbased allegations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (1997) (listing what constitutes discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability). After administrative remedies are exhausted, a grievant can file a civil suit against the employer to demand equitable relief (such as reinstatement and back pay in cases of wrongful termination) and seek compensatory and punitive
damages where the discrimination is shown to be intentional. See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 245,
at 264-65.
Housing discrimination against disabled persons, including those infected with HIV, is unlawful
under a variety of federal, state, and local laws, see id. at 274-87, including the Fair Housing Act, see
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994). Landlords and real estate agents thus cannot discriminate against
HIV-positive persons in the rental or sale of most dwellings without being subject to civil suit, see 42
U.S.C. § 3613, or other governmental actions, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3614(a).
249. See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 245, at 221; see also Josephine Gillter & Sharon Rennert,
HIV Infection Among Women and Children and Antidiscrimination Law: An Overview, 77 IOWA L. REV.
1313, 1384 n.325 (listing many state statutes regarding HIV anti-discrimination protections).
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining disability with respect to an individual as: “(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment”).
251. See Chalk v. United States, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist.
No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376
(C.D. Cal. 1987); see also Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of
the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 16-27 (1997).
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252

cases question these findings; the Supreme Court, at the time of this writing,
granted certiori to decide, inter alia, whether a person with pure asymptomatic
253
HIV infection is a person with a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
The intent of anti-discrimination laws at the federal and state levels is to
create an environment in which persons infected with HIV and other STDs (to
the degree that their condition qualifies as a disability) are not subject to discrimination. The reality is, however, that discrimination of innumerable types
continues, causing infected persons to continue to fear the possibility that their
254
Partner notification
condition may become known to certain individuals.
makes that possibility more probable by collecting and disseminating information to partners who are likely to know them well, or at least by name. Despite
the efforts of some contact tracing programs to maintain the confidentiality of
index cases, breaches continue to occur and identities are revealed regularly.
Where notification of partners remains the priority of partner notification, the
concerns of infected individuals regarding discrimination, like their concerns
about the privacy of their health status, remain largely unresolved through social
legislation.
IV. ETHICAL ANALYSIS BEHIND PARTNER NOTIFICATION
A. Norms and Consequences
255

As argued previously, partner notification poses serious risks to privacy.
Infected persons may be members of societally disfavored groups such as sex
workers, injection drug users, or gays. Disclosure of their status can result in social stigma among their family and friends. They also are vulnerable to dis256
Health records maincrimination in employment, housing, and insurance.
tained and used by the government worry persons at risk; the potential release

252. See Abbott v. Bragdon, No. 96-1643, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3870, at *5-22 (1st Cir. Mar. 5,
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997) (subjecting patient with HIV who brought a Title III claim
against her dentist who refused to treat her to an individualized assessment of whether her circumstances qualified her as disabled, and so finding in the affirmative); Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of
Md., 123 F.3d 156, 167 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (concluding that asymptomatic HIV does not constitute a statutory disability, thus essentially denying these individuals ADA protection); Ennis v. National Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) (overlooking the overwhelming legislative history of the ADA that HIV infection constituted a disability to state in dicta that an
asymptomatic HIV-positive child was not disabled under the individualized assessment required by
the ADA); Cortes v. McDonald’s Corp., 955 F. Supp. 541, 544-47 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (finding under individualized assessment that HIV-positive employee who was asymptomatic and appeared well
was not disabled for the purposes of the ADA); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (challenging the standard conception of HIV infection as a “disability” under the
ADA, although ultimately agreeing it was in the case of an HIV-positive attorney); see also Parmet &
Jackson, supra note 251, at 32-39 (analyzing cases).
253. See Abbott, at *1.
254. See Brandt, supra note 70, at 482 (“To ask persons to voluntarily name contacts when neither
the index patient nor the partner are adequately protected from discrimination or assured of adequate services will lead to suspicion and justifiable skepticism among those at greatest risk.”).
255. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
256. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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of STD or AIDS registries can cause embarrassment and harm.
Legislatures
and courts, moreover, may use these registries for pernicious purposes. In Illinois, for example, a statute was enacted, but not implemented, which would
258
have required cross-matching the state HIV registry with a database of HCWs.
HCWs infected with HIV would have been dismissed or excluded from certain
259
medical practices. Courts also can require disclosure of a person’s HIV status
260
Infected persons also may be concerned with disclofor litigation purposes.
sure to sex or needle-sharing partners. Such disclosures could, at minimum,
could estrange their lovers, and, more importantly, lead to domestic violence of a
261
physical or psychological nature. In addition, partners who are knowledgeable
about the source of their exposure to an STD can disseminate information about
the infected status of their partners to others.
At the same time, the partners of infected persons have an equally powerful
claim that they have a “right to know” of the potential exposure to infection.
Partners claim, with some justification, that they have a right to accurate knowledge to guide their behavior. Without this knowledge, they cannot weigh adequately the risks of sexual or needle-sharing activities. Failure to warn imposes
harsh consequences when an STD is contracted.
The core conceptual problem is that the claim of one individual in a relationship in which an STD is introduced must take precedence; infected individuals cannot maintain their privacy while at the same time making their partners
262
fully aware of their risk of exposure. While the law provides its own answer to
263
this problem, normative or consequentialist reasoning should be examined to
help to resolve the conflict.
1. Privacy
Infected persons have a strong ethical claim to the privacy of their medical
264
Privacy interests, howdiagnosis, records, and their health status generally.
ever, are sacrificed when necessary to reduce a risk to their sex partners. The
degree of sacrifice varies depending upon the form of partner notification.
Where partner notification is performed pursuant to one’s duty to disclose, privacy interests are swept aside since the duty requires infected individuals to in-

257. See Sue Landry, AIDS List is Out: State Investigating Breach, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 20,
1996, at A1 (disclosing the names of an HIV registry to a dating service).
258. See Act of Oct. 4, 1991, Ill. Pub. Act 87-763 (1991).
259. See id.
260. See, e.g., Doe v. American Nat’l Red Cross, 151 F.R.D. 71 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (indicating that
persons need to know blood donor’s identity when Red Cross screening practices are in question
although such information is excluded from the court record); Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp.
898 (D.V.I. 1991) (requiring a defendant in a rape trial to submit to HIV testing to ascertain whether
victim was exposed to virus).
261. See infra notes 304-08 and accompanying text.
262. See Rotello, supra note 88, at A23 (“The rights of infected people must be balanced against
the right of all people to protect themselves.”).
263. See supra Part II.B-C.
264. See Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 119 (Mass. 1985) (“[T]he confidentiality of the
[doctor-patient] relationship is a cardinal rule of the medical profession, faithfully adhered to in
most instances, and thus has come to be justifiably relied upon by patients seeking advice and
treatment.”).
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265

form their partners of their own health status. Although bound to maintain the
confidentiality of a patient’s medical records in light of the HCW/patient rela266
tionship, HCWs nevertheless are compelled ethically, in limited circumstances,
to inform partners of their exposure to infection under a duty or privilege to
267
Whenever a HCW is compelled under a duty to warn unsuspecting
warn.
partners, the confidentiality of infected individuals is compromised. In most
cases, the fulfillment of the duty to warn requires the HCW to identify specifically the source of exposure to partners so they are aware of the actual source of
268
Privacy interests of infected individuals thus are not preserved
danger.
through the fulfillment of the duty to disclose or warn.
Contact tracing programs attempt to preserve the privacy interests of infected individuals in two principal ways: (1) contact tracing programs are vol269
untary in nature; and (2) many programs attempt to conceal the identity of the
270
index case from exposed partners to protect the index case’s confidentiality. In
reality, however, neither of these protections are wholly effective in limiting the
incursion on privacy interests. To the extent that contact tracing is voluntary, the
privacy interests of infected individuals are protected since they can choose not
to participate. Neither infected persons nor their physicians, however, can avoid
their respective duty to disclose or warn. Since contact tracing offers a means
through which partners can be notified in satisfaction of these duties, participation is not merely encouraged. Rather, contact tracing presents the better of
three options facing an individual infected with an STD in many jurisdictions:
either notify your partners on your own without any assistance, await the action
of your doctor who notifies your partners of your infection, or participate in a
contact tracing program where counseling and other assistance is available.
Contact tracing thus can be viewed not so much as a voluntary choice of individuals, but rather as a preferred method of satisfying a legal duty.

265. See supra text accompanying note 127-28.
266. See Martha Swartz, Is There a Duty to Warn?, HUMAN RIGHTS, Spring 1990, at 41, 42 (“The
duty to maintain the confidentiality of information revealed during the course of medical treatment
originated in the Hippocratic Oath and is reaffirmed in the Principles of Medical Ethics” that prohibit physicians from revealing medical information unless “he is required to do so by law” or
“where it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.”
(internal quotations omitted)); see also Morton Winston, Case Studies: AIDS and a Duty to Protect,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1987, at 22, 22 (“The American College of Physicians Ethics Manual
(1984) states that ‘the physician shall keep secret all that he knows about the patient and release no
information without the patient’s consent, unless required by the law or unless resulting harm to
others outweighs his duty to his patient.’”).
267. See supra Part II.C.; see also Frederick G. Reamer, AIDS, Social Work, and the “Duty to Protect,”
36 SOC. WORK 56 (1991) (concerning duty to warn arising in context of social worker’s knowledge of
client’s infection despite confidentiality rights of client); Eugene Schlossberger & Lorna Hecker, HIV
and Family Therapists’ Duty to Warn: A Legal and Ethical Analysis, 22 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 27
(1996) (concerning duty of family therapists to warn others in context of HIV infection of client).
268. See supra Part II.C.1.
269. See James F. Childress, Contact Tracing: A Liberal-Communitarian Perspective, THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY, Winter 1990-91, at 69, 72; see also BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE
FOR CLINICIANS 50 (1995) (stating that “partner notification depends on the voluntary cooperation of
infected persons”).
270. See Childress, supra note 269, at 73.
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While the success of contact tracing largely is tied to “the record of public
271
health officials in preserving the confidentiality of the information obtained,”
attempts to conceal the identities of those who voluntarily participate usually are
272
in vain. The maintenance of patient confidentiality through contact tracing is a
273
factual myth. Confidentiality is breached by the mere participation in contact
tracing programs since public health authorities become aware of the STD status
and identity of index cases for the sole purpose of assisting in the dissemination
274
of exposure information to partners. Many partners independently are aware
of the source of their infection when contacted. Partners who learn directly or
indirectly of the identity of index cases may relay information about the index
case to others. Confidentiality is also an ethical myth as an infected individual’s
privacy rights cannot be preserved where she discloses her private facts to an
agency that intends to disclose that information to partners who the infected person knows and who likely know her. Persons who predominantly benefit from
confidentiality protections of contact tracing are often the same persons whose
lifestyles involve risky behaviors with numerous partners whose identities are
either unknown or cannot be recalled over long time periods, as seen with STDs
275
like syphilis and HIV that have long asymptomatic periods. As a result, pri-

271. CASWELL A. EVANS, JR. ET AL., AMERICAN PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, CONTACT TRACING AND
PARTNER NOTIFICATION: A REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON AIDS OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
HEALTH ASSOCIATION 4 (1988).
272. While some degree of confidentiality is preserved through contact tracing, how much is
preserved depends on the method employed. Since patient referral programs are premised on the
voluntary disclosure of seropositivity by index cases, the confidentiality of the index case’s identity
and STD status unavoidably is breached. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07. Conditional
referral programs at least give the index case the option of notifying partners directly or requesting
the confidential assistance of trained public health personnel where notification proves too difficult.
Like provider referral, conditional referral programs attempt to preserve the identity of index cases
by withholding the name of the index case from partners informed through professional public
health counselors. Confidentiality, however, is not guaranteed. The identities of index cases are
assumed regularly by partners who have engaged exclusively in at-risk behaviors with an index case
or are able to rule out other sources of infection. Spouses, long-time, faithful partners, one-time customers of commercial sex workers, steady IDU partners, and others thus basically are notified of the
identity of the source of their exposure through contact tracing programs. See supra text accompanying notes 108-14.
273. While a great deal of studies are conducted on the efficacy of partner notification programs,
including in relation to their ability to protect the confidentiality of index cases, see infra Part V.A, no
study has sought to prove that the confidentiality of index cases is maintained by interviewing partners within a reasonable time after notification to determine if partners were able to determine correctly the identity of index cases through their own efforts.
274. See Karen H. Rothenberg et al., The AIDS Project: Creating a Public Health Policy—Rights and
Obligations of Health Care Workers, 48 MD. L. REV. 93, 172 (1989). The dissemination of confidential
information about index cases by public health authorities other than for the limited purpose of notifying partners anonymously, however, is statutorily prohibited in many states, even where the index
case authorizes the authorities to release such information. See, e.g., Grattan v. People, 480 N.E.2d
714, 716 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that public health authorities rightfully refused under statutory
authority to honor subpoena duces tecum for the production of the confidential records of a 16-year
old girl who participated in a contact tracing program and subsequently waived her confidentiality
in the records for the purpose of introducing portions into a criminal investigation).
275. Contact tracing is difficult with a disease such as HIV because
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vacy interests of infected persons are sacrificed through systematic contact tracing programs that in reality are not completely voluntary nor confidential.
2. “Right to Know”
Balanced against the claims of infected persons to privacy are the equally
compelling claims of their partners to be informed of the risk. Sex partners un276
derstandably seek to know unforeseen dangers of which others are aware.
Partners claim a “right” to know that they have been exposed to infection because (1) knowledge empowers individuals to avoid continuing risks; (2) knowledge of infection allows for early treatment; and (3) knowledgeable partners can
277
adapt their behavior to prevent further transmission of infection to others. Just
as partner notification does not protect fully the privacy rights of infected persons, it also fails to protect fully their partners’ privacy rights. Since contact
tracing is by its nature voluntary, index cases are not compelled to participate.
Even when index cases choose to participate, they do not have to provide the
names of any or all partners, or even to notify partners under patient or conditional referral programs. In addition, a high percentage of partners cannot be
located due to inadequate or incorrect information volunteered by index cases.
Conditional and provider referral programs do not actually provide the
names of the sources of potential infection to partners, thus leaving some partners with inadequate information to protect themselves fully against a known
threat. Although counseling is offered on how to protect oneself against STD infection, not all persons notified of their exposure choose to receive counseling.
Some partners, therefore, relinquish their own right to know. Under patient,
provider, or conditional referral programs, many partners thus are not informed
completely about their risk of infection.
While the exercise of a duty to disclose imposed on infected individuals or a
duty to warn imposed on HCWs would resolve some of the weaknesses of contact tracing programs by specifically notifying partners of the sources of their
exposure, such duties do not result in reliable notification of partners. Infected
individuals regularly ignore their legal duty to disclose without being subjected
to significant legal ramifications. HCWs also can be reluctant to notify even
when required to do so, as laws that specify when HCWs have a duty to warn
can be lofty and difficult to measure. Strong confidentiality measures concerning patient records and medical information, and the threat of legal and administrative action for unnecessary breaches of confidentiality prevent many HCWs

the long period of infectiousness of HIV as well as the current inability to render persons
noninfectious further diminishes the potential advantages of tracing contacts. It is important to recognize that the problem with partner notification in this instance is not that it
violates civil liberties or that it is intrusive or stigmatizing (although these are important
concerns), but the great uncertainty that it effectively serves the goals of public health and
welfare.
Brandt, supra note 70, at 482 (citation omitted).
276. See Morton E. Winston, AIDS, Confidentiality, and the Right to Know, PUB. AFF. Q., Apr. 1988,
at 91, 99 (arguing that revelation of confidential information is justified when the information revealed may protect those at risk).
277. See Childress, supra note 269, at 74; see also Schoeman, supra note 242, at 266.
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from warning partners. Privilege to warn statutes allow HCWs the option of
warning in some cases without legal sanctions either for breaches of confidenti279
ality or for failures to warn.
3. Normative Analysis
Both infected persons and their partners can make normative claims about
invasion of autonomy. Persons with infection suggest that principles respect for
280
autonomy militate in favor of privacy. Individuals have the right to control the
281
use of health information. Furthermore, “[t]he principle of respect for autonomy . . . includes the right to decide insofar as possible what will happen to one’s
282
person—to one’s body, to information about one’s life, to one’s secrets, etc.” A
patient’s health status, it is argued, ought not to be disclosed without their con283
sent. Partners also appeal to autonomy in claiming a right to know. Partners
cannot make rational, autonomous choices in the absence of relevant information.
Both parties base their normative arguments on the principle of autonomy.
However, autonomy, when properly understood, favors the partner’s claim.
Autonomy supports certain legitimate claims to personal information and decisionmaking for which others interests in confidentiality are insufficient to with284
Autonomous individuals have the right to engage in behold information.
285
The autonomous interests of infected persons,
haviors of their choosing.
286
however, are not absolute. Autonomy, in its most traditional sense, does not
287
A person with
extend to behavior that can result in serious harm to others.
HIV infection has no legitimate ethical claim that maintaining her confidentiality

278. See supra Part II.C.1.
279. See LO, supra note 269, at 53. Such privilege to warn statutes place the decision of whether
to protect a patient’s confidentiality or to warn an innocent partner into the hands of HCWs. See id.
The notification of similarly-situated sexual partners of infected individuals is left arbitrarily to the
discretion of a select few HCWs, thus resulting in potentially uneven and unfair applications. See id.
280. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 126 (4th
ed. 1994) (“Correlative to [respect for autonomy] is the right to self-determination, which supports
various autonomy rights, including those of confidentiality and privacy.”).
281. See id. at 408 (noting that “information about persons is an important part of privacy”).
282. Id. at 410.
283. See, e.g., id. at 142-46.
284. See id. at 424.
285. See id. at 120; see also Winston, supra note 276, at 92 (“The first and most powerful justification for the rule of confidentiality derives from the individual’s right, flowing from autonomy, to
control personal information and to protect privacy.”). These interests can be defined in terms of
privacy and knowledge; privacy, connoting one’s “control over the intimacies of personal identity,”
is a key component of individual autonomy. See Schoeman, supra note 242, at 242. Knowledge is
the requirement that autonomous individuals act with knowledge of factors that affect them personally. See id.
286. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 280, at 126 (“The principle of respect for autonomy
should be viewed as establishing a stalwart right of authority to control one’s personal destiny, but
not as the only source of moral obligations and rights.”).
287. See id. at 126 (noting that “[i]f our choices endanger the public health, potentially harm innocent others, or require a scarce resource for which no funds are available, others can justifiably
restrict our exercises of autonomy”).
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justifies failure to protect others from potential harm, especially where the threat
288
of harm is imminent or the consequences of such harm particularly are serious.
The claim of partners to adequate information necessary to support an
autonomous decision is stronger. Partners who engage in sexual relations cannot act rationally without knowledge of the consequences. While a partner is
free to consent or refuse sex, that choice is meaningless unless it is made with
reasonable knowledge of the risks. Partner notification, then, may be justified by
a partner’s autonomy right to truthful information to guide their behavior.
4. Consequentialist Analysis
Consequentialist theory supports adopting policies that, on balance, pro289
duce the greatest benefit for populations as a whole. The balance of the ethical
claims of infected individuals to their privacy and of partners to know depends
on the extent to which the recognition of such claims is likely to lead to improved
health among the general population. Determining the balance between these
competing interests is complex. The objective is to balance the respective interests of infected persons and their partners in such a way that societal health is
maximized. What remains unresolved is whether partner notification represents
the proper balance.
Many partners believe that their chances for preserving their individual
health rely in substantial part on notification of risk. It follows, they argue, that
universal notification would improve all partners’ chances. Yet, many infected
persons, particularly women, counter this observation by documenting the costs
of partner notification on infected individuals. Retribution in the form of do290
mestic violence and abuse is a serious consequence of partner notification. In
addition, there is a legitimate, unresolved concern that universal partner notification would drive infected persons underground, effectively hiding their STDpositive status from virtually everyone, including partners, doctors, and family
members. Determining whether partner notification provides a net benefit to
relevant populations truly depends on its efficacy. Privacy rights of infected individuals should yield only if partner notification works meaningfully to alter
risk behaviors and to reduce the incidence of HIV and other STDs. This requires
291
a systematic empirical analysis that is discussed later in this Article.

288.

See id. at 426. Tom Beauchamp & James Childress note that

[m]any well-grounded reasons support the practice of informing spouses and sexual partners (past and present) that a particular person has tested positive for exposure to the
AIDS virus. For example, if people are at risk of serious harms, and the disclosure is necessary to prevent—and probably would prevent—the harms (to spouses or lovers or, if
they are already infected, to their partners), disclosure is usually justified.
Id.
289.
290.
291.

See id. at 126-27.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V.
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B. Feminist Theories and Sexual Ethics
Feminists have long supported the idea that women should be informed
292
about their sexual risks. In many ways, feminist theory simply reinforces the
normative arguments previously discussed because women claim that they cannot make autonomous decisions absent critical information regarding risks they
face. However, there are several characteristics of sexual transmission of diseases that suggest a distinct feminist perspective. For reasons of biology, epidemiology, and vulnerability, the “right to know” particularly is pertinent to
women.
From a biological perspective, women have an elevated risk, as compared
293
to men, of contracting disease within the context of a heterosexual relationship.
294
Some STDs, such as syphilis, are more difficult for women to detect than men.
This increased biological risk also can be seen epidemiologically. Women cur295
rently comprise one of the fastest growing groups of people with HIV/AIDS,
296
with increased infection rates seen most heavily among minority women.
In addition, women are much more vulnerable within relationships, often
being economically dependent and subject to physical and psychological abuse.
Partner notification assumes that individuals can control their exposure to the

292. Despite the focus of contact tracing programs on female prostitutes during the 1930s era of
Thomas Parran, such programs were supported by feminist groups as a way to protect innocent
women from infection. As previously discussed, the modern concept of the duty to disclose one’s
infectious diseases originated from civil lawsuits and criminal actions brought by women against
their husbands through whom they became infected with venereal diseases. See supra Part II.B.
These cases eventually resulted in the overturning of the historic legal fiction of interspousal immunity that had immunized husbands against such actions in the past. See supra text accompanying
notes 141-46.
293. See Shelton, supra note 3, at 12; see also Janie Simmons et al., A Global Perspective, in WOMEN,
POVERTY, AND AIDS: SEX, DRUGS, AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE 39, 47-48 (Paul Farmer et al. eds.,
1996).
294. See Blank et al., supra note 85, at 218-19 (“Syphilis infections in women pose a significant
challenge to control programs: women are less likely than men to notice painless reproductive tract
lesions and are therefore less likely to seek medical care for signs and symptoms of syphilis.”).
295. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HIV/AIDS PREVENTION 1 (July 1997) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS PREVENTION]; Karen H. Rothenberg &
Stephen J. Paskey, The Risk of Domestic Violence and Women with HIV Infection: Implications for Partner
Notification, Public Policy, and the Law, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1569, 1569 (1995); Pascale M. Wortley
& Patricia L. Fleming, AIDS in Women in the United States, 278 JAMA 911 (1997).
296. In 1996, African-American and Hispanic women accounted for 59% and 19%, respectively,
of AIDS cases reported among women; these respective rates are 17 and 6 times greater than AIDS
reported for white women in the same year. See HIV/AIDS PREVENTION, supra note 295, at 2. In
1994, African-American and Hispanic females accounted for more than 75% of AIDS cases diagnosed among women. See John K. Watters, HIV Test Results, Partner Notification, and Personal Conduct, 346 LANCET 326 (1995).
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297

disease. Many women, however, lack control over their own exposure because
of their inability to make critical life choices due to poverty, domestic violence,
298
Women may lack the power in their relationships to reand discrimination.
299
quire male partners to refrain from sex or to use condoms. Partner notification
programs that focus on the role of individuals as agents in the effort to control
epidemic STDs may neglect the status of women who societally are dependent
on their partners, and thus do not possess the same amount of control over their
risk of exposure as most men do.
To the extent that public health strategies reflect a masculine structure of
personal responsibility, they ignore the reality of many women’s lives, including
the imminent threat of physical abuse at the hands of notified male partners. Researchers have identified a strong link between AIDS and violence that for
300
women translates into an epidemic potential for domestic abuse. Where partner notification has the potential to result in domestic violence against women,
“[t]he risk of physical harm to the female patient from her partner may be
301
greater than the potential benefit of warning the partner.”
Even if women do have the economic and physical power to require
changes in the sexual behavior of their partners, they may not be aware of the
risks. Women often do not know they are at risk, or only learn of their positive

297. The focus of partner notification on individuals is contrary to the principle of feminist ethics
that rejects societal concentration on individual rights or freedoms, looking instead to societal relations and the social context of rights. See Karen Lebacqz, Feminism and Bioethics: An Overview,
SECOND OPINION, Oct. 1991, at 11, 14-15 (“Feminist ethics, therefore, is explicitly political—it asks
about the distribution of power, about who gains and who loses in any action or transaction, about
the possibilities for exploitation of those who are relatively powerless.”); see also John Hardwig,
Should Women Think in Terms of Rights?, in FEMINISM & POLITICAL THEORY 53, 62 (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 1990) (“One of the tools of [the] oppression [of women] has been the one-sided definition of and
insistence on the rights of the men in personal relationships.”).
298. See Paul Farmer, Women, Poverty, and AIDS, in WOMEN, POVERTY, AND AIDS, supra note 293,
at 3, 4-5; see also ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG, THE PEOPLE’S HEALTH: A MEMOIR OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND
ITS EVOLUTION AT HARVARD 163 (1997) (“In many AIDS-plagued countries, for example, women’s
low status, lack of education, and economic dependence on men are so ingrained that AIDS is easily
spread despite educational programs.”).
299. See Shelton, supra note 3, at 12.
300. See Richard L. North & Karen H. Rothenberg, Partner Notification and the Threat of Domestic
Violence Against Women with HIV Infection, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1194, 1195 (1993). As one New
York City caseworker described in her eyewitness account of a HIV-positive woman’s disclosure of
her HIV infection to her husband: “When she told him, he said So you have AIDS?’—then, hysterical sobbing, crying. After he pulled himself together the first thing he did was attack her.” Nina
Bernstein, When Women Aren’t Told Their Lovers Are Dying of AIDS, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 3, 1993, at
52.
301. North & Rothenberg, supra note 300, at 1195 (arguing that this is true especially since medical studies have shown the risk of HIV transmission from female to male is significantly lower than
from male to female).
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status when a partner or child is diagnosed with, or dies from, AIDS. In the
303
HIV epidemic, the greatest risks to women are from males who are bisexual or
304
injecting drug users. Yet the risk status of men is not apparent and often requires some formal notification.
305
Feminist theories, despite all their degrees and differences, agree that “the
evaluation of medical practices must give primary attention to the impact of such practices on women—not just on individual women but on women as a group, including especially disadvantaged women such as poor women and women of
306
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has presented a modern challenge to the
color.”
premises on which feminist support of partner notification is grounded. Al307
though HIV/AIDS generally has been viewed as a gay disease, societal views
of HIV-positive women have at times been unbecoming. Consistent with traditional societal views of female prostitutes throughout the syphilis epidemic,

302. See Nora Kizer Bell, Women and AIDS: Too Little, Too Late?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN
MEDICAL ETHICS 46, 59 (Helen Bequaert Homes & Laura M. Purdy eds., 1992); Nat Hentoff, Editorial, The AIDS Establishment’s Conspiracy of Silence, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1994, at A23 (noting that in
the 1980s “the New York City Health Department surveyed a sizable number of infected women in
East Harlem. Hardly any had known, during sex, that their husbands or companions had been infected. The women were furious at having been kept so vulnerably ignorant.”); Bernstein, supra note
300, at 52 (“Many of the women most at risk of contracting AIDS have no idea they are in danger.
And many of the men responsible find it too hard to tell them on their own.”); Tye, supra note 244, at
1 (“‘Many partners may not know they’re at risk, and that’s true for women in particular.’” (quoting
Dr. Kathleen Toomey of the CDC)); see also Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F. Supp. 746, 747 (M.D.
Tenn. 1993) (receiving a tainted blood transfusion, a mother did not discover her HIV transmission
until five years later when her infant died of AIDS-related complication).
303. See Bernstein, supra note 300, at 52 (documenting the story of a woman who learned from
her husband about his HIV-positive status through a partner notification program, although he
failed to inform her that he became infected by engaging in sex with male prostitutes).
304. See Bruce Lambert, As AIDS Spreads, So Do Warnings for Partners, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1990,
at A22; see also Margaret Connors, Sex, Drugs, and Structural Violence: Unraveling the Epidemic Among
Poor Women in the United States, in WOMEN, POVERTY, AND AIDS, supra note 293, at 91, 91-94
(documenting the story of one married woman who learned of her exposure when she uncovered
the wall heater in her bathroom to find a needle, cooker, and rubber hose that her husband used to
inject drugs).
305. See Rebecca J. Cook, Feminism and the Four Principles, in PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS
193, 195 (Raanan Gillon ed., 1994) (“Feminism is no more monolithic than are the philosophies and
politics from which feminist analysts draw inspiration in explaining sexist structures of society and
proposing reforms . . . .”).
306. Lebacqz, supra note 297, at 12; see also Nina Bernstein, The Secret Life of AIDS: When Women
Ask Doctors or Social Workers, ‘Why Didn’t You Tell Me?’ the Answer Is Often, ‘We Thought You Knew’,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 2, 1993, at B46 (quoting Catherine Lynch, director of women’s issues for Gay
Men’s Health Crisis as saying: “The voices that have dominated the debate so far have been male,
coercive, public-health voices at one end and ACT UP at the other. . . . And guess what, they’re all
boys. No one’s looked at women’s stake in this issue.”).
307. See Bell, supra note 302, at 49 (“[B]ecause AIDS was first recognized in the United States in
the male homosexual population, the disease was stigmatized as a ‘gay disease,’ referred to, even
among male homosexuals, as the ‘gay plague.’”); see also SUSAN SHERWIN, NO LONGER PATIENT:
FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE 219 (1992) (“Medical researchers and clinicians and public
health authorities leapt quickly to the conclusion that AIDS is a ‘gay plague,’ a punishment for sexual activity that transcends acceptable practice.”); HENIG, supra note 298, at 161. This characterization was exacerbated by misinformation that heterosexuals, especially women, could not contract
the disease. See Farmer, supra note 298, at 4-5.
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308

women have been viewed as “vectors” of disease who infect unsuspecting men
or children. The rise of heterosexual and vertical transmission of HIV was at309
And like other high-risk groups, HIV-positive
tributed in part to women.
women became silent victims of the disease as society initially chose to protect
the confidentiality of seropositive individuals over female partners’ right to
310
know.
Feminists demand that partner notification, like many governmentsponsored programs, be analyzed by asking about its specific effects on women.
As Katherine T. Bartlett explains:
[A]sking the woman question means examining how the law [or regulation]
fails to take into account the experiences and values that seem more typical of
women than men, for whatever reason, or how existing legal standards and
concepts might disadvantage women. . . . The purpose of the woman question is
to expose those features and how they operate, and to suggest how they might
311
be corrected.

Feminists evaluate the models of partner notification in the context of the
reality of women’s lives to protect women as partners, who may not know they
are at risk of infection, and to protect women as patients, who must contend with
economic dependence and domestic violence. Although notification is important, it may increase the likelihood of harm suffered by women as patients who
are dependent economically or who suffer from abuse, and concurrently oppress
312
women by prohibiting them from making their own choices.
Partner notification from a feminist perspective is both favored because it
gives women vital knowledge to protect themselves and disfavored because it
potentially exposes women to violence. Some women face consequences including domestic abuse, abandonment, and economic misfortune as a result of
notification. Although feminists generally support partner notification in its effort to notify women at risk of infection, they question the development of the
methods through which it is accomplished as unresponsive to women’s needs.

308. See Ruth Faden et al., Women as Vessels and Vectors: Lessons from the HIV Epidemic, in
FEMINISM AND BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 252, 252-53 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996).
309. One notable expert, James W. Curran, then at the CDC, described HIV-positive women who
gave birth as guilty of an “invidious transmission” of HIV from mother-to-child. See Paula A.
Treichler, AIDS, Gender, and Biomedical Discourse: Current Contests for Meaning, in AIDS: THE
BURDENS OF HISTORY 190, 211 (Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M. Fox eds., 1988) (“With this act the passive
receiver again becomes a culpable agent who transmits her infected blood vertically’ to her unborn
child.”).
310. See Burr, supra note 20, at 57.
311. Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837 (1990).
312. See Bell, supra note 302, at 57 (“For many women, mandatory testing carries with it the specter of forced celibacy, prohibitions against procreation (accompanied by the potential of sanctions
against violators), and even the threat of forced abortion.”).
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V. EFFICACY OF PARTNER NOTIFICATION
A. Public Health Efficacy: Empirical Analyses
A partner’s claim to knowledge of health risks predominantly supports
partner notification. Legal analysis holds that information concerning risks to
which partners are exposed justifies the duties to disclose and warn and contact
313
tracing, despite infringements on the privacy interests of infected individuals.
Normative analysis favors partner notification because individuals have a legitimate claim to fundamental knowledge necessary to protect their own
314
health. Partner notification, however, cannot rely on the moral “right to know”
and legal duties alone. Consequentialist and feminist theories expose weaknesses in the support for partner notification. Infected women face the darker
side of partner notification, suffering physical, emotional, and economic abuse
from the dissemination of information to their male partners. Consequentialism
requires objective proof of the efficacy of partner notification even though it
commonly is assumed to be an effective public health strategy.
Partner notification as a public health practice demands more than subjective proof of efficacy. Scientifically-verifiable and demonstrably-sound proof
that partner notification actually reduces the risk of infection is required. To be
effective, partner notification must accomplish substantially its intended goals.
First, partner notification must advise partners of the risks of harm so they can
make informed choices to reduce the risks. Under this view, even if contacts do
not alter their behaviors, there is a positive value in enhanced autonomy. It is
necessary to devote a great deal of attention to this first goal. Under the prevalent methods of contact tracing, patient and conditional referral, data suggest
that partners often are not informed. In such cases, there clearly is no positive
value to partner notification. When partners are informed, at least the normative
value of providing this information to autonomous individuals is accomplished.
Second, and more important, partner notification is designed to protect the
public health. If partner notification reduces the rate of STD infection as well or
better than other public health interventions, it may be regarded as effective.
The central question, therefore, is whether partner notification accomplishes the
goal of reducing STD transmissions as part of a national, comprehensive public
health strategy. Do the notification, education, counseling, testing, and treatment services provided as part of contact tracing programs reduce the transmission rate of STDs, and, if so, at what cost and how? Answering this question is
complex. Some studies suggest that partner notification is effective in limited
environments involving high-risk populations. Scientifically-objective proof of
the efficacy of contact tracing as a widespread public health practice, however, is
inconclusive. The accumulated data suggest that partner notification as a national practice to control HIV infection does not work nearly as well as is claimed
by its proponents. As a result, support for partner notification based on moral
and legal claims to information loses force where partner notification does not
actually serve public health goals.
313.
314.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part IV.A.
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Examining the scientific efficacy of partner notification is not a simple task.
Efficacy is largely an empirical question. Measuring the effectiveness of partner
315
notification through contact tracing is problematic. No scientifically valid empirical standard exists to measure the effectiveness of contact tracing as applied
to STDs across large populations. The consensus of opinion instead holds that
“[a]ctive contact tracing programs have been effective (but costly) in controlling
localized outbreaks of specific antibiotic resistant strains of sexually transmitted
diseases with short latency periods and in targeting specific subgroups of the
316
317
318
Studies suggest that STDs such as syphilis, gonorrhea, and
population.”
319
chlamydia have been controlled among subgroups through contact tracing.
Contact tracing in the context of HIV/AIDS has been challenged on the basis that
finding and notifying partners is less effective than with other STDs since there is
320
no cure for AIDS and the long asymptomatic incubation period of the infection
321
These observations, however, do
makes tracing difficult among populations.
not justify a failure to attempt to notify persons at risk of HIV infection. While
AIDS remains a terminal condition, new pharmacological interventions can
322
prolong the life of an HIV-infected individual by delaying symptomology. In
addition, although it may be difficult to notify former partners of HIV-infected
persons, those who are notified are likely to have been more recently exposed to
infection, rendering counselling and treatment services more useful for the con323
Clearly, “[t]he key issue remains not
tact and potential future partners.

315. See, e.g., Brandt, supra note 70, at 481 (“Do partner notification programs achieve their
goals? It is striking how little is known about the relative cost and effectiveness of these programs.”);
Andrew T. Pavia et al., Partner Notification for Control of HIV: Results After 2 Years of a Statewide Program in Utah, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEATH 1418, 1421 (1993) (“[B]ecause of the difficulty of measuring behavioral change and of detecting any impact of behavioral change on the rate of HIV infection, the
true effectiveness of partner notification in the control of HIV infection is unknown.”).
316. EVANS ET AL., supra note 271, at 6.
317. See Suzanne E. Landis et al., Results of a Randomized Trial of Partner Notification in Cases of
HIV Infection in North Carolina, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 101 (1992). But see Andrus et al., supra
note 14, at 542 (1990) (finding that partner notification efforts in Oregon were demonstrably inadequate to stem the rise of syphilis infections from 1978 to 1987).
318. See Hawazin Faruki et al., A Community-Based Outbreak of Infection with Penicillin-Resistant
Neisseria Gonorrhea Not Producing Penicillinase (Chromosomally Mediated Resistance), 313 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 607, 608-10 (1985); see also Landis, supra note 317, at 101 nn.10-14.
319. See, e.g., Kathleen E. Toomey & Willard Cates, Jr., Partner Notification for the Prevention of
HIV Infection, 3 AIDS S57 (1989) (citing Barry P. Katz et al., Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness of Field
Follow-up for Patients with Chlamydia trachomatis Infection in a Sexually Transmitted Diseases Clinic, 15
SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 11 (1988)).
320. While vaccination and a cure would help to break the chain of transmission of HIV, their
absence alone does not mean that tracing HIV contacts serves little purpose. Interestingly, when
contact tracing first was instituted on a national scale in the United States to combat syphilis in 1936,
no truly effective cure had been developed. Penicillin as treatment for syphilis was not available
until 1943. See supra Part II.A.1.a).ii).
321. See Toomey & Cates, supra note 319, at S58.
322. See id.; see also Lynda Richardson, Progress on AIDS Brings Movement for Less Secrecy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997, at A1.
323. See West & Stark, supra note 99, at 70 (“Because of the long [latency] periods involved [with
HIV], often it is difficult for the patient or health department to locate all the partners, especially
those exposed years earlier.”).
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whether sex and needle-sharing partners of HIV-infected individuals should be
324
informed, but rather how this notification will occur.”
Public health studies suggest that HIV partner notification programs can be
325
effective in locating and counseling infected contacts of index cases and in re326
327
These findducing STD infection rates, particularly among at-risk groups.
328
ings often focus on preserving the confidentiality of index cases. For example,
a study conducted in the United Kingdom in 1993 found partner notification in
the form of a voluntary provider referral program where confidentiality was
preserved to be an effective strategy for identifying individuals at risk of becoming infected with HIV and providing them with access to counseling and
329
Twenty-nine new index cases were identified over a seven-year
health care.
period in a mid-sized community from seventy-nine original index cases, for a
330
seropositivity rate of 31.6%.
The seropositivity rate describes the percentage of contacts identified
through partner notification in a given program who test positive for HIV for the
331
first time as a result of their notification. In general, the higher the seropositivity rate, the greater the efficacy of contact tracing as claimed by public health
332
authorities. The seropositivity rate in the United Kingdom study, for example,
compares favorably to the reported rates of contact tracing programs in Sweden

324. See Toomey & Cates, supra note 319, at S58.
325. A study in Belgium, which recommended the use of a partner notification program for heterosexuals with low risk factors, demonstrated the value of such programs in instances where a single, sexually-active, and HIV-infected individual agrees to participate. See Nathan Clumeck et al., A
Cluster of HIV Infection Among Heterosexual People Without Apparent Risk Factors, 321 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1460, 1460 (1989). The index case, a heterosexual man, identified 15 previously unknown female sexual partners, 14 of whom agreed to be tested, and 7 of whom tested positive. See id. In addition to these 7 women, 4 other partners of this single index case had previously tested positive as a
result of sexual contact with the individual, thus resulting in 11 total contacts of one person becoming infected with HIV. See id.
326. See M.W. Adler, Contact Tracing, 284 BRIT. MED. J. 1211, 1211 (1982); Ralph H. Henderson,
Control of Sexually Transmitted Disease in the United States—A Federal Perspective, 53 BRIT. J. VENEREAL
DISEASES 211, 212-14 (1977); Richard S. Pattman & Elspeth M. Gould, Partner Notification for HIV Infection in the United Kingdom: A Look Back on Seven Years Experience in Newcastle upon Tyne, 69
GENITOURINARY MED. 94, 94 (1993).
327. See Pavia, supra note 315, at 1418 (recommending that partner notification be used to reach
at-risk populations based on a public health study in 1993 which examined the results of mandatory
provider referral programs over a two year period in Utah); N.E. Spencer et al., Partner Notification
for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in Colorado: Results Across Index Case Groups and Costs, 4
INTL J. STD & AIDS 26, 31 (1993) (conducting a retrospective study of its voluntary contact tracing
services in 1988, the Colorado Department of Health concluded that partner notification should be
offered to all HIV-infected individuals, but more specifically to core individuals at greatest risk of
HIV infection); Toomey & Cates, supra note 319, at S57 (explaining that partner notification strategies have been effective in targeting intervention activities for specific “core-group” populations).
328. See Landis, supra note 317, at 101.
329. See Pattman & Gould, supra note 326, at 96; see also R.A. Keenlyside et al., Attitudes to Tracing
and Notifying Contacts of People with HIV Infection, 305 BRIT. MED. J. 165 (1992).
330. See Pattman & Gould, supra note 326, at 96.
331. See Andrus et al., supra note 14, at 542.
332. See id. (“Traditionally, the success of contact notification has been measured by how many
sexual contacts for whom locating information was available were actually notified of their exposure.”).
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334

(15%) and Norway (13%).
Comparing seropositivity rates as a measure of
efficacy, however, is unsound. Variances in reported seropositivity rates are
likely the result of generally incomparable factors, including: (1) the demographics of the population being studied; (2) the culture of the society in which
the studies are conducted; (3) the means of operating particular contact tracing
programs; (4) the length of time over which the study is conducted; (5) the period in time in which the study is performed; and (6) the sample size of the pro335
gram studied. This is not to say that reported seropositivity rates of studies on
the efficacy of partner notification are of no value. Reported rates can demon336
strate the efficacy of different contact procedures within internal studies or in
337
Seropocomparison to other public health measures in the same community.
sitivity rates of contact tracing programs, however, largely are incomparable
across populations, methods, and time.
A second fallacy of comparing seropositivity rates as an affirmation of efficacy is that it looks past a primary function of contact tracing, that is, actually
338
notifying and counselling partners. Efficacy studies in Oregon and North
339
Carolina involving syphilis and HIV, respectively, concluded that partner notification is unsuccessful in containing STDs where many potential contacts cannot
be notified due to the inability of index cases to identify their numerous sexual
and drug partners. In actuality, the ability of contact tracing programs to locate
partners of index cases infected with STDs such as syphilis and HIV that have
long latency periods is minimal. Since seropositivity rates are calculated only
among those partners who are located, the rates do not reflect the prevalence of
disease in a community or the effective ability of contact tracing programs to

333. See generally Pattman & Gould, supra note 326, at 96; Johan Giesecke et al., Efficacy of Partner
Notification for HIV Infection, 338 LANCET 1096 (1991) (discussing partner notification programs in
Sweden).
334. See Pattman & Gould, supra note 326, at 96.
335. For example, in comparison to Pattman & Gould’s British study, the Swedish study examined the efficacy of a national (versus local) conditional (versus provider) referral program over
eighteen months (versus seven years) in 1989-1990 (versus 1985-1992). See Giesecke et al., supra note
333, at 1096. The Swedish study concluded that of the 365 (versus 79) index cases who voluntarily
chose to participate, 53 (versus 29) previously unknown cases of HIV infection were diagnosed for a
seropositivity rate of 14.5% (versus 31.6%). See id. at 1098.
336. The Swedish study, for example, internally compared the seropositivity rates of its conditional referral program with available information based on a patient referral model and determined
that the rate would have dropped almost 33% if patient referral had been exclusively offered to voluntary participants. See id. at 1098; see also Richard E. Hoffman et al., Comparison of Partner Notification at Anonymous and Confidential HIV Test Sites in Colorado, 8 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY
SYNDROMES & HUMAN RETROVIROLOGY 406, 409 (1995) (finding a twofold difference in seropositivity
rates of newly tested contacts between those HIV-infected index cases who were tested at confidential versus anonymous testing sites).
337. See Pavia et al., supra note 315, at 1421 (noting from the study that the seropositivity rate of
contacts through partner notification “was substantially higher than the rate found in any counseling and testing site, confirming that [partner notification efforts] were successful in reaching those at
high risk”).
338. See Andrus et al., supra note 14, at 542.
339. See Landis, supra note 317, at 101,105 (stating that because of the large percentages of partners either unidentified or unable to be located through partner notification, the authors were reluctant to endorse the efficacy of partner notification as a practice).
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actually trace all, or even most, partners. Seropositivity rates are thus an inaccurate means by which to judge the efficacy of partner notification.
The confidentiality of index cases who voluntarily participate in contact
340
tracing programs is a critical issue of law and ethics. Confidentiality has been
an appropriate focal point of modern studies examining partner notification efforts involving HIV-positive individuals; these studies stress the importance of
confidentiality in the operation of contact tracing programs. A 1991 Colorado
study found a twofold difference in seropositivity rates of newly tested contacts
between those HIV-infected index cases who were tested at confidential testing
341
sites versus those who were tested at anonymous testing sites. In addition, in
North Carolina, an internal, comparative study of contact tracing programs randomly assigned index cases to participate in a provider referral program (where
confidentiality was guaranteed) and patient referral program (where confidenti342
ality was not). Adequate counseling was provided to both groups to encourage the identification and notification of all sexual and needle-sharing partners.
Of those who were assigned to provider referral programs, fifty percent of the
named partners were located and notified by public health counselors. This
compared favorably to the patient referral group where only seven percent of
partners were notified, despite the state legal requirement that infected persons
343
notify their partners directly or through a contact tracing programs.
While these studies demonstrate the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of index cases in contacting partners, they do not prove that confidentiality actually is maintained. They simply allege that where confidentiality
protections are furnished initially, as through provider referral, index cases are
more likely to participate in partner notification. As this Article has argued, preserving the confidentiality of index cases through partner notification is a factual
and ethical myth. Were index cases advised of this conclusion prior to their participation in a provider referral program, the studies suggest they will not participate voluntarily. While preserving confidentiality is thus an important factor
in improving the efficacy of partner notification, studies that reach this conclusion without proving that confidentiality ultimately is preserved are flawed. It is
scientifically and ethically inconsistent to advocate the efficacy of confidential
partner notification where confidentiality is assured falsely to voluntary participants.
The degree to which partner notification works to alter favorably the behavior of at-risk individuals also is unclear. A study in South Carolina systematically attempted to demonstrate the effectiveness of partner notification in al-

340. See supra Parts II.C, III.B, IV.A.
341. See Hoffman et al., supra note 336, at 409 (describing testing jointly performed by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment and the University of Colorado Health Sciences
Center). The study compares provider referral methods of partner notification at a single anonymous HIV testing site in Denver to 13 confidential HIV testing sites across the state over an 18month period. See id. at 406. The seropositivity rate of newly-tested partners of index cases attending confidential testing centers was 36%, compared to only 15% of those newly-tested partners who
were HIV-positive and identified by index cases attending anonymous testing centers. See id. at 409.
342. See Landis, supra note 317, at 101.
343. See id. at 103. The overall seropositivity rate among partners of index patients in the study
was 23%. See id. at 104.
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344

tering the at-risk behaviors of contacts. Partner notification services in a rural
South Carolina district included voluntary follow-up interviews with HIVpositive and HIV-negative contacts at six-month intervals, which provided an
opportunity to measure behavioral changes in such individuals. Through these
interviews, the authors tabulated the number of sexual and needle-sharing partners reported by prior contacts before and after partner notification services.
Marked decreases in the number of sexual partners were reported: of those HIVpositive individuals who were re-interviewed at least once, reported partners
decreased from an average of 5.6 per case to 1.1 per case after partner notification, an eighty percent decrease. HIV-negative individuals reported on average
345
fifty percent fewer partners after partner notification. While these findings are
promising, they lack demonstrative proof of decreased at-risk behaviors, and fail
to represent the behavioral trends of many partners who chose not to participate
in the follow-up interviews.
Noting a lack of evidence regarding the impact of testing and counseling on
sexual behaviors, a group of Canadian researchers examined several STD notification studies in 1994 in an attempt to determine the effectiveness of various
346
Their findings were, not surprisingly, inconclupartner notification models.
sive, as “there has been a paucity of well designed studies to evaluate the effec347
The authors noted that, “there is
tiveness of partner notification strategies.”
very little upon which to estimate the ultimate benefits and harms of partner notification for HIV infection,” and further that, “arguments for and against provider referral for HIV infection tend to be based more on convictions than on

344. See Randolph F. Wykoff et al., Notification of the Sex and Needle-Sharing Partners of Individuals
with Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Rural South Carolina: 30-Month Experience, 18 SEXUALLY
TRANSMITTED DISEASES 217 (1991) [hereinafter Wykoff et al., Notification of the Sex and Needle-Sharing
Partners]. The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) examined a voluntary and confidential HIV provider referral program in a rural health district over a 30month period from 1986-1989. See id. at 218. SCDHEC reported that 49 HIV-positive persons were
identified and counseled from 280 contacts who agreed to be tested, a seropositivity rate of 18%. See
id.
345. See id. at 220. While reluctant to apply their findings to the rest of the nation, the authors
concluded that “partner notification appears to be an effective addition to other efforts to control the
spread of HIV,” id., for the following reasons: (1) it can accurately target education and testing services to those at greatest risk of acquiring or spreading HIV including those outside typical “risk
groups” associated with the diseases; (2) it can be extremely important in supplying necessary medical and health support services to HIV-positive individuals; (3) it is well-accepted by at-risk individuals and results in important behavioral changes; and (4) partner notification may assist in
tracking demographic indices and changes in the HIV epidemic in a given area. See Wykoff et al.,
Notification of the Sex and Needle-Sharing Partners, supra note 344, at 221; see also Jeffrey L. Jones et al.,
Partner Acceptance of Health Department Notification of HIV Exposure, South Carolina, 264 JAMA 1284,
1284 (1990) (determining that 87% of sexual partners contacted over two years through a partner
notification program in rural South Carolina thought the health department was right to contact
them about their exposure, and 92% of these same persons indicated that the health department
should continue to notify persons exposed to HIV).
346. See Andrew D. Oxman et al., Partner Notification for Sexually Transmitted Diseases: An Overview of the Evidence, 85 CANADIAN J. PUB. HEALTH S41 (1994) (examining previous notification studies
conducted by Canadian researchers to determine their effectiveness).
347. Id. at S45. Minimal assistance with patient referral services is effective and, to a lesser degree, provider referral programs result in more notification than patient referral programs. See id. at
S46.
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348

data.” As a result, they recommended that policy decisions regarding partner
349
notification be based on grounds other than efficacy.
The Canadian report illuminates a major dilemma in examining the efficacy
of contact tracing. It is extremely difficult (or nearly impossible) to measure efficacy accurately with so many variables to calculate. While virtually all studies
on partner notification efficacy report disparate rates of seropositivity, none suggest that high rates of seropositivity among contacts of HIV index cases is an exclusive determinant of the efficacy of the program. Whether partner notification
actually reduces the rate of HIV transmission through behavioral change re350
mains largely speculative. As part of a national comprehensive public health
strategy, partner notification has not been proven scientifically to reduce the rate
of HIV infection among the general population or alter the at-risk behaviors of
index cases or partners alike.
B. Economic Perspectives: Cost-Effectiveness and Incentives for Behavior
Change
With limited financial resources devoted to public health efforts to combat
STDs, including HIV, economic justifications for each part of the comprehensive
strategy are essential. Strategic elements that produce demonstrably sound,
cost-effective benefits are attractive to those who appropriate funds for such ef351
Yet, ecoforts, to the exclusion of other, less economically viable elements.
nomic analysis cited in support of partner notification often is misguided.
“Savings” in the form of medical treatment costs foregone by the alleged
prevention of infection of others as a result of partner notification often is cited
352
as economically justifying such efforts. Partner notification programs are analyzed under cost-benefit principles by calculating the cost per new case identified. This figure is deemed important because identifying a new index case
through partner notification may mean that future cases of infection will be pre-

348.

See id. at S46.

The fact is that practices like name reporting and contact tracing arose in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, before there was any scientific way of determining whether they
worked. They may have satisfied a popular demand that health authorities do something,
but the fact is, we don’t really know how effective they were.
Rotello, supra note 88, at A23.
349. See Oxman et al., supra note 346, at S46.
350. See Pavia, supra note 315, at 1422 (describing how the authors were unable to conclude
through incontrovertible data that partner notification and HIV testing decrease the transmission of
HIV by modifying the behavior of index cases, despite statistics based on a small sample group of
partners suggesting a substantial decrease in the reported rate of sexually-transmitted diseases
among partners over a four-year period).
351. See EVANS ET AL., supra note 271, at 6 (“The costs of contact tracing for HIV must be weighed
against the competing needs of other public health programs. The diversion of resources from other
communicable disease programs such as AIDS, STD, and TB programs should be viewed in light of
the increase of cases of these diseases in many areas.”).
352. See Spencer et al., supra note 327, at 31 (noting that the Colorado study estimated that if each
of the 12 partners identified as positive avoided transmitting HIV to at least one individual because
of partner notification services, and only 6 of the 12 potentially-infected individuals later contracted
HIV, the average savings in medical care costs would outweigh the costs of the program almost
11:1); see also Pavia et al., supra note 315, at 1422.
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vented since index cases are counseled on how to prevent infecting others. In
addition, with STDs other than HIV, where curative treatment presently is available, identifying and treating an infected individual effectively can break the
chain of transmission. The lower the cost of new case identified, the more economically sound a program is judged to be, principally because the costs of prevention are much lower than the costs of treating people once they have become
353
infected.
Comparing the costs of identifying new index cases to the costs of treating
future infected persons if index cases go unidentified is senseless from the public
health perspective. Not only do such comparisons completely fail to address
whether partner notification results in positive behavioral changes among those
notified, the comparisons ridiculously suggest that if it takes X dollars to treat an
HIV-infected individual, it is cost-effective to spend X - 1 dollars to prevent such
infections through partner notification. Public health authorities will not deny
that spending resources on efforts to prevent the transmission of STDs has posi354
tive cost-benefits, provided an adequate number of infections are prevented.
With limited resources devoted to public health efforts to control STDs, however,
funds must be allocated to efforts that most effectively reduce infection rates.
Partner notification is not “the sole strategy for preventing [STD] transmis355
sion.” To the contrary, it is a part of a comprehensive public health strategy
that includes testing, screening, and reporting services, largely funded by the
356
CDC. It is important, therefore, to examine the opportunity costs of expending
limited resources on partner notification to the exclusion of other strategies that
may be more effective. Regardless of cost-benefit analyses, the economic inquiry
should be whether X dollars spent on partner notification could be used more
efficiently to accomplish public health goals through other strategies such as
health education or condom distribution. Unfortunately, comparative economic

353. In the Colorado HIV study, the cost to identify a new index case through patient and provider referrals programs in 1988 was estimated to be $1625 per person identified. See Spencer et al.,
supra note 327, at 31. Other studies have documented varied costs per new HIV index case identified. See Stephen Crystal et al., AIDS Contact Notification: Initial Program Results in New Jersey, 2 AIDS
EDUC. & PREVENTION 284, 292 (1990) (noting that the cost per contact identified was $2260 for New
Jersey’s conditional referral program); Pavia et al., supra note 315, at 1422 (noting that the cost to
identify each partner newly testing positive was $3205 for Utah’s provider referral program); Randolph F. Wykoff et al., Contact Tracing to Identify Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in a Rural
Community, 259 JAMA 3563, 3565 (1988) (including figures of $810 per case for South Carolina provider referral program).
354. A 1993 investigative report affirmatively answered, through cost-benefit principles, the
broad economic question: “Does the expenditure of CDC HIV/AIDS funds on CTRPN [counseling,
testing, referral, and partner notification] services provide a net economic benefit to society?” Holtgrave et al., supra note 98, at 1228 (internal quotations omitted). According to their calculations
(using 1990 figures), CTRPN services in combination produce a benefit-cost ratio of 20.09, meaning
that for every dollar spent on these services, society gains $20.09 in total economic benefits. See id.
The cost per infection averted through CTRPN services was estimated at $25,780. See id. at 1230.
The authors concluded that “it can be strongly stated that [CTRPN services do] appear to yield net
economic benefits to society.” Id.
355. EVANS ET AL., supra note 271, at 7.
356. See infra Part VI.A.
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studies examining partner notification against other strategic public health ef357
forts to control STDs virtually are non-existent.
There is still a finer economic question to be examined. Economics is a sci358
entific theory used to predict rational human behavior. At its core, it is the science of rational choice in an environment of limited resources in relation to hu359
man wants. Under this view “[t]he task of economics, so defined, is to explore
the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life,
360
his satisfactions—what . . . shall [be] call[ed] his ‘self-interest.’” Individual be361
havior is rational when it adheres to economic principles of rational choice.
The economic question concerning partner notification is the degree to which it
influences individual behavior so as to produce rational decisions that accomplish public health objectives.
In their controversial economic analysis of the AIDS epidemic in which they
argue that public health education manipulates and interferes with rational decisionmakers, Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner conclude that CDC programs (such as contact tracing) that identify disease transmission may increase
362
the spread of disease. They envision sexual encounters and relationships under their rational choice model as “trade[s] in the standard economic sense of an
363
activity perceived as mutually beneficial to the persons engaged in it.” They
argue that people will engage in risky behaviors in an economically rational
fashion; a person will participate in sexual acts placing them in danger of HIV
364
infection where the actor’s expected utility or subjective welfare is maximized.
Since individuals will act according to the determination of their own maximum
utility, Philipson and Posner argue that the threat of HIV infection will alter in365
In the face of an incurable disease like
dividual risky behavior differently.
366
HIV/AIDS, those who choose risky sex essentially value it over life.
Predicting in 1993 that the United States population is approaching an eco367
nomically efficient level of HIV infection, Philipson and Posner have been de368
scribed as arguing that

357. But cf. Giesecke et al., supra note 333, at 1096, 1099 (examining the relative costs of partner
notification in Sweden, where HIV-prevalence is relatively low, as compared to the costs of strategies to prevent the transmission of HIV, and concluding that partner notification programs “seem[]
more cost-effective than large screening programs”).
358. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (3d ed. 1986).
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id. at 3-4.
362. See Ronald Bayer et al., Trades, AIDS, and the Public’s Health: The Limits of Economic Analysis,
83 GEO. L.J. 79, 103 (1994) (reviewing TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES
AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 128 (1993)).
363. Id. at 79 (citing PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 362, at 5).
364. See id. (citing PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 362, at 8). Stated alternatively, “[w]hen
someone engages in unprotected sex, he or she is using an informal internal calculator to decide
whether the risk of getting AIDS or some other [STD] outweighs the benefits—money or drugs in
some cases and love, acceptance, status, or pleasure in others.” H ENIG, supra note 298, at 163-64.
365. See Bayer et al., supra note 362, at 79 (citing PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 362, at 13-14).
366. See id. at 87 (citing PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 362, at 75, 230).
367. See id. at 91 (citing PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 362, at 44).
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state intervention to fight AIDS is presumptively unwarranted. . . . [They further argue] that mandatory testing for HIV is not worth the cost (in terms of,
among other things, privacy) and could well be counterproductive; that the state
is probably spending far too much money on research for vaccines, cures, and
treatment; and that some money should be spent on targeted education pro369
grams that facilitate the operation of people’s rational calculations.

The economists were critical of testing for HIV, arguing that testing actually
increases the spread of HIV infection, as uninfected persons are lulled into risky
behaviors after testing negative and some infected individuals hide their disease
370
from partners despite testing positive. Philipson and Posner argue that to the
extent that contact tracing results in additional testing of contacts, partner notifi371
cation may contribute to the spread of HIV.
Though imaginative, Philipson and Posner’s economic assessment of partner notification as contributing to the spread of HIV is neither supported by em372
pirical data nor accepted by public health authorities. No study has found an
increase in overall HIV infection rates based on increased HIV testing or partner
373
Allowing the HIV epidemic to run its course, as Philipson and
notification.
Posner suggest, is unfounded and inconsistent with public health practice. Unlike the non-interventionist nature of economic strategies, public health efforts,
like partner notification, necessarily are interventionist. Where persons are dying of a preventable disease, public health interventions not only are compelling,
but also are practical where early identification may benefit the infected through
374
clinical intervention, particularly in the case of perinatal transmission of HIV.
While economic justifications for partner notification in the form of costbenefit analyses are off target, it equally is negligent to suggest that partner notification actually contributes to increased incidences of STD infection. The answer to the true economic question of whether partner notification is more or less
effective, in comparison to other elements of a comprehensive public health
strategy, largely is unknown. As a result, supporting partner notification as a
national practice on an economic basis alone is illusory.
VI. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR PARTNER NOTIFICATION
Despite the moral and legal claims supporting partner notification, impediments to implementing it as a widespread practice abound. In addition to
its general failure to protect confidentiality, state operated contact tracing programs are not perceived by infected individuals as voluntary, in light of judi-

368. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Brian D. Weimer, The Economic Epidemic in an AIDS Perspective, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (1994) (reviewing PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 362).
369. Id. at 738-39 (citing PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 362, at 133-42, 163-66, 181-206, 220-22).
370. See Bayer et al., supra note 362, at 91, 103 (citing PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 362, at 91,
94).
371. See id. (citing PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 362, at 128).
372. See id. at 91, 105.
373. See id. at 91. To the contrary, testing and partner notification have been effective empirically
in reducing HIV infection, at least among high-risk populations when confidentiality is maintained.
See supra notes 325-30 and accompanying text.
374. See Bayer et al., supra note 362, at 105-06.
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cially enforced duties to disclose and warn, but rather as options to selfnotification. In this sense, partner notification has a mandatory nature that discourages participation. Lack of participation is one determinant of the essentially unproven efficacy of partner notification efforts. Although partner notification is an accepted practice both ethically and morally, its unproven efficacy
reflects the reality that administrating morality is problematic. Cost-benefit
analysis projects positive returns on dollars spent on partner notification, but in
the economic sense, such programs suffer from a lack of demonstrable evidence
that the services provided are the most cost-effective available or actually result
in behavioral modification. These facts, coupled with the real world potential of
partner notification to cause more harm than good, especially as experienced by
STD-positive women and other disadvantaged persons who may suffer mental
and physical harm, societal discrimination, and personal economic ruin, challenge the public health conception of partner notification as a valid and useful
tool.
Partner notification represents the weak link in the comprehensive public
health strategy to prevent STD transmission. Worse yet, it actually may hinder
persons from being tested for STDs. Although more studies about the effectiveness of partner notification are necessary given its long-standing use, present
evidence suggests that partner notification at best represents an antiquated and
largely ineffective public health intervention when implemented nationally. As
a result, other public health measures should be examined to determine if they
can be utilized more effectively to combat STDs without the drawbacks of partner notification.
A. Partner Notification as Part of Public Health Surveillance and Prevention
Strategies
Partner notification cannot be viewed outside the context of a broad range
of public health strategies designed to prevent transmission of STDs. Contact
tracing, for example, can only be effective if individuals at risk are tested early in
the course of their infection and if positive cases are reported to health authorities. If individuals and health officials have no knowledge of their STD status,
the issue of partner notification does not arise.
Testing involves the administration of a diagnostic test to determine
375
Tests
whether individuals have contracted a particular infectious condition.
376
exist to diagnose virtually every known STD, although the effectiveness and
377
costs vary for each STD. In the case of HIV, a serologic test for the disease was
378
not developed until 1985; later, the CDC would recommend pre- and post-test

375. See THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 6, at 157.
376. See id. at 157-58 (noting that several different diagnostic tests exist for many STDs); see also
Shelton, supra note 3, at 12 (noting that two-thirds of STD infections cannot be detected other than
through the use of diagnostic tests).
377. See THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 6, at 157- 58.
378. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., National HIV Case Reporting for the United States: A Defining
Moment in the History of the Epidemic, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1162 (1997).
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380

counseling and medical intervention as integral parts of HIV testing. Despite
opposition from AIDS service organizations, who argued that testing would lead
381
to greater discrimination, millions of HIV serologic tests have been performed
382
at publicly-funded testing sites, including family planning clinics, tuberculosis
383
clinics, drug treatment centers, and primary care clinics. The main purpose of
testing for STD infection as part of the comprehensive strategy is to diagnose and
384
treat persons to prevent further transmission.
Testing, however, like partner notification, is not exclusively a function of
public health authorities. Many private health care providers provide testing
385
Still others seek testing for STDs, including
services for individual patients.
386
HIV, test themselves anonymously using home collection tests. Private testing
methods allow individuals to learn of their STD status in a confidential setting
outside public health clinics, hospitals, managed care organizations, and private
physician offices. The primary disadvantage of home testing, from a public
health perspective, is the lack of opportunity to provide positive, non-directive
counseling concerning the psychological effects of testing, opportunities for
treatment, and strategies for behavior change.
While testing services concentrate on diagnosing infection among consenting individuals who request or seek such services, screening programs attempt
to determine infection through tests administered to groups at risk of disease or
387
other sub-populations. Screening, which refers to the “systematic application
388
of [diagnostic tests] to specific targeted populations,” is implemented to diagnose individuals who are or may be at risk of contracting an STD or who would
pose a threat to others. An example is the screening practice of premarital

379. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Technical Guidance on HIV Counseling, 269
JAMA 2072, 2073-74 (1993) (stating that HIV counseling prior to or after testing should be culturally
competent, sensitive to issues of sexual identity, developmentally appropriate, and linguistically
specific).
380. See David J. Landry & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Public Health Departments Providing Sexually Transmitted Disease Services, 28 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPS. 261, 261 (1996) (stating that while federal funds assist with providing prevention strategies, state and local governments are expected to
provide necessary funds for medical treatment of infected individuals).
381. See Richardson, supra note 322, at A1 (describing opposition from Gay Men’s Health Crisis).
382. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 379, at 2073.
383. See id. at 2074. Federal public health objectives call for the increase of the number of publicly-funded tests as well as the number of facilities where such are provided by the year 2000. See
id. at 2073-74 (citing PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000: NATIONAL HEALTH PROMOTION
AND DISEASE PREVENTION OBJECTIVES—FULL REPORT WITH COMMENTARY (1991)).
384. See Landry & Forrest, supra note 380, at 261.
385. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 379, at 2073.
386. See Gostin et al., supra note 378, at 1165.
387. Screening involves the administration of diagnostic tests to individuals or populations to
detect diseases. See VERGIL N. SLEE & DEBORA A. SLEE, HEALTH CARE TERMS 397 (2d ed. 1991); see
also THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 6, at 156 (stating that current guidelines on acceptable
screening practices for STDs do not recommend the testing of national populations as such efforts
largely are ineffective and represent an inefficient use of limited resources).
388. Gostin & Curran, supra note 95, at 361. In the context of STD prevention strategies, screening represents the programmed testing of members of risk groups to determine those who are STDpositive, not the testing of donated tissue products, like blood, to protect recipients of such products
(although such is another form of screening). See id.
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389

syphilis tests dating back to the 1930s. Modern STD screening programs target
persons who utilize family planning and adolescent health clinics for STDs like
390
chlamydia. Since patients at STD and drug treatment centers may have an ele391
vated risk, these centers are frequently the focus of screening programs. Mandatory screening programs involving such individuals, however, have been criticized as ineffective at accomplishing the public health objective of modifying at392
risk behaviors. Individual counseling and therapy on a voluntary basis, there393
fore, are recommended as a corollary to screening programs.
Where testing and screening procedures identify cases of STD infection
among individuals, reporting requirements mandate that these cases be relayed
394
to state authorities. Reporting, which can be named or non-named and coded
to prevent dissemination of private information, exists at all levels of public
395
Reporting requirements are justified by the need to track the prevahealth.
396
lence and incidence of STDs across populations. Disease patterns and trends
determined through state reporting assist authorities in their efforts to allocate
397
limited resources devoted to preventing STD transmission. Information gained
through reporting also may assist in measuring the efficacy of public health efforts to control particular STDs. Mass educational campaigns can be targeted to
at-risk groups, and named reporting can be a direct link to offering partner notification services to infected individuals who otherwise have not been located
398
through public testing and screening.
Although STD reporting requirements differ from state to state, all states
require reporting for STDs, including syphilis, gonorrhea, chlamydia, chancroid,
399
and hepatitis B. Private providers, however, often fail to comply with report400
ing requirements. AIDS reporting is required in all states, and more than half

389. See THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 6, at 156 (noting that despite being proven virtually
ineffective in preventing syphilis infection, this screening technique remains a requirement under
the laws of 15 states as of 1996). Syphilis screening among members of the general population was
recommended during the Parran era of the 1930s. See Thomas A. Farley, Approaches to Screening and
Antibiotic Use for Syphilis Prevention, 24 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 227, 227-28 (1997).
390. See Landry & Forrest, supra note 380, at 261.
391. See Gostin & Curran, supra note 95, at 363.
392. See id. (stating that mandatory screening programs for whole populations are generally disliked by public health authorities as violative of personal liberties and privacy interests).
393. See id.
394. See Richardson, supra note 322, at A1.
395. See, e.g., Nancy E. Stroup et al., Sources of Routinely Collected Data for Surveillance, in
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE 31, 33-38 (Steven M. Teutsch & R. Elliot
Churchill eds., 1994) (discussing disease notification and reporting mechanisms).
396. See id. at 37.
397. See Richardson, supra note 322, at A1.
398. See Stroup et al., supra note 395, at 37-38; see also Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr.,
The “Names Debate”: The Case for National HIV Reporting in the United States, 62 ALB. L. REV. (1998)
(forthcoming).
399. See Shelton, supra note 3, at 12.
400. See id.
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401

the states have reporting requirements for HIV. This policy decision of states
to not require HIV reporting is in part reflective of the vocal concerns of community advocates about infringements on privacy interests resulting from the sys402
tematic reporting and collection of confidential information by government.
While many infected persons can be identified and assisted through testing,
screening, and reporting requirements, partner notification is intended to supplement these methods. Partner notification is an accepted component of the
comprehensive public health strategy where testing and screening programs
identify infected individuals, the names of infected persons are reported to state
public health authorities who track the spread of the disease, and contact tracing
assists individuals in notifying their partners of the risk of infection. Testing is
recommended for all partners notified and the strategic process is begun again.
Throughout the process, counseling and education are stressed to modify individual risky behaviors.
As one component of the strategy designed to reach persons at risk of infection who may not otherwise be aware of their exposure or inclined to modify
their at-risk behavior, partner notification lacks proof of efficacy and unnecessarily imposes serious infringements on individual rights and interests. Alternative approaches to partner notification can achieve the same public health objectives more efficiently with less intrusion on personal liberty and privacy
interests.
B. Utility of Alternative Approaches to Partner Notification
While the national practice of partner notification may be challenged, the
need to inform at-risk persons of dangers of which they may be unaware is indisputable. The value of collecting information from infected individuals and
notifying those at risk is clear. It is the method of notification that comprehensive analysis of partner notification brings into dispute. As an alternative to direct partner notification, information gained through the channels of partner notification, that is through infected individuals, can be used to focus educational
and notification efforts in a confidential manner on persons at risk, including
403
While some public health authorities suggest developing focused
partners.
404
or
educational programs for people at high risk for STD infection

401. See Gostin et al., supra note 378, at 1163 (finding that 26 states now have HIV reporting, and
2 more, Florida and New Mexico, are in the process of implementing HIV surveillance. But those
states account for only 24% of the AIDS cases reported to the CDC through 1996. Of the 10 states
with the highest rates of reported AIDS cases, of which New York is included, only New Jersey and
Louisiana have implemented HIV reporting).
402. These policies may soon change to reflect the expected national recommendation of the
CDC that all reporting agencies provide information concerning HIV and AIDS infection. See id. at
1162, 1165.
403. Thus, this Article is not advocating the abandonment of the public health theory of partner
notification. Utilizing available information from people who are infected with an STD serves a legitimate purpose of directing public health efforts in areas where prevention is a real possibility.
Rather, this Article agrees with others that there may exist a more effective means of using available
information effectively to notify persons at risk of exposure without infringing the privacy interests
of infected persons or sacrificing the ethical rights to know of their partners.
404. See Landis, supra note 317, at 105.
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405

street/community outreach programs as alternatives to partner notification,
others propose using information gained through the traditional practice of
partner notification to ascertain the at-risk behaviors of all individuals within a
group or sub-population at risk.
Through methods similar to modern business marketing principles, most
applications of contact tracing in its present form can be replaced with social
406
Complex in practice, SNA attempts to measure the
network analysis (SNA).
way in which people relate to each other by examining determinants of their social structure, or network. It transforms information obtained from individuals
through interviews, surveys, or epidemiologic studies into data about their in407
teraction within networks. Complementary approaches of network ascertainment and ethnography are combined to describe “a social process, such as the
transmission of disease, and to contribute to disease control and program
408
evaluation.” Instead of concentrating on information about partners, as traditional contact tracing does, SNA attempts to identify persons in an infected individual’s social setting and offer epidemiologic treatment (testing and medical
evaluations) to STD network members discovered through ethnographic analy409
sis. Further analysis allows authorities to target public health efforts at those
410
who are calculated to be at the greatest risk of infection.
Some of the benefits of SNA over traditional contact tracing include: the
ability of public health authorities to focus efforts on persons at greatest risk of
STD infection; the development of enhanced knowledge about existing transmission rates within defined areas and sub-populations that “brings disease control
411
closer to the starting line;” the advantage of not being required to inquire specifically about partners of infected persons; the provision of important information to at-risk individuals without breaching the confidentiality of sources; the
ability to identify and notify persons at risk who are not necessarily former or
existing sexual or IDU partners of infected persons, but may be in the future; and
the ability to develop more detailed information about at-risk behaviors to allow
412
more effective behavioral interventions.
There are disadvantages to SNA as well. First, the approach is dependent
upon information gathering, and thus is labor intensive, expensive, and time413
consuming. This drawback also is true of provider referral, which is perhaps
the most efficacious form of contact tracing. Second, if the information is incomplete or incorrect, network behavioral calculations may be off target. Third, SNA

405. See West & Stark, supra note 99, at 70.
406. This concept has developed independently of this Article. See Samuel R. Friedman, Editorial, Network Methodologies, Contact Tracing, Gonorrhea, and Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 23
SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 523 (1996); Richard Rothenberg & Jerry Narramore, The Relevance
of Social Network Concepts to Sexually Transmitted Disease Control, 23 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES
24 (1996).
407. See Rothenberg & Narramore, supra note 406, at 24-25.
408. See id. at 26.
409. See id. at 27.
410. See id. at 27-30.
411. Id. at 29.
412. See Friedman, supra note 406, at 524.
413. See Rothenberg & Narramore, supra note 406, at 28.
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requires technologically-advanced statistical calculations by knowledgeable experts to which smaller public health districts may lack adequate access. New
statistical methods that simplify the deduction of individual behavior from aggregate data without affecting accuracy, however, may prove valuable in epi414
demiological applications like SNA. Fourth, network techniques also may be
415
incompatable for differing STDs and difficult to replicate in all communities.
Fifth, since SNA does not undertake to notify partners directly, participation by
infected persons does not satisfy their legal duty to disclose; HCWs cannot refer
infected patients to SNA programs to fulfill their duty to warn. Finally, like
contact tracing, the efficacy of SNAs in the field of epidemiology remains un416
clear.
Innovative strategies like SNA, nonetheless, demonstrate new guidance for
public health efforts. In weighing the benefits of SNA and the drawbacks of
contact tracing, public health authorities should consider SNA in combination
with contact tracing on a reduced scale, limited to those environments in which
417
contact tracing is demonstrated to be more effective.
VII. CONCLUSION
From its origins in the practice of reglementation to its development during
the syphilis epidemic to its modern application in the HIV/AIDS epidemic,
partner notification has been motivated by the moral imperative to notify and
protect persons who are unaware of their risk of STD exposure. Few people
question the underlying morality of open and honest information in relation to a
“hidden epidemic.” The consequences of partner notification are complex, however, and are not uniformly beneficial to infected persons, their partners, and the
community. Even though the practice is defensible on normative grounds, partner notification has demonstrable flaws. Partner notification presents a cost to
individuals in loss of privacy and in discrimination. For women, it can result in
abandonment, neglect, and abuse. In addition, research data do not demonstrate
convincingly the effectiveness and economic benefits of partner notification. For
these reasons, alternative strategies like social network analysis should be considered to supplement or replace partner notification. Social network analyses,
involving focused education and notification of sub-populations at high risk,
may change risk behaviors without infringing civil liberties.
As seen in the syphilis epidemic, and now experienced in the fight against
HIV, STDs strike vulnerable populations and pose a complex dilemma between
civil liberties and public health. HIV/AIDS eventually will become a chronic,
manageable disease, but its immediate lesson is clear: public health efforts must

414. See Karen Freeman, Statistician Builds What May Be a Better Data Mousetrap, N.Y. TIMES, July
8, 1997, at C8.
415. See Friedman, supra note 406, at 523.
416. But see id. at 524 (“Research to develop and field-test ways to combine contact tracing with
rapid-ascertainment network techniques could provide an important tool for preventing epidemic
outbreaks of a range of parenterally and sexually transmitted diseases.”).
417. See id. at 524 (recommending that network techniques should be used for “[s]pecific research projects . . . [where they] may provide better data”); Rothenberg & Narramore, supra note
406, at 29.
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be modeled within societal realities. Relics of the past, such as contact tracing,
must conform to modern understandings of privacy, women’s rights, and perhaps most important, a rigorous determination of public health efficacy and costefficiency.

